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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(2)(h)(1988). 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dated December 
7, 1988. A copy of said Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum 
1. 
-iii-
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the 
December, 1985 trustee's sale was valid. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in awarding 
attorney's fees and costs of court to defendant and not to 
plaintiff, when plaintiff was the prevailing party in the action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, Occidental Nebraska Federal Savings Bank 
brought on action against defendants Daniel S. Mehr, Kathryn C. 
Mehr, Daniel S. Mehr II, and Deborah L. Mehr seeking a deficiency 
judgment resulting from a trustee's sale which took place in 
April of 1986. Defendants answered contending that a trustee's 
sale which occurred in December 1985 on the same property was 
valid and therefore the April trustee's sale had no effect. 
Plaintiff argued that, as a matter of law, the 
December, 1985 trustee's sale was invalid since the statutory 
requirements governing non-judicial foreclosures were not 
complied with in that three months did not elapse from the 
recording of an Amended Notice of Default before a Notice of Sale 
was sent. Therefore, the April, 1986 trustee's sale was valid 
since the statutory mandates were complied with. 
Defendants contended that the December, 1985 trustee's 
sale was valid since the statutory requirements for a non-
judicial foreclosure were substantially complied with and 
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therefore the April, 1985 trustee's sale was invalid and did not 
create a deficiency. 
The case was tried before a jury with the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup presiding. The parties stipulated to all the 
facts except for the fair market value issue which was presented 
to the jury. After the jury returned with its decision as to 
valuation, the Court held that the December 1985, trustee's sale 
was valid and that the April, 1986 trustee's sale was of no 
effect. The Court entered a deficiency judgment against 
defendants in the principle amount of $7,339.44 based on the 
December 16, 1985, trustee's sale. The Court also awarded 
attorneys fees and costs to the defendants in the amount of 
$4,451.98, to be offset against the judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts presented below were stipulated to by the 
parties at the beginning of the trial. 
1. On January 28, 1983, defendants obtained a loan 
from Richards Woodbury Mortgage Corp. secured by a trust deed on 
certain real property located in Uintah County, Utah. The loan 
was subsequently assigned to plaintiff. (Plaintiff's First 
Amended Complaint paragraph 3, defendants answer paragraph 3). 
2. Defendants fell behind in their obligation to pay 
the debt and plaintiff, on July 26, 1985, caused to be recorded a 
Notice of Default. The July 26, 1985 Notice of Default omitted a 
portion of the property to be foreclosed. A copy of the Notice 
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of Default is attached as Exhibit MAM. (See court transcript p. 
4, lines 5-12). 
3. Thereafter, plaintiff caused to be recorded on 
September 9, 1985, an Amended Notice of Default which fully 
described the property to be sold. (See court transcript p. 4, 
lines 13-18). 
4. A Notice of Sale was mailed to the defendants on 
November 13, 1985 scheduling a trustee's sale for December 16, 
1985. (See court transcript p. 4, lines 19-21). 
5. Less than three months had transpired since the 
date the Amended Notice of Default was recorded (September 9, 
1985) and the Notice of Sale went out (November 13, 1985). Three 
months had passed since the recording of the first Notice of 
Default (July 26, 1985). 
6. On December 16, 1985, a Trustee's Sale was held, 
and the only bid entered was by plaintiff in the amount of 
$983,086.33. (See court transcript p. 4, lines 22-25). 
7. Prior to the expiration of three months from the 
December 16, 1985 trustee's sale, plaintiff filed a deficiency 
action against the defendants. 
8. It was thereafter determined by the beneficiary 
and the trustee that a defective procedure had occurred in the 
foreclosure process. In March 1986, plaintiff then caused a 
Notice of Sale to be sent to the defendants which notice 
indicated that a trustee's sale would take place on April 16, 
1986. (See court transcript p. 5, lines 1-10). 
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9. On April 16, 1986, a trustee's sale was held and 
the plaintiff, the only bidder, was the successful bidder with a 
bid of $400,000.00. (See court transcript p. 5, lines 7-10). 
10. Plaintiff then amended the complaint previously 
filed to reflect the April 1986 trustee's sale and seeking a 
deficiency judgment in the amount of $608,287.61. 
11. Defendants denied liability and argued that the 
first sale in December of 1985 was valid and that the April 1986 
trustee's sale had no effect. 
12. The trial Court held that the December, 1985 
trustee's sale was valid and that therefore the April, 1986 sale 
was of no effect. The Court then entered a deficiency judgment 
against defendants, as of December 16, 1985, of $7,339.44 based 
on the difference between the bid amount of $983,086.33 and the 
debt of $970,425.77. The Court also awarded attorney's fees and 
costs to the defendants in the amount of $4,451.98, to be offset 
against the judgment in favor of plaintiff. (See court 
transcript p. 10, lines 6-14). 
13. The trial Court based its ruling on the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision of Concepts, Inc. v. First Security 
Realty Serv.. 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987). (See Court Transcript 
p. 4, lines 1-4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff argues that the December 1985 trustee's sale was 
invalid because the Notice of Sale was sent out before three 
months had passed from the recording of the Amended Notice of 
4 
Default as required by Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967). The trial 
court improperly granted costs and attorney's fees to defendant 
since plaintiff was the prevailing party and was thus entitled to 
its attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 
(1985). 
The trial court's ruling was made as a "matter of law" 
and the appellate court, in its review, need not give any 
deference to the lower court's decision but should review the 
decision to determine if, based on the stipulated facts, it was 
correct as a matter of law. City of West Jordan v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd.. 767 P.2d 530, 98 UAR 37, 38 (Utah 1988). 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DECEMBER 1985 TRUSTEE'S SALE IS INVALID SINCE 
THREE MONTH DID NOT ELAPSE FROM THE RECORDING OF 
THE AMENDED NOTICE OF DEFAULT TO THE DATE THE 
NOTICE OF SALE WAS SENT OUT. CONTRARY TO THE 
REQUIREMENT OF UTAH CODE ANN. $57-1-24 (1967). 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967), Sale of trust property by 
trustee - Notice of Default, provides: 
The power of sale herein conferred upon the 
trustee shall not be exercised until: 
(a) the trustee shall first file for record, in 
the office of the recorder of each county wherein 
the trust property or some part or parcel thereof 
is situated, a notice of default, identifying the 
trust deed by stating the name of the trustor 
named therein and giving the book and page where 
the same is recorded or a description of the trust 
property, and containing a statement that a breach 
of an obligation for which the trust property was 
conveyed as security has occurred, and setting 
forth the nature of such breach and of his 
election to sell or cause to be sold such property 
to satisfy the obligation; 
5 
(b) not less than three months shall thereafter 
elapse; and 
(c) after the lapse of at least three months the 
trustee shall give notice of sale as provided in 
this act. 
Emphasis added. 
In this case a Notice of Default was recorded on July 
26, 1985. The July Notice of Default did not contain a complete 
description of the property to be sold at the trustee's sale. It 
did not include Lots 21, 22 and 23 of Central Park, Plat A, a 
proposed subdivision. To correct that omission, an Amended 
Notice of Default was recorded on September 9, 1985. The Amended 
Notice of Default provided, on page 2, that the defendants had 
ninety (90) days from its recording date to cure the default. As 
stated, Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967) requires three months to 
expire after the recording of the notice of default before the 
trustee can give notice of the trustee sale. In this case that 
would have been December 9, 1985. However, in the present case, 
the Notice of Sale was sent out on November 13, 1985 almost a 
month before the expiration of the statutory three month 
reinstatement period and clearly prior to the expiration of the 
90 day cure period provided in the Amended Notice of Default. 
The trustee's sale that then occurred in December of 1985 was 
invalid because the trustee cannot exercise the power of sale 
conferred by Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967) until the required 
steps are complied with. A noted commentator stated: 
Institution of the [private foreclosure] 
proceeding is governed by the terms of the mortgage 
where no statue prevails; but where a statute 
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prescribes the method, that should be followed. If the 
notice, and the advertising, do not comply with these 
commands, the sale will be ineffective;.... 
G. Glenn, Glenn on Mortgages § 107 (1943). Since the 
requirements of the non-judicial foreclosure statute were not 
complied with the December 1985 trustee's sale was ineffective. 
The trial court held that Concepts, supra was 
controlling in the present case. Plaintiff contends the Courtfs 
holding is in error. The facts in the instant case are 
significantly different from the facts in Concepts. The facts in 
Concepts centered around the question of whether or not a 
typographical error in the published notice of sale with respect 
to the year the sale was to occur was sufficiently irregular to 
invalidate the sale. The question in this case centers around 
the question of whether or not the Amended Notice of Default had 
any impact on the non-judicial sale of foreclosure sale of 
December 1985 and whether or not the scheduling of the December 
1985 trustee's sale prior to the expiration of three months from 
the recording date of the Amended Notice of Default was a 
sufficient irregularity to invalidate the December 1985 trustee's 
sale. 
In Concepts the lender failed to file its deficiency 
action within the three month period provided by Utah Code Ann. 
§57-1-32 (1985). Upon recognizing that failure, the lender in 
Concepts then attempted to take advantage of the fact that the 
published notice of sale contained a typographical error with 
respect to in what year the sale was to take place even though 
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the notice of sale itself clearly indicated the correct year. 
In the case at bar, Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967) 
clearly mandates that three months must expire before the Notice 
of Sale can be sent out. There can be no dispute that 
requirement was not complied with if the three month period to 
reinstate began upon the recording of the Amended Notice of 
Default. However, the trial Court in its decision, chose to 
completely ignore the Amended Notice of Default. No explanation 
or reasoning was provided as to why the Amended Notice of Default 
did not automatically give the defendants three months from the 
date of its recording to cure the default. Instead the trial 
court held that the July 1985 Notice of Default was correct and 
that three months expired from the date of its recording before 
the Notice of Sale was sent out and therefore the December 1985 
trustee's sale was valid. 
Plaintiff contends such reasoning is in error. 
Although plaintiff found no cases on point, in favor of either 
side, as to what impact an amended notice of default has on a 
reinstatement period, plaintiff contends that it is illogical and 
a dangerous precedent to rule that a notice of default can be 
arbitrarily ignored as it was in this case. 
The statutory law with respect to non-judicial 
foreclosures clearly provides that three months must expire from 
the recording of the notice of default before a notice of sale 
can be given. Thus, upon the recording of the Amended Notice of 
Default in September of 1985 the defendants and any other 
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interested third parties were automatically given three months 
from the day of the recording to reinstate the loan. To hold 
otherwise would create a state of uncertainty in the non-
judicial foreclosure process since it would be unclear when an 
amended notice of default provided three months in which the 
debtor can cure or whether or not such amended notice of default 
had no impact on the already running three month period from the 
recording of the first notice of default. Utah Code Ann. §57-1-
24 (1967) unmistakenly provides that three months must expire 
from the recording of the notice of default before a notice of 
sale can be sent out. Despite the language of that statute, the 
trial court ruled, based on the holding in the Concepts case that 
the foreclosure process leading to the December 1985 sale was 
complied with. As stated, however, the Concepts case should not 
be controlling in this situation because of the wide difference 
in the facts of the two cases. 
Since the power of sale system reduces the prohibitive 
costs of a judicial foreclosure and conserves judicial resources 
by providing an expeditious non-judicial means of foreclosure, it 
ultimately benefits all parties involved in real estate 
transactions. Those parties all have a legitimate interest in 
enforcing society's demands for strict compliance with power of 
sale procedures. Strict compliance with the requirements of a 
trustee's sale preserves the integrity of the trustee's sale 
process for all parties concerned with that system by reducing 
the need for judicial supervision of the process, thereby 
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enhancing its use because of the savings in cost and time that 
are inherent in a non-judicial process. It is unjust to allow 
the defendants to avoid liability for the debt which they freely 
entered into. They received their benefit of the bargain but the 
plaintiff is being precluded from obtaining the benefits of the 
bargain it entered into which is extremely unjust. Sales can be 
set aside in cases which reach unjust extremes. Concepts, supra 
at 1159 (Utah 1987). In this case the December 1985 sale should 
be determined to be invalid and the April sale valid. 
B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
DEFENDANT WHEN PLAINTIFF WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY. 
The lower court erred in granting attorney fees and 
costs to the defendants. In actions dealing with trust deeds, 
the prevailing party is entitled to collect its costs and 
reasonable attorney fees. The last sentence of Utah Code Ann. 
§57-1-32 (1985) states, M[i]n any action brought under this 
section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect his 
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action 
under this section." 
In this case, the Plaintiff sought relief under Utah Code 
Ann. §57-1-32 (1985) and obtained judgment in its favor and is 
thus the prevailing party. The trial court found a deficiency of 
$7,339.44 in favor of plaintiff. A "prevailing party" has 
repeatedly been defined by courts in many jurisdictions as the 
party which is predominant in a law suit and is one who 
successfully prosecutes the action even though not to the extent 
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of his original contention and is one in whose favor the decision 
or verdict is rendered and the judgment entered. See Buza v. 
Columbia Lumber Company, 395 P.2d 511, 514 (Alaska 1964); Travner 
v. Cushing. 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984); Davson v. Shearer. 337 P.2d 
46, 48 (Wash. 1959); City of Yakutut v. Rvman, 654 P.2d 785, 793 
(Alaska 1982); Medhus v. Putter. 603 P.2d 669, 674 (Mont. 1979). 
Merely because plaintiff did not recover all that it claimed 
does not mean it did not prevail. It received a judgment in its 
favor and therefor has prevailed. A prevailing party is a party 
in whose favor the judgment or the verdict is to be entered. See 
Haven v. Amrine, 727 P.2d 533, 535 (Mont. 1986); State v. Alaska 
Intern Air, Inc.. 562 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Alaska 1977); Moritzkv v. 
Heberlein, 697 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Wash. App. 1985). For example, 
in Haven, supra at 535, the court defined prevailing party as 
"the one who has an affirmative judgment rendered in his or her 
favor at the conclusion of* the entire case." Plaintiff has 
obtained a verdict in its favor and is therefor the prevailing 
party and is entitled to its costs and reasonable attorneys fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court erred in ruling that the July 1985 
Notice of Default was appropriate and that the September 1985 
Amended Notice of Default had no impact on the three month 
reinstatement period thereby validating the December 1985 
trusteed sale. Utah Code Ann. §57-1-24 (1967) clearly provides 
that three months must elapse from the recording of the notice of 
default before notice of sale can be given. There is no question 
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that the three month cure period did not elapse from the date of 
recording of the Amended Notice of Default before the Notice of 
Sale went out in November of 1985• This is clearly a violation 
of the non-judicial foreclosure statute which invalidates the 
December 1985 trustee's sale. There is no basis or reasoning or 
grounds to simply ignore the recording of the Amended Notice of 
Default and treat it as if it had no impact on the foreclosure 
process. As such the Court should rule that the December 1985 
trustee's sale was invalid and that the April 1986 was valid and 
enter judgment accordingly. Additionally, since a judgment was 
entered in favor of the plaintiff, even though for a much less 
amount than prayed for, Plaintiff is still the prevailing the 
party and is entitled to its attorney's fees pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §57-1-32 (1985). 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of April, 1989. 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON, JENSEN, 
KESLER & SWINTON 
s^ Glen W. Roberts 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 





DANIEL S. MEHR, KATHRYN C. 
MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II, and 
DEBORAH L. MEHR, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-86-1905 
In this matter, a trial by jury was held on February 2 and 
3, 1988, before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. At the conclusion 
of the trial, the issue of valuation of the real property as of 
December 16, 1985 and April 16, 1986 was submitted to the jury. 
The Court determined that the question regarding the validity of 
the December 16, 1985 sale was a legal issue and therefore did 
not submit that issue to the jury. 
On February 3, 1988, the jury returned its findings and 
found that the fair market value of the real property, as of 
December 16, 1985, was $425,000.00 and as of April 16, 1986 was 
$375,000.00. The Court held that the December 16, 1985 trustees 
sale was valid and therefore the April 16, 1986 trustees sale was 
of no effect. Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the 
amount of indebtedness owed to the plaintiff by defendants, 
including attorneys fees and costs, as of December 16, 1985 was 
$970,425.77. A bid of $963,086.33 was made by plaintiff and 
accepted by the trustee and was then applied against the amount 
owing on the Note. Thus, a deficiency of $7,339.44 as of 
December 16, 1985 resulted and is payable by defendants to the 
plaintiff. The Court further awarded defendants their costs and 
attorneys fees in the amount of $4,451.98. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
as follows: 
1. JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANTS in favor 
of plaintiff for the amount of $7,338.94 which represents the 
aforementioned deficiency against defendants, plus interest from 
December 16, 1985 through Ootoboa.JH>7 1988 at the Note default 
rate of sixteen and one-half percent (16.5%) per annum in the 
amount of $"$+£ A1, ftf , plus after accruing interest at the Note 
default rate/until paid in full. 
2. JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED AGAINST PLAINTIFF in favor 
of defendants in the amount of $4,451.98 which represents 
defendants1 attorneys fees and costs. u&^£ c t ^ ^ J ^ Z l . c$f^)rT~ 
3. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the judgment amounts against 
plaintiff and defendants shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorneys fees expended in collecting said 
judgments by execution or otherwise as shall be established by 
affidavit.
 n 
DATED this 1 day of gOtoubui, 1988. 
BY /THE COUET.J 
Judge Kenneth I^tgt^up 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
Lynn S. Davies, 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the following Judgment, by depositing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, on this ffi&l day of October, 1988, 
to the following: 
Lynn S. Davies 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CSB Towers, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Sal t Lake City, Utah 84110 
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CONCEPTS, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and Ray Pry, individually, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, formerly 
known as Utah Mortgage Loan Corpo-
ration, a Utah corporation, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 20144. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 1, 1987. 
Trustors under trust deeds executed 
and delivered for development of real prop-
erty brought action seeking declaratory 
judgment that trustee's sale conducted un-
der power of sale provision in trust deed 
was valid, and that trustee was precluded 
from, rescheduling second sale of same 
property. The Third District Court, Sum-
mit County, Philip Fishier, J., held that 
trustee's sale was void, and trustors ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court held that (1) 
validity-of sale-was not affected by minor 
typographical error in publication of notice 
of foreclosure sale which stated that sale 
would take place in previous year, and (2) 
trustee's failure to bring deficiency action 
within three months after sale* of property 
terminated all of-trustors' remaining obli-
gations. 
Reversed. 
1. Mortgages *»369(7) 
Party who seeks to have trustee sale 
set aside for irregularity, want of notice, or 
fraud has burden of proving his contention, 
it being presumed, in absence of evidence 
to contrary, that sale was regular. 
2. Mortgages *»369(2) 
Defects in notice of foreclosure sale 
that will authorize setting aside of sale 
must be those that would have effect of 
chilling bidding and causing inadequacy of 
3. Mortgages *=»354 
Notice of trustee's foreclosure sale 
was not rendered invalid by fact that publi-
cation dated 1988 stated that sale would 
take place in 1982. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-26. 
4. Mortgages *»375 
Trustee which purchased property b 
foreclosure sale could not bring deficiency 
action three months after sale, where valid-
ity of sale was not affected by minor typo* 
graphical error in publication of notice of 
foreclosure sale. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-25. 
5. Mortgages «=»3e9<2, 3) 
Sale once made will not be set aside 
unless interests of debtor were sacrificed 
or there was some attendant fraud or un-
fair dealing. 
6. Mortgages *»335 
Maker of deed of trust with power of 
sale may condition exercise of power upon 
such conditions as he may describe. 
7. Mortgages ^*375 
Once trust deed sale has been made, 
trustee's exclusive remedy for deficiency is 
to institute deficiency action within three 
months of date of sale. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-
28(2), 57-1-32. 
B. Ray Zoll, Tom D. Branch, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
James Gilson, Salt Lake City, for defend-
ant and respondent 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judg-
ment in a declaratory judgment action, de-
claring a trustee's sale conducted under a 
power of sale provision in a trust deed void 
as a matter of law for failure to comply 
with section 57-1-25 of the Utah Convey-
ances Act We reverse. 
Plaintiffs were trustors under trust 
deeds executed and delivered to defendant 
for the development of real property into 
the Park West Condominiums in Park City, 
Utah. The amount of the loan exceeded 
$3,000,000. When plaintiffs failed to per 
form under the trust deed notes and loan 
agreements, defendant filed a notice of de-
CONCEPTS, INC. v. FIRST SEC. REALTY SERV. Utah 1159 
Cite a* 743 ?2d 1158 (Uuh 1987) 
fault. On September 14, 1983, plaintiffs 
were served with a notice of sale to beheld 
on October 28, 1983. In compliance with 
statutory requirements, the notice was also 
posted on the property to be sold and in 
three public places in Summit County. De-
fendant also caused the notice to be pub-
lished in the Salt Lake Tribune on October 
3, 10, and 17 of 1983, as evidenced by an 
affidavit of publication. The notice was 
dated "This First Day of October 1983" 
and stated that the property "mil be sold 
. . . at the Summit County Courthouse . . . 
on October 28, 1982...." (Emphasis add-
ed.) Defendant-was the only .purchaser 
and .bidder at the sale. Although neither 
party has apprised this Court of the 
amount of the bid, it is our understanding 
that defendant bid an amount substantially 
less than the outstanding balance due un-
der the notes. The trustee passed'title*to 
defendant by^ virtue**6f aHxustee's deed. 
On April 2, 1984, and April 30, 1984, 
plaintiffs were served with a ten-day sum-
mons advising them that an action had 
been commenced to "recover deficiency due 
under notes dated November 17, 1981, and 
February 2, 1982." An affidavit in the 
record indicates that plaintiffs' attorney re-
fused to stipulate to the timeliness of the 
action l and was informed by counsel for 
defendant that a sale of the property would 
be rescheduled because of the typographi-
cal error in the Salt Lake Tribune notice 
misstating the year of the sale. This ac-
tion ensued, with claims for declaratory 
relief, injunction, and damages. 
The parties stipulated that the facts were 
not in dispute and that the solejegal issue 
before the trial court-was the validity of 
the sale on October.„28, 1983. Because 
disposition of a case by summary judgment 
denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, 
we review the facts and inferences in the 
light most favorable to the party against 
whom the judgment-was-granted. Atlas 
Corp. v. The Clovis National Bank, 737 
P.2d 225 (Utah 1987). Where, as here, 
summary judgment is granted as a matter 
of law rather than fact, we are free to 
1. Section £ k W 2 icrf.the XJtalfConveyances Act 
requires aiuw^onitoii^ecover^the'-balancc due 
upon the °M[gayfffl Jjff^&ch ^hesmatt-deed 
reappraise the trial court's legal conclu-
sions. Id.; Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick 
Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 
1986). 
[1,2] The purpfcse^f-strict notice re-
quirement* in A nonjudicial aale of property 
secured by trust deed is to inform persons 
w t^h~an interest 4n the property of the 
pending sale of-that property, so that they 
may act to protect^those interests. Mor-
rell v. Arctic Trading Co., Inc., 21 Wash. 
App. 302, 584 P.2d 983 (1978). The objec-
tive of the notice is to prevent a sacrifice of 
the property. If that objective is attained, 
immaterial errors and mistakes will not 
affect the sufficiency of the notice or the 
sale^jnade .pursuant thereto. Russell v. 
Webster Springs National Bank, 164 
W.Va. 708, 265 S.E.2d 762 (1980). A party 
who seeks to have a trustee sale set aside 
for irregularityrwant of notice, or fraud 
has the"burden*>f proving his contention, it 
being presumed, inJhe absence of evidence 
to the contrary t^hat^ the sale.was regular. 
Id. Defects in -the -notice of foreclosure 
sale that will authorize the setting aside of 
the sale must be those that would have the 
effect of chilling the bidding and causing 
an inadequacy /of price. Boyce v. Hughes, 
241 Ga. 357, 245 S.E.2d 308 (1978). The 
remedy of setting aside the sale will be 
applied^only in.cases which reach unjust 
extremes. McHugh v. Church, 583 P.2d 
210 (Alaska 1978). 
With these guidelines before us, we ex-
amine the case at hand. The parties do not 
dispute the fact that the statutory notice 
requirements were strictly observed, ex-
cept that the notice by publication dated 
October 1, 1983, stated that the sale would 
take place on October 28, 1982. Errors like 
these do not normally operate to vitiate a 
foreclosure sale. Russell, supra (sale was 
advertised for 10:00 a.m., EDT, on Novem-
ber 4, when on that date EST was in effect. 
Held: no substantial departure from provi-
sions .of trust deed or notice of sale as to 
vitiate sale); Lovell v. Rov>an Mutual Fire 
Insurance Co., 46 N.C.App. 150, 264 
was givenm&8BM&f$9Jbc„ commenced within 
three monUtfatftesahe'aale of the property un-
dcPBtnttt-ideed.-
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S.E.2d 743 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 
802 N.C. 160, 274 S.E.2d 170 (1981) (notice 
of foreclosure hearing was improperly giv-
en as S January 1978 when sent in Decem-
ber of 1978. H e l d ^ b y i o u s l y .inadvertent 
error was not enough to invalidate proceed-
ings); Hankins v. Administrator of Veter-
ans Affairs, 92 Nev. 578, 555 P.2d 483 
(1976) (sale was erroneously advertised to 
take place in North Las Vegas. Held:-pro-
ceedings jvere£notJqvalidated asjplaintiffs 
were^ot^ni%lj^J^-*mistake); Bailey v. 
Pioneer Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation, 210 Va. 558, 172 S.E.2d 730 (1970) 
(first notice by publication left out place of 
sale. Held:-substantial compliance with 
the requirements of the trust deed was 
sufficient, so long as
 7 parties were not af-
fectSdMn alfnatenal way); Holzman v. 
Bristol County Savings Bank, 277 Mass. 
383, 178 N.E. 622 (1931) (notice stated that 
sale would be held June 9 "at 10 o'clock in 
the forenoon." The year was left o u t 
Held: no one was likely to be misled by the 
omission from the notices in what year the 
sale .-was to take place). But, where the 
erroneous date had the effect of not adver-
tising the sale at all, the court held that 
presumably no one was informed of the 
actual date. Booker v. Federal Land 
Bank of New Orleans, 175 Miss. 281, 164 
So. 877 (1936). 
[3] The facts here are similar to those 
in Russell, Lovell, and Holzman, The lan-
guage of the notice by publication is in 
futuro, advising the public that the sale 
will be held at a future date. As such, it 
can hardly be argued, nor does defendant 
argue, that the notice confused bidders or 
resulted in an undervaluation of the proper-
ty. Defendant's at*tefnent that the incor-
rtet date'had the potential to mislead pro-
•pectiwbidders it insufficient to conclude 
titetftin fact did. 
14) Defendant received the trustee's 
deed after the foreclosure sale of October 
28,1988. Though the presumption of valid-
ity of sale is not conclusive and may be 
rebutted, Houston First American Sav-
ings v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.1988), 
section <67-l-£8(l) at the>Utah Conveyances 
Act state 4hat**citto%irtrust&'s deed 
avfliTinirniK>mp^ttnA^a*r**'*>,*a^l>*T>f*w*ir «**"Mi-*^ 
suchtCompliance-and^are^conchiSTve evi-
dence in^favorof bona fide purchasers and 
encumbrancers Jor^yalue and without no-
tjpe. See also Triano v. First American 
Title Insurance Co. of Arizona, 181 Ariz 
581, 643 P.2d 26 (1982). Defendant does 
not argue that it did not pay value, nor that 
it had notice of any irregularities in the 
foreclosure proceedings at the time of sale. 
Nonetheless, defendant now argues that as 
beneficiary under,the trust deed and pur-
chaser at ,aale, Jt jvas -not -qualified as a 
bona, fide purchaser, so AS to be entitled "to 
rely on the recitals in-the deed he receives 
from the trustee -sfter-the sale" (citing 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 303 
(Utah 1978)). Although .^e agree that de-
fendant ^ a s ^ w t ^ ^ i u ^ i i d e purchaser, 
that factxioes not change the result in this 
case. 
[5,6] Defendant's argument that the 
flaw in the notice by publication invalidated 
the sale to it perverts and uses as a sword 
a statute that was meant to shield the 
property rights of a trustor. A sale once 
made will
 ;not be set aside unless the inter-
ests of^e<iebtor^wprt sacrificed or there 
was *ojpe-attendant f raud o r unfair deal-
ing. McHue v. Church, 583 P.2d at 215, 
216. The maker of the deed of trust with 
power of sale may condition the exercise of 
the power upon such conditions as he may 
describe. Houston First American Sav-
ings, 650 S.W.2d at 768. Indeed, defendant 
itself, in its memorandum in support of 
motion for summary judgment, as well u 
in its argument before this Court, repeated-
ly concedes that the right to set aside s 
trustee's sale is predicated upon the impair-
ment of the trustor's rights to the proper-
ty. MPublicatkm-omioea^pp(>tect^the debt-
or's intereat^and s ^ e ] ^ ensure the fair-
nets wof^the-aaie throughjcompetitive bxi-
d ing ,^us z #ecur ing- t i j eyh igh^^p6M^W 
prices"-(citing Comments, Validity of Pow-
er of Sale and Procedural Considerations 
in Its Exercise, 16 U.Kan.LRev. 611, 617 
(1968)). The rea^Qj^or^trictj^ 
with titfTOttttsHWfn*^^ 
o U ^ t | f ^ ^ ' : ( c i t i n g University Savings 
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grantor of the power is entitled to have his 
directions obeyed; to have the proper no-
tice of sale given; to have it to take place 
at the time and place, and by the person 
appointed by him" (citing Houston First 
American Savings, 650 S.W.2d at 768, and 
quoting from Fuller v. O'Neal, 69 Tex. 
349, 6 S.W. 181 (1887)). "The right of a 
grantor of a deed of trust to have its 
provision strictly complied with to effect a 
valid foreclosure sale is absolute" (citing 
Harwath v. Hudson, 654 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. 
App.1983)). "Statutes making recitals in a 
trustee's deed conclusive evidence of their 
truth, may operate to deprive the trustor 
(or those claiming under him) of property 
without cfue process of faw, i.e., tfie oppor-
tunity for an individualized hearing" (citing 
P. Basye, Clearing Land Titles § 43, at 
168-69 (1983 Supp.)). (All emphases ours.) 
[7] In short, there is nothing in defend-
ant's argument that would persuade us to 
adopt defendant's reasoning. The statutes 
governing foreclosure sales under trust 
deeds protected the interests of plaintiffs 
up to the moment that the property was 
sold and a trustee's deed issued. There-
after, the trustee's deed operated to convey 
to defendant, without right of redemption 
by plaintiffs, title to the property of plain-
tiffs and all parties claiming under them. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28(2) (1986). De-
fendant thereafter had three months to in-
stitute action to recover any balance due on 
the obligation for which the trust deeds 
were given as security. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-J-32. Once a trust deed sale has 
been made, that remedy is the exclusive 
remedy under statute. Cox v. Green, 696 
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985). 
We hold that the trustee's sale on Octo-
ber 28,*1988;*wa8~ properly advertised and 
that the notice published in the Salt Lake 
Tribune substantially complied with our 
statutory requirements. Inasmuch as the 
validity of the sale was not affected by the 
minor typographical error, the trustee's 
deed validly conveyed to defendant all of 
plaintiffs' right, title, and interest in the 
property, subject only to plaintiffs' continu-
ing liability for any remaining deficiency. 
Defendant's failure to bring a deficiency 
o«4^« «rifVim thro* mnnthg after the sale of 
the property terminated all of plaintiffs' 
remaining obligations, and defendant's at-
tempt aUrescheduling the same property 
for a second sale ^ as^improper as a matter 
of 4aw. 
The judgment is reversed. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, 
having disqualified himself, does not 
participate herein. 
| MY MUMMR SYSTIM> 
TRUE-FLO MECHANICAL SYSTEMS, 
INC., Plaintiff, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, De-
partment of Employment Security, De-
fendant 
No. 860281. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 9, 1987. 
Rehearing Denied Oct 21, 1987. 
Board of Review of Industrial Commis-
sion found that electrical contractor was 
Successor for purposes of ch&rgwg prede-
lessor's unpaid unemployment benefit 
Costs to electrical contractor's account in 
determining contractor's contribution rate. 
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that 
(1) contractor "acquired" substantially all 
ftssets of its predecessor for purposes of 
charging predecessor's unpaid unemploy-
ment benefit costs to contractor's account, 
even though contractor leased assets from 
actual purchasers; (?) evidence that prede-
cessor advised Department of Employment 
Security to close its employer's account 
following sale of its assets, together with 
Evidence that predecessor filed wage report 
tor last quarter showing no payroll, was 
Sufficient to support finding of Board of 
CODE• Co 
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Hted by designating that 4ts payment of 
$191,463.40 • be applied * on the principal 
amount of the judgment. A debtor or his 
surety may direct application of his payment 
as may be most advantageous to him. 60 Am. 
Jui. 2d Payment §§95, 130 (1987). Clay & 
Company was '.severally liable for the full 
ainount of the judgment, and when Aetna as 
surety paid the principal amount of the judg-
ment and so designated its payment, it satis-
fied the entire principal amount of the judg-
ment. Vater» Aetna recognized that it was also 
jointly and severally liable for postjudgment 
interest on $75,000 of the judgment. It there-
upon paid plaintiff an additional $25,097.30, 
thereby fully discharging its obligation as a-
judgment debtor and as surety for John Clay 
& Company. 
If plaintiff is unable to recover the balance 
owing him because of the bankruptcy of John 
Clay & Company, the blame must be assigned 
to him for his failure to demand an adequate 
supersedeas bond. 
DURHAM, Justice: (Dissenting) 
I dissent. The plain language of section 15-
4-3 governs the result in this case. Utah Code 
Ann. §15-4-3 (1986) states: 
The amount or value of anv 
consideration received by the 
obligee from one or more of several 
obligors, or from one or more of 
joint or of joint and several obli-
gors, in whole or in partial satisfa-
ction of their obligations shall be 
credited to the extent of the amount 
received on the obligation of all co-
obligors, to whom the obligor or 
obligors giving the consideration did 
not stand in the relation of a surety. 
This statute governs the allocation of the 
amount remaining from the supersedeas bond 
after outstanding interest was paid. Clay, on 
whose behalf the payment was made, gave to 
Jorgcnsen consideration which, according to 
the statute, "shall be credited ... on the obli-
gation of all co-obligors/ §15-4-3. Thus, 
the remaining $140,175.03 should first be 
credited to Aetna and Clay's joint obligation 
of $75,000. Aetna's obligation as a joint 
debtor, and not as a surety, under the trial 
court's judgment is therefore satisfied. 
The majority opinion argues that the rem-
aining amount can be credited to Clay's sep-
arate obligation before being credited to Aetna 
and Clay's joint obligation. This result does 
not fully account for the language found in 
section 15-4-3. First, the statute operates 
when any consideration is received by a jud-
gment debtor. Second, the statute clearly 
contemplates debts owed by* several, and -not 
^y.^olnt , vobligorsj when If ^ includes ^ pbnsideL 
more several obligors*." Finally/the majority** 
construction reriders the statute useless. Jf an 
obligor is able to specify the allocation of his 
payment, section 15-4-3 serves no purpose* 
1
 All funds left after satisfying the joint debt 
should be allocated to Clay's several obliga-
tion. Hence, interacting ^the joint debt 
($75,000) from the remaining funds paid on 
the supersedeas bond ($140,175.03) leaves 
$65,175.03. This amount may be credited to 
Clay's several obligation (consisting of the 
judgment amount of $191n463.40 minus the 
joint debt of $75,000, or $116,463.40). Thus, 
after applying the bond first to interest, then 
to joint obligations, and then to several obli-
gations, $51,288.37 of the original judgment 
remains to be satisfied. This amount, however, 
is part of the purely several obligation owed-
by Clay to Jorgensen. Aetna's duties as a 
joint debtor were fulfilled and its obligations 
satisfied when the amount received by Jorge-
nsen on the supersedeas bond was, after allo-
cation to accrued interest, divided according to 
section 15-4-3. 
I would therefore reverse the trial court's 
order holding Aetna liable to Jorgensen for 
$60,337.68 plus interest owed after April 17, 
1984. 
Cite as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD, et 
at., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20078 
FILED: December 30, 1988 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Honorable David B. Dee 
ATTORNEYS: 
Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for 
appellants 
Mark A. Madsen, Arthur H. Nielsen, and 
Clark R. Nielsen, Salt Lake City, for 
- appellees 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Plaintiffs city of West Jordan, the elected 
mayor and members of the city council, five 
city employees, and two taxpaying ^city resid-
ents/ (hereinafter!/West Jordan0.) ippeal from , 
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defendant Utah State Retirement Board ("the 
Board"). Th<e district court rejected a.variety 
of constitutional challenges mounted by West 
Jordan to portions .of Senate Bill 327, which 
was passed by the 1983 legislature, and to 
certain portions
 rof the underlying statutes 
governing the state retirement system. These 
challenges largely center around amendments 
that S.B. 327 made to the various state retir-
ement programs participated in by West 
Jordan, amendments that expressly deny 
municipalities participating in these programs 
as of January 1, 1982, the right to withdraw 
from membership in the system. We affirm. 
In 1961, the Utah State Legislature created a 
retirement system for all employees of the 
state and its subdivisions. See 1961 Utah Laws 
-chs.> 100-02. Political subdivisions of the 
state were presumed to be members of the 
system but were free to opt out of the plan. Id. 
at § § 5 - 6 . Short ly thereafter , West 
Jordan's city council passed a resolution that 
took. advantage of this option. However, in 
1968 the city reversed itself and joined the 
general state retirement system. In 1979, the 
city also joined Utah's public safety retire-
ment system and, at the same time, enlarged 
its participation in and coverage under the 
general state retirement system. The city relied 
entirely on the state system to provide retire-
ment benefits for its employees until December 
of 1981, when the city obtained supplemental 
Tetirement benefits for some of its employees 
from Beneficial Life Insurance Company 
^'Beneficial Life").. In June of 1982, the city 
council voted to rescind the resolutions of 
-1968 and 1979 requesting membership in the 
state retirement system; West Jordan claimed 
that the effect of this action was to withdraw 
the city entirely from participation in the state 
retirement system. 
Senate Bill 327 was passed by the legislature 
in 1983, apparently in response to attempts by 
West Jordan and other political subdivisions 
to withdraw from the system. It continued the 
presumption that each political subdivision of 
the state is a member of the system, but exp-
licitly provided that any entity which was a 
member as of January 1, 1982, cannot opt out 
of the system and must continue to meet its 
requirements. 1983 Utah Laws ch. 224, §11; 
Utah Code Ann. §49-10-11(1), (2) (Supp. 
1983) (now codified at Utah Code Ann. 
§§49-2-204 , 49-3-204 (Supp. 1987)). 
Any political subdivision that was not a 
member as of January 1982 can elect to be 
excluded from the system only if it does not 
choose to provide any retirement benefits to 
its employees. If it .chooses to provide bene-
fits, it must do so through the state retirement 
system!* 1983 Utah Laws ch. 224, §11; Utah 
C o d e ' A n n . §49-10-11(2) v(Supp,.;. 1983) 
(now; codified atlUtahl-Code :AnnT §$49-2£| 
2M:49&m(Su$Xi9fhKIt *QkkdL$l3LSt i 
Jordan filed the present action,^ seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the provisions of 
the bill and some of the provisions of the 
underlying retirement system statutes violate 
both the state and federal constitutions. The 
trial court rejected these arguments in a 
memorandum decision denying West Jordan's 
motion for summary judgment. The trial court 
then granted the Board's motion for summary 
judgment, upholding the challenged provisions 
of S.B. 327 and of the underlying retirement 
system statutes. On appeal, West Jordan rea-
sserts a number of the claims raised below. 
Before reviewing these claims, we note that 
the appeal before us presents questions of law 
only. Therefore, we review the legal conclus-
ions supporting the summary judgment for 
correctness. E.g., Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 
(1988); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 1985). 
Underlying many of West Jordan's challe-
nges to the constitutionality of S.B. 327 is the 
claim that by denying members the right to 
withdraw unilaterally from participation in the 
retirement system, S.B. 327 alters system 
members' rights and obligations. West 
Jordan's premise is that it had the right to 
withdraw at will from participation in the 
system before the passage of S.B. 327. To the 
extent that this premise is unsound, we need 
not address arguments based on it. 
When the city petitioned to join the state 
retirement system in 1968, the statutes creating 
that system were silent on the right of 
members to withdraw. The question, then, is 
whether that silence indicates legislative intent 
either to grant or to deny members the right to 
withdraw. From the system's inception, its 
design has been such that certainty and stabi-
lity of membership is necessary to achieve the 
actuarial soundness sought by the legislature. 
This objective could easily be imperiled if 
political subdivisions that had joined the 
system were free to withdraw at any time. This 
suggests that under the terms of the original 
statute, no such right was intended to be given 
to those opting to join the system. Confirm-
atory evidence of this intention is the applic-
ation form the city filed in 1979 to expand its 
participation in the retirement system and to 
join the public safety retirement system. That 
application plainly .tates that enrollment in 
the system is permanent and members may not 
withdraw. Finally, S.B. 327 states in its prea-
mble that it is a clarification of the laws as 
they exist. See 1983 Utah Laws ph. 224 prea-
mble. Under these circumstances, we conclude 
that legislative silence at.the time the system 
was created does got indicate that members 
would, be
 w free * t6 withdraw at any time. 
%&h±h wec*ncludc that thissilenceibbuldbe 
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rawal was not permitted. Therefore, the city 
never had the right to ^ withdraw unilaterally 
from participation in the system, and we fund 
no merit in West Jordan's claims to the extent 
that they are based on the presumption that 
members could freely withdraw from the 
system prior to S.B. 327's enactment. 
Moving on to West Jordan's remaining 
challenges, we begin with the presumption of 
validity that must be accorded legislative 
enactments when attacked on constitutional 
grounds. The burden is on those who would 
have us strike down an act. See, e.g., Lehi 
City v. Mciling, 87 Utah 237, 246-47, 48 
P.2d 530, 535 (1935). In that light, we first 
consider West Jordan's claim that S.B. 327 
and the underlying retirement statutes2 violate 
article VI, section 28 of the Utah Constitution, 
which- denies the legislature authority to 
"delegate to any special commission, private 
corporation or association, any power ... to 
perform any municipal functions/ Utah 
Const, art. VI, §28. This argument takes 
several forms. First, West Jordan focuses on 
the fact that as a result of the changes made 
by S.B. 327, if any municipality chooses to 
provide retirement benefits to its employees, it 
must become a member of the state retirement 
system and offer at least the benefits required 
of system members. West Jordan seems to 
contend that somehow the fact that member-
ship in the state system is now mandatory 
rather than voluntary amounts to a violation 
of article VI, section 28. This claim is merit-
less. 
Article VI, section 28 prohibits only the 
legislature's delegating certain powers relative 
to municipal matters to a special commission. 
By requiring that municipalities offering reti-
rement benefits do so in part through the state 
retirement system, the legislature has not del-
egated any powers to anyone; it has simply 
regulated how municipalities must perform a 
function, if they choose to do it at all. Article 
VI, section 28 is not implicated by this fact 
alone. Therefore, the validity of the Board's 
place in the retirement system is unaffected by 
the mandatory membership provision of S.B. 
|327. . ' , . 
West Jordan's second argument under 
article VI, section 28 is directed against dele-
gating to the Board responsibility to operate a 
retirement program that covers municipal 
employees. West Jordan contends that the 
Board is a "special commission" and that the 
provision of retirement benefits to municipal 
employees is a "municipal function." For the 
purposes of argument, we will assume that the 
Board constitutes a "special commission," 
although the Utah cases do not give this term 
any clear meaning. See, e.g., Tygesen v. 
Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 279-81, 
226 P.2d 127; 129-31 *(1950); Uhi^City v. 1 
MeWng, 87 Utah at^72-79, 48 P,2d<*t 546- | 
Utah 536, 566-69, 271 P. 961, 972-73 
(1928); id. at 574, 271 P. at 975 (Gideon, J., 
concurring); id. at 577, 271 P. at. 976 
(Woolley, District Judge, concurring). 
The central question, then, is whether the 
Board is performing a "municipal function" 
within the meaning of article VI, section 28. A 
brief background' on that section will be 
helpful. Article VI, section 28 is termed a 
"ripper clause/ See generally Porter, The 
Ripper Clause in State Constitutional Law: An 
Early Urban Experiment-Parts 1 and //, 
1969 Utah L. Rev. 287, 450 [hereinafter 
""Porter"). Its prototype first appeared in 
Pennsylvania in the late 19th century, and it 
was subsequently adopted by a total of eight 
states over the next few years. Id. at 306-11 
& nn. 147-50. The motivation for the Penn-
sylvania clause was to protect local govern-
ment councils from having their particularly 
local functions usurped by special boards or 
commissions that were unrepresentative and 
were often created by the state legislature at 
the behest of special interests. Id. at 306-11. 
These ripper clauses, although often written 
in virtually identical language, have been given 
different interpretations in different states and 
often within one state at different times. See id. 
at 310-11 & nn. 147-50, 481-90. This is 
understandable to some extent because, for 
example, conceptions of what constitutes an 
area of uniquely local concern that ought to 
be under the control of local government-
the concept underlying the ban on delegating 
the "performance of] any municipal funct-
ions "--has varied among states and over 
time. See Utah Const, art. VI, §28; Porter at 
485 & nn. 178, 179. Particularly apt here is a 
quotation from Porter in which he discusses 
the indeterminacy of the meaning given other 
state constitutional provisions designed to 
restrict legislative action with respect to subj-
ects described variously as "local affairs," 
"municipal purposes/ or "corporate purp-
oses": 
Although such phrases were meant 
to serve as standards for the courts 
in determining the areas of city 
action protected from legislative 
interference, they have been of 
limited value because the only 
meaning that can be given to the 
words "local" and "municipal" on 
their face is geographical rather 
than legal. Since a geographical 
definition would allow cities com-
plete freedom to act within their 
boundaries, which would completely 
disrupt state government, the final 
determination as to what is "local" 
or "municipal" is thrust upon the 
judges, "who have no .guides to 
decision except the often conflicting 
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has been that the phrases "local 
affairs' and 'municipal functions' 
have simply nol gained any empir-
ical meaning, even after a century 
of interpretation. 
Porter at 295 (footnotes omitted). 
This sort of uncertainty fairly characterizes 
the case law that, purports to give meaning to 
the term "municipal functions" in article VI, 
section 28. A review of our decisions provides 
relatively little by way of a consistent analyt-
ical framework for determining how to char-
acterize a given area of activity. See Porter at 
473-78 & nn. 123, 128, 135, 140 (canvassing 
all Utah cases decided before 1969); see also Salt 
Lake City v. International Ass'n of Fir-
efighters Locals 1645, 593, 1654, and 2064, 
563 P.2d 786, 791 (Utah 1977) (Crockett, J., 
concurring) (stating that "municipal function" 
merely means "public function" and is not in 
any way distinct from the term "state func-
tion"). Compare, e.g., Municipal Bldg. Auth. 
v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 281-82 (Utah 1985) 
(assuming arguendo that building a jail is a 
municipal function), with Tribe v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 540 P.2d 499, 502-03 (Utah 
1975) (finding that construction of a parking 
facility is a state rather than a municipal 
function), and Salt Lake County v. Murray 
City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339, 1342-43 
(Utah 1979) (relying on Tribe for the propos-
ition that fighting urban blight by means of 
redevelopment* plans is a state rather than a 
municipal function), and International Assfn 
of Firefighters, 563 P.2d at 788-89 (holding 
that providing firefighting services is a state 
rather than a municipal function and stating 
the same of police and health protection). 
However, our more recent cases, such as Tribe 
and International Ass'n of Firefighters, reflect 
an increasing willingness to recognize that 
many functions traditionally performed by 
municipalities may be sufficiently infused with 
a state, as opposed to an exclusively local, 
interest to escape characterization as 
"municipal functions" for purposes of article 
VI, section 28. This appears to be the appr-
oach advocated by Porter. See Porter at 486-
87. 
Given that the cases establish no bright line 
test for xietermining whether a function is 
municipal and that no Utah cases have consi-
dered a situation factually analogous to the 
retirement system at issue, we must at least 
articulate our approach to this characterization 
issue. We reject, as a general matter, the 
search for any hard and fast categorization of 
specific functions as "municipal" or "state." 
Instead, in determining whether a function is 
municipal, we think it appropriate to take a 
balancing approach, one which considers a 
number of factors that are pertinent tq the 
specific legislation at issue. These include, but 
are not limited to, the relative abilities of the 
state and municipal governments to perform 
the function, the degree to which the perfor-
mance of the function affects the interests of 
those beyond the boundaries of the municip-
ality, and the extent to which the legislation 
under attack will intrude upon the ability of 
the people within the municipality to control 
through their elected officials the substantive 
policies that affect them uniquely. This last 
factor should .serve to ensure due deference to 
a paramount purpose of the ripper clause, as 
it has been interpreted in Utah: "'to prevent 
interference with local self-government.'" 
Municipal Bldg. Auth. v. Lowder, 111 P.2d at 
281 (quoting Lehi City v. MeiUng, 87 Utah at 
272, 48 P.2d at 546). This sort of balancing 
approach is best suited to accomplishing the 
purposes of the ripper clause without erecting 
mechanical conceptual categories that, without 
serving any substantial interest, may hobble 
the effective government which the state con-
stitution as a whole was designed to permit. 
The foregoing approach leads us to conc-
lude that the retirement systein statutes do not 
delegate to the Board the performance of a 
"municipal function." First, the state certainly 
has a legitimate interest in determining the 
minimum level of retirement benefits provided 
to public employees by its political subdivis-
ions, among others. Presumably, in the 
absence of the ripper clause, it could fix such 
minimums and require all political subdivis-
ions to meet them under its general welfare 
power.3 It has so far chosen to permit local 
subdivisions to decline to offer retirement 
benefits. That does not, as West Jordan 
argues, amount to an acknowledgment that it 
is a municipal affair beyond the state's power; 
rather, it is simply an accommodation to local 
government that may be considered in appra-
ising the legislation's intrusiveness. 
The Mate also has another legitimate interest 
beyond the level of benefits provided retirees. 
The financial soundness of retirement systems 
into which monies attributable to employees 
are paid, including systems serving only gov-
ernmental employees, is certainly a legitimate 
subject of statewide concern. The legislature 
has chosen to further this interest by establis-
hing a statewide retirement system for all 
government employees and by requiring that 
any political subdivisions offering retirement 
benefits do so through the state system, the 
actuarial soundness and financial integrity of 
which the legislature is assured through the 
activities of the Board. 
As for the relative abilities of state and local 
government to perform the function of prov-
iding a financially sound retirement program, 
there is every reason to believe that the state, 
by consolidating funds from many smaller 
political subdivisions and providing for cont-
inuity and expertise in the management of the 
funds, can do a better job than each separate 
local unit of government. 






Finally, there is the critical question of the 
challenged legislation's degree of intmsiveness 
on local officials' control of policies that 
uniquely affect their citizenry. The legislation 
at issue leaves local units of government with 
complete autonomy in deciding whether to 
offer any retirement benefits. It also permits 
the local governments to provide additional 
benefits over and above those provided by the 
state system. All it requires is that a local unit 
of government that chooses to offer retirement 
benefits do so through the state system at a 
specified minimum level. That is the only 
respect in which the legislation could be said 
to interfere with control over uniquely local 
matters. On the other hand, the Board, the 
agency charged with the management of the 
retirement systems, cannot be said to intrude 
in any significant way in tHfe day-to-day 
functioning of local government; it simply 
manages the funds in an actuarily sound 
fashion and pays benefits. On balance, we 
conclude that the level of intmsiveness on 
local self-government resulting from this 
legislation is minimal and does not warrant 
our holding that the policies underlying the 
ripper clause are affected. Therefore, .we find 
that the legislation does not delegate the per-
formance of a municipal function to the 
Board, as West Jordan claims. 
West Jordan next claims that article XI, 
section 5 of the Utah Constitution requires 
that any classification of municipalities must 
be on the basis of population only. West 
Jordan contends that because sections 49-11-
23 and 49-6a-15 of the Code, which estab-
lish specific contribution rates to the state 
retirement system for designated municipali-
ties, classify municipalities on a basis other 
than population, those statutes are unconstit-
utional. See Utah Code Ann. §§49-6a-14, 
49-11-23 (1982 & Supp. 1983) (now codified 
at Utah Code Ann. §§49-4-301, 49-5-
301 (Supp. 1988)). 
In order to assess West Jordan's challenge, 
we must first determine the scope of article 
XI, section 5. The language upon which West 
Jordan relies for its claim that all distinctions 
between municipalities must be based on 
population is underlined in the following 
quotation of the first two sentences of article 
XI, section 5: 
Corporations for municipal purp-
oses shall not be created by special 
laws. The legislature by general laws 
shall provide for the incorporation, 
organization and classification of 
cities and towns in proportion to 
population, which laws may be 
altered, amended or repealed. 
Utah Const, art. XI, §5 (emphasis added). 
We think that West Jordan takes the emp-
hasized words out of context. This language is 
not a general ban on the classification of. 
municipalities on. any grounds other than 
population.4*Rather, it is simply part of a 
provision establishing guidelines and limitat-
ions on tfce legislature's powers when it acts to 
provide for the organization of municipalities. 
The c l a s s i f j c a t i on -on - the -bas i s -o f 
population requirement of article XI, section 
5 only applies to laws that classify municipa-
lities for the purpose of defining their powers 
and functions and directs that if such laws 
make distinctions between the powers of 
various municipalities, those distinctions must* 
be on the basis of population only. Our review 
of the state constitution and relevant precedent 
has revealed no authority that contradicts this 
interpretation of article XI, section 5, and 
West Jordan has cited none. Cf. Towler v. 
Warenski, 59 Utah 171, 174-77, 202 P. 374, 
376-77 (1921) (stating that the legislature has 
the power to classify cities for purposes of city 
elections according to population, but that it 
must provide some method for changing from 
one class to another with shifts in population); 
People v. Page, 6 Utah 353, 355-56, 23 P. 
761, 761-62 (1890) (determining that city 
officials should be elected as provided in a 
statute that classified cities according to pop-
ulation rather than as provided in the city 
charter); 1 E. McQuillin & C. Keating, The 
Law of Municipal Corporations §§3.07, 3.08 
(3d ed. 1987); 2 E. McQuillin, C. Keating & S. 
Flanagan, The Law of Municipal Corporations 
§§4.68-4.70, 4.73-4.74 (3d ed. 1988) 
(indicating that constitutional provisions 
similar to Utah's typically relate only to laws 
that define the powers and functions of 
municipalities). For this reason, we conclude 
that article XI, section 5 does not apply to the 
distinctions made by sections 49-11-23 and 
49-6a-15. 
West Jordan raises a number of other 
claims of unconstitutional classification in the 
retirement system's statutory contribution rate 
schedule, which is set out in sections 49-6a-
15 and 49-11-23 and differentiates between 
some municipalities. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§49-6a-15, 49-11-23 (Supp. 1983) 
(now codified at Utah Code Ann. §§49-4-
301, 49-5-301 (Supp. 1988)). West Jordan's 
attack is facial, i.e., it merely says that the 
distinctions exist and therefore they must be 
invalid. By failing to support its argument 
with any reasoning or authority, West Jordan 
would have us shift the burden of justifying 
these distinctions to the Board. 
When considering challenges to matters of 
economic regulation that do not affect speci-
ally protected interests, we give deference to 
the legislature's judgment as to classifications 
needed to achieve the ends sought. See, e^. t 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Cky 
Corp., 752 P.2d at 888 (interpreting artide I, 
section 24. of the Utah Constitution and 
section 10-8-80 of the Utah Code) (citing Biter 
v.^Mathcson, 607 P.2d 233, • 344 (Utah 
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1979); State v. Taylor, 541 P.2d 1124, 1125-
26 (Utah 1975), questioned on Other grounds, 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Emery County, 702 
P.2d 121, 125-27 (Utah 1985); Meniovc v. 
Salt Lake County, 18 Utah 2d 203, 209, 418 
P.2d*227, 231 (1966)). To strike down such 
legislation, we must find that the means are 
not reasonably related to the achievement of a 
legitimate legislative purpose, see Mountain 
Fuel, 752 P.2d at 887, 890, and the burden is 
on the party attacking the legislative enact-
ment to show that it' offends the constitution. 
This is a burden that West Jordan has wholly 
failed to carry. Therefore, extensive analysis is 
not necessary to defeat its claim. It is enough 
to say that it appears that each of the distin-
ctions in sections 49-6a-15 and 49-11-23 
is a recognition of actuarial experience and 
that these distinctions account for existing 
differences among certain groups of employees 
and among a few municipalities. As such, in 
the absence of a showing by West Jordan to 
the contrary, we assume that they are reaso-
nably related to the maintenance of an actu-
arially sound system for the provision of ret-
irement benefits to municipal employees. See, 
e.g., S.B. 191, 38th session Utah Legislature, 
House of Representatives' Debates, 59th day 
(Mar. 12, 1969), discs 9 (positions 12-27), 10 
(positions 0-17), 11 (positions 4-6) 
(discussing the different rates at which the 
affected state and municipal retirement funds 
were accumulating deficits and the appropri-
ateness of different contribution rates to red-
ucing the deficits and making the funds actu-
arially sound). 
West Jordan's next claim is that the effect 
of S.B. 327 is to impair the city's contractual 
relations with either the Board or Beneficial 
Life in violation of article I, section 10 of the 
federal constitution and article I, section 18 of 
the Utah Constitution. See U.S. Const, art. I, 
§10;* Utah Const, art. I, §18.« Specifically, 
West Jordan argues that S.B. 327 alters its 
contractual relationship with the Board by 
prohibiting unilateral withdrawal. We find no 
merit to this argument because, as has been 
explained above, we conclude that West 
Jordan has never had the right to withdraw. 
Also without merit is West Jordan's claim 
that its contrlct with Beneficial Life is impa-
ired by S.B. 327. First, as noted, West Jordan 
did not have that right when it entered its 
agreement with Beneficial Life in 1981. 
Second, West Jordan is not now, nor has it 
ever been, prohibited from obtaining supple-
mental coverage from any private source, 
including Beneficial Life, as it has done in the 
past. 
Finally, without citation to any factual fin-
dings of the trial court, any statutory or con-
stitutional provisions, or any case law, counsel 
for West Jordan claims that from time to time 
the legislature has raided the retirement fund 
to use the money for general state purposes 
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and that this is improper. The record does not 
support this claim; therefore, we do not 
address it. But in declining -to consider this 
claim, we certainly do not mean to suggest 
that any such diversion of retirement funds 
would be permissible. 
We have considered all of West Jordan's 
other claims and find them to be without 
merit. We find tio issue of material fact suff-
icient to preclude summary judgment. For the 
reasons stated, we affirm. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C Howe, Associate Chief Justice 
1. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
1. Senate Bill 327 also contains a number of other 
amendments to the Utah State Retirement Act that 
are not at issue here. The principal amendments 
involved in this case are S.B. 327's express requir-
ements that participating municipalities remain in 
the retirement system and that municipalities 
wishing to provide retirement benefits to employees 
participate in the retirement fund, as well as the 
bill's definition of "full participation" and its 
express authorization of supplemental coverage from 
sources other than the retirement fund See 1983 
Utah U w s ch. 224, §§3, 6, 11, 12; Utah Code 
Ann. §§49-6a- 8 .1 , 49-10-1 l ( l ) - ( 2 ) , (5)-
(6), 49-11-14(1), (4), (5) (Supp. 1983) (now codi-
fied at Utah Code Ann. §§49-2-204, 49-3-
204,49-4-204,49-5-204 (Supp. 1987)). 
2. West Jordan's article VI, section 28 claims 
appear to be based in part on the provisions of the 
retirement act that set forth the Board's existence 
and duties See Utah Code Ann. §§49-9-1 to-
3 , - 7 , - 8 , - 1 1 , 4 9 - 1 0 - 9 , - 1 5 (1982 & Supp. 
1983). 
3. Examples of the legislature's exercise of its 
general welfare power in the area of employment 
benefits include the Workers' Compensation Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-1 to-107 (1988), the 
Occupational Disease Disability Act, id. %%35-2-
1 to-65, and the Unemployment Compensation 
Act, id. §§35-4-1 to-26. These provisions, 
which require employers to provide certain benefits 
analogous to retirement compensation, apply to 
political subdivisions as well as to private employers. 
See id. § § 3 5 - 1 - 4 2 ( 1 ) , 3 5 - 2 1 0 ( a ) , 35-4-
8.5(a). With respect to unemployment compensa-
tion, the legislature has expressly declared the foll-
owing public policy: 
Economic insecurity ... is a serious 
menace to the health, morals, and 
welfare of the people of this state .... 
The Legislature, therefore, declares that 
in its considered judgment the public 
good, and the general welfare of the 
citizens of this state require the enact-
ment of this measure, under the police 
power of the state .... 
Id. §35-4-2. This exercise of the police power 
was tacitly upheld in Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 175, 189, 134 P.2d 
479, 485, reh'g denied, 104 Utah 196, 141 P.2d 694 
(1943). This Court has also upheld both of the other 
acts against various constitutional challenges. See, 
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e.g., Masich v. United States Smelting, Rcf. & 
Mining Co., 113 Utah-101,423-27, 191 P.2d 612, 
623-25, appeal dismissed, 335 JU.S. . 866 (1948) 
(Occupational Disease Disability'Act); United Air 
Lines Transp. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 107 
Utah 52, 61-62, 151 P.2d 591, 595 (1944) 
(Workers' Compensation Act). Moreover, it could 
be argued that the legislature has plenary power 
over all conditions of employment in the state, 
whether public or private, regardles of the ripper 
clause. See Utah Const, art. XVI, §8. 
4. In fact, a statutory classification based on popu-
lation may violate the other provisions of our state 
constitution that require laws to be uniform and 
general, Utah Const, art. I, §24; id. art VI, §26, 
if population is unrelated to the statute's purpose. 
Sec, e.g., Saville v. Corless, 46 Utah 495, 496-98, 
151 P. 51, 51-52 (1915); Love v. Liddle, 26 Utah 
62, 65-69, 72 P. 185, 186-87 (1903); Laman v. 
Harrill, 233 Ark. 967, 969-73, 349 S.W.2d 814, 
816-18 (1961); Waybright v. Duval County, 142 
Fla 875, 879-81, 895-901, ,196 So. 430, 432-33, 
439-41 (1940); Berentz v. Board of Commissioners 
of Coffeyville, 159 Kan. 58, 64-66, 152 P.2d 53, 57-
58 (1944); 2 E. McQuiliin, C. Keating & S. Flan-
agan, The Law of Municipal Corporations §4.74 
(3d ed. 1988); see also Board of Education of Ogden 
v. Hunter, 48 Utah 373, 383-87, 159 P. 1019, 1022-
24 (1916) (holding a classification based on popul-
ation and total assessed property valuation uncons-
titutional as a special and nonuniform law), cf. 
Hulbert v. State, 607 P.2d 1217, 1223-24 (Utah 
1980) (quoting Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Utah 
Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 564 P.2d 751, 754, 755-56 
(Utah 1977), for the proposition that legislative 
classifications must be reasonable and must be 
related to the legislation's purpose). 
5. "No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex 
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts...." U.S. Const, art. I, §10. 
6. "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts shall be 
passed." Utah Const, art. I, §18., 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v, 
Fred W. STANDIFORD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20345 
FILED: December 30, 1988 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Honorable James S. Sawaya 
ATTORNEYS: -
David L. Wilkinson, Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt 
* Lake City, for Appellee 
David A. Hansen, Phil L. Hansen, Steven L. 
Hansen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
STEWART, Justice-
Defendant Fred W. Standiford was convi-
cted of second degree murder for the fatal 
stabbing of Hisae Wood. He appeals the 
conviction on a variety of grounds. We 
affirm. 
I. THE FACTS 
Sometime between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. 
on April 27, 1984, Hisae Wood was stabbed to 
death in an assault during which 107 stab 
wounds were inflicted on her body. Earlier 
that night, Standiford had been m^his garage 
with his friend, Joey Granato, painting 
Granato's Jeep. Twice during the evening, 
Standiford and Granato went to Wood's res-
idence to purchase cocaine. After each trip, 
Standiford and Granato freebased the cocaine 
and then resumed painting the Jeep. Around 
4:00 a.m., Standiford told Granato that he 
was going to a* convenience store to bu> ciga-
rettes. Although he was gone longer than 
necessary for that errand, his behavior was not 
unusual when he returned. When Standiford 
revealed that he had more cocaine, Granato 
asked if. Standiford had returned to the 
Woods' residence. Standiford replied that he 
had not and indicated that he had merely 
saved the cocaine from one of their earlier 
purchases. 
The next day, Standiford contacted Granato 
and as.ced if he had heard that Mrs. Wood 
had been murdered. Later that day, Standi-
ford was questioned by the police. Afterwards, 
he told Granato that they were both in trouble 
and that if the police asked, Granato should 
tell the police that he and Standiford had not 
left the garage all night. Granato became 
concerned, contacted the police, and volunte-
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construction of RCW 62A 9-318(1 )(a), and 
the practical effect of allowing affirmative 
claims, we conclude this section does not 
allow account debtors, in this case Lydig, 
an affirmative claim against an assignee, 
Rainier > 
The judgment of the Superior Court is 
affirmed 





40 Wash App 181 
Jack MORITZKY, d /b / a Jack Moritzky 
Construction, Respondent, 
v 
Henry S HEBERLEIN, Jr. and Wend\ J 
Heberlein, husband and wife, individu-
ally and the marital community com-
posed of them. Appellants, 
Jack Moritzky and Jane Doe Moritzky, 
husband and wife, d /b / a Jack Moritzky 
Construction and Western Surety Co , 
Third Party Defendants and Respon-
dents 
No 612i-HI-8 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 3, Panel Three 
April 2, 1985 
Construction company filed suit to 
foreclose mechanic's hen on house after 
homeowner refused to pay for "extras" 
requested by construction company, and 
homeowner counterclaimed for negligent, 
incomplete work, and various code viola 
tions, and also asserted a third party com 
5 Lvdig argues in the alternative that it should 
be able to recover the payment under the theor> 
of unjust enrichment The Uniform Commcr 
cial Code provides "Unless displaced b> the 
particular provisions of this Title, the principles 
of law and equity shall supplement its provi 
HEBERLEIN Wash 1 0 2 3 
(WwhApp 1985) 
plaint agamst construction company's con 
tractor's bond The Superior Court, Yaki-
ma County, Bruce P Hanson, J , foreclosed 
hen for the full $2,092 93, awarded home-
owner $4,937 on the counterclaim, awarded 
attorney fees to construction company, 
and, filing a motion for reconsideration, 
allowed costs to homeowner as prevailing 
party Homeowner appealed The Court 
of Appeals, Mclnturff, Acting C J , held 
that (1) counterclaim asserted by home-
owner was a compulson counterclaim 
which homeowner had to assert or waive, 
and (2) the action was tried as one lawsuit, 
and despite holding that construction com-
pany was entitled to judgment for extras 
sought under the hen, homeowner received 
the affirmative net judgment, and was enti-
|led to an award of attorney fees under the 
lien statute 
Reversed in part and remanded 
1. Costs <s^32(2), 172 
Determination of which party is the 
prevailing party, whether for purpose of 
awarding costs or attorney fees, is made on 
basis of which part) has an affirmative 
judgment*rendered in his case at the con 
elusion of the entire case 
2 Set-Off and Counterclaim <£=>60 
Counterclaim asserted b\ homeowner 
for negligent and incomplete construction 
was a compulsory counterclaim to action 
brought by construction compan\ to fore 
close mechanic's lien, and thus, homeowner 
had to assert such counterclaim or waive it 
forever CR 13(a) 
3 Mechanics' Liens <s=310(3) 
Action to foreclose mechanic's lien, and 
homeowner's counterclaim for negligent 
and incomplete construction, which was a 
compulsory counterclaim, was tried as one 
lawsuit, and thus, despite holding that con 
struction company was entitled to judg 
sions RCW 62A 1-103 Thus cquit) supple 
merits the code only where code provisions do 
not displace other rules Here, however RCW 
62A 9-318(1 )(a) addresses this problem, and re 
sort to other theories, which would possibl> 
have produced a different result, is denied 
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ment for extras sought under the lien, 
homeowner, who received the affirmative 
net judgment, was entitled to attorney fees 
under the lien statute. West's RCWA 60.-
04.130; CR 13(a). 
Patrick Andreotti, Charles C. Flower, 
Flower & Andreotti, Yakima, for appel-
lants. 
John E. Maxwell, Blechschmidt & Max-
well, P.S., Inc., Grandview, for respon-
dents. 
McINTURFF, Acting Chief Judge. 
Henry and Wendy Heberlein (Heberlein) 
appeal an award of attorney fees to Jack 
Moritzky, d/b/a Moritzky Construction 
(Moritzky). We reverse. 
In September 1981, Moritzky contracted 
to frame and roof Heberlein's residence. 
Construction began immediately. During 
the course of the work, Moritzky failed to 
comply with plans and specifications, per-
formed work in a negligent manner, violat-
ed several Yakima building codes and did 
not complete the framing work called for 
by his contract. Heberlein paid Moritzky 
for most of his labor, but refused to pay 
$2,092.93 of "extras" requested by Moritz-
ky. 
On January 29, 1982, Moritzky filed a 
lien for $2,092.93 with the Yakima County 
Auditor. Three months later, suit was 
commenced to foreclose the lien. Heber-
lein answered the suit by counterclaiming 
for the negligent, incomplete work and the 
various code violations. Heberlein also as-
serted a'third party complaint against Mor-
itzky's contractor's bond, Western Surety 
Company. 
Following trial, the Superior Court, in its 
oral opinion: (a) foreclosed Moritzky's lien 
for the full $2,092.93; (b) awarded Heber-
lein $4,937 on the counterclaim for negli-
gent and defective work; (c) decided He-
berlein's counterclaim was an "independent 
action" from the lien foreclosure under 
RCW 60.04, thus no attorney fees and/or 
costs could be awarded Heberlein; and (d) 
awarded Moritzky $2,008.80 reasonable at-
torney fees for the lien foreclosure. It is 
important to note that the Superior Court 
expressly held Moritzky's lien judgment 
would be set off against Heberlein's dam-
ages, providing for a net affirmative judg-
ment to Heberlein. 
Following a motion for reconsideration, 
the Superior Court did allow costs to He-
berleir, as the prevailing party under RCW 
4.84.030, but refused to change its ruling 
on attorney fees under the hen statute, 
RCW 60.04.130. Heberlein appealed. Both 
parties request attorney fees on appeal. 
Heberlein contends he was the prevailing 
party under RCW 60.04.130 because of the 
net affirmative judgment following the set-
offs. Moritzky argues that he was the 
prevailing party on the lien claim since the 
court foreclosed the entire lien. Moritzky 
contends the counterclaim was a separate 
action, and the trial court correctly award-
ed attorney fees in the manner described 
above, citing Johnson v. Thompson Con-
struction, 1 Wash.App. 194, 460 P.2d 291 
(1969). 
Johnson is clearly distinguishable from 
the present case in that it involved former 
RCW 60.04.130 which read, in pertinent 
part: 
The court may allow, as part of the costs 
of the action, the moneys paid for filing 
or recording the claim, and a reasonable 
attorney's fee in the superior and su-
preme courts. 
In 19G9. that section of RCW 60 04.130 was 
amended to read; 
The court may allow to the prevailing 
party in the action, whether plain tiff' or 
defendant, as part of the cosu of the 
action, the moneys paid for filing or re 
cording the chum, and a reasonable attor-
ney's fee in the superior and supreme 
court. 
(Italics ours ) 
[ 1 ] Thus, the -disposition of this case 
turns on the definition of "prevailing par 
ty".. Determination of which party is the 
prevailing party,-whether for the purpose 
fl^f.ajvarjdmp costs onat torneyfees , is made 
on trifrfrasis of*which party has an affirma-
STATE v. KOMOTO 
Cite a« 697 P.2d 1025 (Wash.App. 1985) 
Wash. 1025 
tivejudgment ren(d_eredjnJii§J[avor at the 
conclusion,w&the*entire9tcase. Ennis v. 
Ring, 56 Wash.2d 465, 353 R2d 950 (1959); 
Stott v. Cervantes, 23 Wash.App. 346, 595 
P.2d 563 (1979). 
[2,3] The counterclaim asserted by He-
berlein for the negligent and incomplete 
construction was a "compulsory" counter-
claim under CR 13(a). Heberlein had to 
assert such a counterclaim or that claim 
would be waived forever. 3A L. Orland, 
Wash.Prac, Rules Practice, § 5162 (1980). 
This action was tried as one lawsuit, and 
despite the holding that Moritzky was enti-
tled to judgment for the extras sought 
under the lien, Heberlein received the af-
firmative net judgment. 
The Superior Court erred in awarding 
attorney fees to Moritzky, and did not exer-
cise its discretion in determining Heber-
lein's attorney fees. Accordingly, that por-
tion of the judgment awarding attorney 
fees is reversed; the matter is remanded to 
determine attorney fees to Heberlein, if 
any, for the trial and to set attorney fees 
on the appeal to Heberlein as the prevailing 
party on appeal. 
THOMPSON and MUNSON, JJ., concur. 
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STATE of Washington, Respondent, 
v. 
Clifford Brian KOMOTO, Appellant. 
No. 13969-0-1. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 1. 
April 8, 1985. 
Defendant was convicted in the Superi-
or Court, King County, Lee Kraft, J., of 
felony hit and run, and he appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Coleman, J., held that: 
(1) testimony of two witnesses that they 
observed green car hit victim without stop-
ping, coupled with evidence of injury to 
accident victim, was sufficient to establish 
corpus delicti of felony hit and run; (2) 
evidence was sufficient to allow case to 
proceed to jury; (3) troopers had probable 
cause to believe blood alcohol would be 
relevant; and (4) warrantless entry of de-
fendant's residence was justified. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles <£=>353 
To prove that someone has committed 
offense of driving while under influence, 
state must show that defendant operated 
or was in actual physical control of vehicle 
while he was under influence. 
2. Automobiles <s=>332 
Defendant's physical condition is crit-
ical element of crime of driving while under 
the influence. 
3. Automobiles e ^ S S 
Felony hit and run does not require 
any showing of defendant's physical state, 
rather, it requires proof that driver did not 
perform duties specified in statute and, 
thus, proof of condition of driver is not 
necessary to establish existence of criminal 
agency in felony hit and run. West's 
RCWA 46.52.020. 
4. Criminal Law <3=>535(1) 
Conviction cannot be sustained on con-
fession alone, but, rather, some corrobora-
tive evidence establishing corpus delicti is 
necessary to convict when confession is-
part of evidence. 
5. Criminal Law <£=>563 
Proof of corpus delicti of any crime 
requires evidence that crime charged was 
committed by someone; amount of proof 
needed is evidence of sufficient circum-
stances which would support logical and 
reasonable deduction of fact sought to be 
proved, which is less than that necessary to 
take case to jury. 
MEDHUS v 
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Melroy L MEDHUS, Jr., Ben Williams, 
Billy G. Reddig and Lynne A. Reddig, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Kenneth A. DUTTER, Mary E. Dutter, 
Thomas J. Deutsch and Janet M. 
Deutsch, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 14693. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted on Briefs Aug. 15, 1979. 
Decided Nov. 21, 1979. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 21, 1979. 
Action was brought to enjoin defend-
ants from obstructing plaintiffs' use of the 
road that crossed defendants' property and 
to recover damages for interference with 
use of the road and for trespass, with de-
fendants counter-claiming for timber tres-
pass and an order requiring one plaintiff to 
move a fence. The Eleventh District Court, 
Flathead County, Robert Sykes, J., found 
that plaintiffs had an easement for road-
way purposes across one portion of respon-
dents' property but not another and ordered 
fence moved, and appeal was taken. The 
Supreme Court, Harrison, J., held that: (1) 
since use of road began permissibly and 
continued to be permissive until defendant 
blocked the road, plaintiffs had not estab-
lished the existence of a prescriptive ease-
ment; (2) language in warranty deed, by 
which defendants acquired the property, re-
ferring to an easement for road purposes 
did not establish an easement of record; (3) 
trial court should have made findings and 
entered judgment on plaintiff's trespass 
claim; (4) main issue in controversy rule 
applies in interpreting cost statute; and (5) 
district court correctly awarded cost to re-
spondents, including cost of survey neces-
sary to determine boundary. 
Affirmed in part and remanded with 
Hir«>etiona 
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1. Easements <*=5 
To establish existence of a prescriptive 
easement, the party claiming the easement 
must show open, notorious, exclusive, ad-
verse, continuous and uninterrupted use of 
the easement claimed for the statutory |>eri-
od. 
2. Easements *=>5 
Since use of road was permissive at its 
inception, to find a prescriptive easement 
there was required to be a showing of a 
distinct and positive assertion of the right 
to use the road hostile to the owners by 
those claiming the easement, that such 
right was brought to the attention of the 
owners and that such use continued for the 
full statutory period. 
3. Easements «=»36(1) 
Occasional use of disputed road by 
hunters, hikers and neighbors for cutting 
Christmas trees and gathering firewood 
was insufficient to raise a presumption of 
adverse use for purpose of acquisition of 
prescriptive easement. 
4. Easements <&=^ 14(3) 
An easement cannot be created in fa-
vor of a stranger to a deed, however, courts 
will depart from that rule to give effect to 
the grantor's intent. 
5. Easements <*=>14(3) 
Before creation of an easement in a 
stranger to a conveyance will be recognized 
the intent of the grantor to create an ease-
ment must be clearly shown. 
6. Easements «=>14(3) 
If it appears it is as likely that purpose 
of a clause in a deed is to protect grantor's 
warranty of title as to reserve an easement 
in a stranger to the conveyance the court 
will not depart from majority rule and, 
hence, will not find an easement. 
7. Easements *=»14(3) 
To determine the intent of a grantor to 
create an easement in a stranger to a con-
veyance courts have considered the ex-
pressed language of the deed, testimony by-
grantor stating their intent, whether grant-
or received less value for the property be-
cause of the easement and sufficiency of 
dear.rint.inn nf the location of the easement 
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and whether or not the reservation names a 
dominant tenement. 
8. Easements <s=*14(3) 
Language in warranty deed referring 
to easement for road purposes was insuffi-
cient to establish easement of record in 
owners of adjacent tract in view of grant-
or's testimony that there was a road up to 
home on the property that nobody other 
than the owners should be using, want of 
testimony showing that grantors received 
less than full value because of the easement 
and considering that although language in a 
deed located the easement it failed to name 
a dominant tenement. 
9. Trespass <s=>69 
Where plaintiff elicited testimony at 
hearing supporting his claim of trespass the 
trial court should have entered findings, 
conclusions or judgment concerning the 
matter. 
10. Costs $=>4 
Main issue in controversy rule is to be 
used in interpreting the Montana cost stat-
utes. MCA 25-10-101, 25-10-102. 
11. Costs e=32(3) 
If a plaintiff files a complaint in an 
action covered by the cost statute and suc-
ceeds only partially, plaintiff is entitled to 
costs. MCA 25-10-101. 
12. Costs <a=>32(5) 
If in an action subject to the cost stat-
ute the defendant counterclaims and suc-
ceeds in having plaintiff's claim totally de-
nied but only recovers a portion of the 
relief demanded in the counterclaim, the 
defendant should receive costs; however, if 
a party initiates a lawsuit, the defendant 
counterclaims and the judgment awards 
both parties part of the relief they seek, the 
party prevailing on the main issue in con-
troversy in the case must be allowed costs. 
MCA 25-10-101, 25-10-102. 
13. Boundaries <^ =>45 
Costs *=>32(5) 
Costs were properly allowed defend-
ants in action to enjoin them from obstruct-
ing plaintiffs' use of a road that crossed 
defendants' property as well as damage for 
trespass and for interference with use of 
the road, with defendants counterclaiming 
for timber trespass and order requiring one 
plaintiff to move a fence erected along 
boundary line, since main issue was exist-
ence of an easement across disputed road, 
closing of the road precipitated the suit and 
most of the testimony at trial concerned 
existence of easement over the road and 
defendants prevailed on such issues; de-
fendants were also entitled to cost of 
boundary survey. MCA 25-10-101, 25-10-
102. 
Hash, Jellison, O'Brien & Bartlett, Kalis-
pell, for appellants. 
Moore, Lympus & Doran, Warden, Wal-
terskirchen & Christiansen, Kalispell, for 
respondents. 
HARRISON, Justice. 
Appellants initiated this action in District 
Court, the Eleventh Judicial District, the 
Honorable Robert C. Sykes presiding, ask-
ing the court to enjoin respondents from 
obstructing appellants' use of a road that 
crossed respondents' property. Appellants 
sought to obtain a decree granting them an 
easement along the road. Appellants also 
sought damages for interference with the 
use of the road, and appellant Medhus 
sought damages for trespass to his proper-
ty-
Respondents filed a counterclaim against 
appellant Medhus for timber trespass and 
sought an order requiring Medhus to move 
a fence erected along the boundary of their 
property and the Medhus property. 
The District Court found that appellants 
had an easement for roadway purposes 
across a portion of respondents' property, 
but found no easement across another sec-
tion of the property. The court ordered 
appellants be allowed to remove some per-
sonal property from the portion of the road-
way across which no easement was found. 
However, the court entered no findings, 
conclusions or judgment concerning appel-
lants' trespass claim. 
MEDHUS v. 
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The court further found appellant Me-
dhus had not committed timber trespass but 
had erected a fence on respondents' proper-
ty. The court ordered the fence moved to 
the correct boundary line. The District 
Court awarded costs of the suit to respon-
dents, including the cost of a boundary sur-
vey done at the request of respondents. 
Appellants appeal this judgment. 
Respondents Thomas Deutsch and Janet 
Deutsch are the legal owners, and respon-
dents Kenneth Dutter and Mary Dutter are 
the equitable owners, being purchasers un-
der contract for deed, of certain real prop-
erty located in Flathead County. The dis-
puted road passes across their property. 
The Deutsches acquired the property in 
1964 from A. P. and Martha T. Marcoux. 
The Marcouxes conveyed the property to 
the Deutsches by a warranty deed. The 
deed contained language referring to an 
easement for road purposes across the 
premises. The notice of purchasers' inter-
est giving notice of the contract under 
which the Dutters hold their equitable in-
terest to the property contains similar lan-
guage. This property will be referred to as 
the "Dutter property/' 
Appellant Melroy Medhus owns real prop-
erty that lies east of the Dutter property 
and above it on a mountainside. This prop-
erty will be referred to as the "Medhus 
property." Appellants Billy G. Reddig and 
Lynne A. Reddig are buying a portion of 
the Medhus property under contract for 
deed. Appellant Ben Williams is the owner 
of three parcels of real property which are 
«ast of both the Dutter and Medhus proper-
ties. 
Foothills Road, a public highway, passes 
close to the western boundary of the Dutter 
property. Near the southern boundary of 
the Dutter property a dirt and gravel road 
leaves Foothills Road and goes up the 
mountainside across the Dutter property. 
This roadway leaves the Dutter property 
and enters the Medhus property and forms 
a "Y" on the Medhus property. The Dis-
trict Court found, apparently for the sake 
of completeness, that all of the appellants 
had an easement along that roadway from 
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the Foothills Road to the boundary of the 
Dutter property. An easement over this 
section of road was not asked for in appel-
lants' complaint. The northern branch of 
the "Y" continues across the Medhus prop-
erty and reenters the Dutter property for 
300 feet whereupon it reenters the Medhus 
property and continues easterly and up the 
mountainside onto the Williams property. 
The District Court found that none of the 
appellants had an easement across this 300 
foot road on the Dutter property. 
The following diagram approximates the 
position of the property of the parties and 
road in dispute (marked "disputed road" on 
the diagram); 
t 
Hood oort * * * C M O s " < » Cevir 
The use of the 300 foot road marked 
"disputed road" on the diagram is the cen-
ter of controversy in this case Appellants 
do not contest the portion of the judgment 
ordering them to move their fence, and 
respondents do not challenge the finding of 
an easement of the other section of the 
road. The Trablik property marked on the 
diagram is not involved in the current dis-
pute. 
The road was built in 1933 by the Koenig 
brothers, loggers working east of the Dut-
ter and Medhus properties. Before con-
structing and using the road, the loggers 
got permission from Clarence Haines, then 
the owner of the Dutter property. The 
District Court found that since the 1930's, 
the disputed road has seldom been used. 
The court found that neighbors used the 
road for cutting firewood or Christmas 
trees and members of the general public 
used the road to go up Mill Creek to hunt, 
hike and gather huckleberries. The bridge 
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over Mill Creek leading to the road washed 
out for a period of time and was replaced in 
the 1970's. Dutter bulldozed the road shut 
in 1978, leading to the instigation of this 
suit. 
This appeal raises the following issues for 
our consideration: 
1. Did the District Court err in finding 
that appellants did not establish a prescrip-
tive easement across the disputed road? 
2. Did the District Court err in finding 
that appellants did not establish an ease-
ment of record across the disputed road? 
3. Did the District Court err in not en-
tering findings, conclusions and a judgment 
on appellants' trespass claim? 
4. Did the District Court err in award-
ing costs to the respondents? 
[1] To establish the existence of a pre-
scriptive easement, the party claiming the 
easement must show open, notorious, exclu-
sive, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted 
use of the easement claimed for the statuto-
ry period. Garrett v. Jackson (1979), Mont., 
600 P.2d 1177, 36 St.Rep. 1769, 1771; Hay-
den v. Snowden (1978), Mont., 576 P.2d 
1115, 1117, 35 St.Rep. 367, 369; Taylor v. 
Petranek (1977), Mont., 568 P.2d 120, 122, 34 
St.Rep. 905, 909; Harland v. Anderson 
(1976), 169 Mont. 447, 451, 548 P.2d 613, 615. 
The controversy in this case turns on 
whether appellants showed the use of the 
disputed road by them and their predeces-
sors in interest was adverse rather than 
permissive. If appellants failed to show 
adverse use, they have not established all 
the elements necessary to perfect an ease-
ment by prescription and the District Court 
ruling on this issue must be upheld. 
In Taylor, we said: 
"Although a use permissive in its incep-
tion may ripen into a prescriptive right, it 
cannot do so unless there is a later dis-
tinct and positive assertion of a right 
hostile to the owner, which must be 
brought to the attention of the owner, 
and the use continued for the full pre-
scriptive period. (Citations omitted.)" 
568 P.2d at 123. 
In Wilson v. Chestnut (1974), 164 Mont. 
484, 491, 525 P.2d 24, 27, we approvingly 
quoted 2 Thompson on Real Property (1961 
Replacement), Easements, § 345, as follows: 
" ' . . I f the user began by the per-
mission of the owner, it will not ripen 
into an adverse or hostile right until no-
tice of such adverse user is brought home 
to the owner and the user continued 
thereafter for the statutory period.'" 
See also White v. Kamps (1946), 119 Mont. 
102, 171 P.2d 343. 
[2] Here, the testimony shows the use of 
the disputed road was originally permissive. 
Clarence Haines gave the Koenig brothers 
permission to build and use the road. Since 
the use of the road was permissive at its 
inception, to find a prescriptive easement 
here we must find in the record a distinct 
and positive assertion of a right to use the 
disputed road hostile to the owners by those 
claiming the easement. The record must 
also show the right was brought to the 
attention of the owners and continued use 
of the easement for the full statutory peri-
od. 
[3] Looking to the record, we find occa-
sional use of the road by hunters, hikers 
and neighbors cutting Christmas trees and 
gathering firewood. We have previously 
held this type of use insufficient to raise a 
presumption of adverse use. Taylor v. Pe-
tranek, supra, 568 P.2d at 123; Harland v. 
Anderson, supra, 169 Mont, at 451-452, 548 
P.2d 613. Being insufficient to initially es-
tablish adverse use, this type of use does 
not represent the distinct and positive as-
sertion of a hostile right brought home to 
the owner of the purportedly servient tene-
ment necessary to transform originally per-
missive use into adverse use. Under these 
facts, the use of the road began permissive-
ly and continued to be permissive until Dut-
ter blocked the road in 1978. Appellants, 
therefore, did not establish the existence of 
a prescriptive easement across the Dutter 
property. 
The second issue raised by this appeal 
concerns the language in the deeds used to 
convey the Dutter property. The language 
in the deeds reads, "Subject, however to an 
MEDHUS v 
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easement for road purposes now existing 
over and across the herein described premis-
es." 
[4] The majority rule is that an ease-
ment cannot be created in favor of a stran-
ger to the deed. Wilson v. Chestnut, supra, 
164 Mont, at 492, 525 P.2d 24, see also 
Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1199, 1201-1202 (1963). 
In the proper case, however, we will depart 
from that rule to give effect to the grant-
or's intent State of Montana, By and 
Through the Montana State Fish and Game 
Commission v. Cronin (1978), Mont., 587 
P.2d 395, 399, 35 St.Rep. 1798, 1802; Wilson, 
164 Mont, at 492, 525 P.2d 24. The question 
thus becomes one of determining the intent 
of the grantors in including the above lan-
guage in the deeds. 
[S-7] Before the creation of an ease-
ment in a stranger to a conveyance will be 
recognized, the intent of the grantor to 
create the easement must be clearly shown. 
Cushman v. Davis (1978), 80 Cal.App.3d 731, 
145 Cal.Rptr. 791, 793. If it appears it is as 
likely the purpose of the clause in the deed 
was to protect the grantor's warranty of 
title as to reserve an easement, we will not 
depart from the majority rule and find an 
easement. Wilson, 164 Mont, at 492, 525 
P.2d 24. To determine the intent of the 
grantor in situations similar to the case at 
bar, courts have considered the express lan-
guage of the deed, Wilson, 164 Mont, at 492, 
525 P.2d 24; testimony by grantors stating 
their intent, Willard v. First Church of 
Christ, Scientist, Pacifica (1972), 7 Cal.3d 
473, 102 Cal.Rptr. 739, 498 P.2d 987, 989; 
the fact that the grantor received less value 
for the property conveyed because of the 
existence of an easement, Mott v. Stanlake 
(1975), 63 Mich.App. 440, 234 N.W.2d 667, 
668, and Willard, 498 P.2d at 989-990; and, 
the sufficiency of the description of the 
location of the easement and whether or not 
the reservation names a dominant tene-
ment, State of Montana, By and Through 
the State Fish and Game Commission v. 
Cronin, supra, 587 P.2d at 399. 
[8] Considering these factors here, we 
find the lantruatre contained in the deed 
. DUTTER Mont. 6 7 3 
603 PJd 669 
almost identical to the language in Wilson, 
where we held no easement had been re-
served. Further, respondent Deutsch stat-
ed he knewr the deed contained the lan-
guage and had discussed it with appellant 
Bill Reddig, but that he did not know the 
implications of the language. Deutsch said 
he did know there was a road up to the 
home on the Dutter property that nobody 
other than the owners should be using. 
This testimony indicates that in executing 
the documents that passed equitable title to 
the property, Deutsch did not intend to 
create an easement. There is no testimony 
on the record showing any of the grantors 
of the Dutter property received leas than 
full value for the land because of the exist-
ence of an easement. Finally, although the 
language of the deed does locate the ease-
ment, it fails to name a dominant tenement. 
Considering these factors together, here, as 
in Wilson, it is as likely the grantors intend-
ed to protect their warranty of title as to 
reserve an easement. Thus, the deeds do 
not establish an easement of record. 
The third issue raised by this appeal in-
volves the failure of the District Court to 
enter findings, conclusions or a judgment 
concerning Count IV of appellants' com-
plaint. This count alleges Dutter tres-
passed on the Medhus property while bull-
dozing the disputed road shut and damaged 
the property by removing gravel to build 
the Kelly bump that blocked the road. 
[9] Appellants elicited testimony at the 
hearing on this case supporting the claim. 
The trial judge did not, however, enter 
findings, conclusions or judgment concern-
ing the matter. The District Court should 
have made findings concerning this issue 
and entered a judgment accordingly. Clav-
er v. Rosenquist (1972), 160 Mont. 4, 13, 499 
P.2d 1235, 1240. We therefore return the 
matter to the District Court with instruc-
tions to enter findings, conclusions and a 
judgment on this issue. In doing so, the 
court should hold whatever further proceed-
ings, if any, it deems necessary. 
The final issue raised here deals with the 
award of costs to respondents. Sections 
25-10-101 and 25-10-102, MCA, control the 
6 7 4 Mont. 603 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
disposition of this question. Those sections 
require the awarding of costs to the plain-
tiffs or the defendants in cases of this na-
ture upon a judgment in their favor. 
In this case, the judgment granted appel-
lants an easement over a portion of respon-
dents' property, but denied appellants any 
right to use the section of road over which 
the appellants prayed for an easement in 
their complaint. On remand, the District 
Court may find in favor of appellants or 
respondents on appellants' trespass claim. 
The judgment stated respondents should 
take nothing by their counterclaim but also 
ordered Medhus to move his fence. Re-
spondents had ^^cequested the fence be 
moved as part of ttieir counterclaim. 
The judgment thus found in favor of both 
parties to the suit on different issues 
involved in the case. We have previously 
held that a plaintiff need not recover on all 
claims presented by a complaint to be enti-
tled to costs under section 25-10-101, MCA. 
Jones v. Great Northern Railroad Company 
(1923), 68 Mont. 231, 242-245, 217 P. 673, 
677-678. We have also allowed a defend-
ant to recover costs when only partially 
successful on a counterclaim but totally suc-
cessful in defeating the plaintiff's claim. 
Spencer v. Mungus (1903), 28 Mont. 357, 
359-360, 72 P. 663, 664. We have never 
squarely faced, however, the issue of 
awarding costs in a case where the plaintiff 
partially succeeds on the complaint and the 
defendant prevails as to a part of the coun-
terclaim. In the only case presenting the 
question, the Court decider] in favor of the 
defendant without discussion. Aronow v. 
Hill (1930), 87 Mont. 153, 163, 286 P. 140, 
144. 
Montana adopted its cost statute from 
California. That state still has a similar 
statutory setup for awarding costs. Section 
1032, Cal.Code Civ.Proc. In interpreting 
their cost statutes, the California courts 
have come to the same result reached in 
Aronow by determining which party pre-
vailed on the main issue in controversy in a 
case. Whiting v. Squeglia (1924), 70 Cal. 
App. 108, 232 P. 986, 990. In Whiting the 
plaintiffs filed a complaint and the defend-
ant counterclaimed. The trial court en-
tered a judgment granting the plaintiffs 
part of the relief they requested and the 
defendant part of his claim with costs to 
the defendant. Whiting, 232 P. at 987. On 
appeal, the award of costs was upheld un-
der the costs statute based on the rationale 
that the defendant had prevailed on the 
main issue in controversy and, therefore, 
judgment had been entered in his favor. 
Whiting, 232 P. at 990. 
[10-12] Given the use of the main issue 
in controversy rule in California in inter-
preting cost statutes similar to those in 
Montana, we now adopt the rule in Mon-
tana for interpreting sections 25-10-101 
and 25-10-102, MCA. If a plaintiff files a 
complaint in an action covered by section 
25-10-101, MCA, and succeeds only partial-
ly, the plaintiff is entitled to costs. If an 
action is filed, the defendant counterclaims 
and succeeds in having the plaintiff's claim 
totally denied but only recovers a portion of 
the relief demanded in the counterclaim, 
the defendant should receive costs. If, 
however, a party initiates a law suit, the 
defendant counterclaims, and the judgment 
awards both parties part of the relief they 
seek, the party prevailing on the main issue 
in controversy in the case must be allowed 
costs. 
[13] Applying this rule to the case at 
bar, we find the District Court correctly 
awarded costs to respondents. The main 
issue in controversy here was the existence 
of an easement across the disputed road. 
The closing of the road precipitated the law 
suit and most of the testimony at the trial 
concerned the existence of an easement 
over the road. Respondents prevailed on 
that issue. The cost statutes therefore enti-
tled them to their costs of suit, including 
the cost of the survey necessary to deter-
mine boundary between the Medhus and 
Dutter properties. 
The judgment is affirmed in part but 
remanded to the District Court with in-
structions to enter a judgment on appel-
lants' trespass claim. 
HASWELL, C. J., and DALY, SHEA and 
SHEEHY, JJ., concur. 
CITY OF YAKUTAT, Appellant, 
Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
Frank L. RYMAN, Jr., Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant. 
Nos. 6033, 6099. 
Supreme Court of Alaska. 
Nov. 5, 1982. 
Taxpayer brought action against first-
class city to obtain a refund of general 
property taxes. The Superior Court, First 
Judicial District, Juneau, Allen T. Compton, 
J., entered judgment in favor of taxpayer 
for the years 1974 and 1975 and awarded 
costs and attorney fees, but entered judg-
ment in favor of city for year 1976 and 
denied costs and attorney fees, and city 
appealed and taxpayer cross-appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Rabinowitz, J., held that: 
(1) first-class city failed to substantially 
comply with statutory requirements so as to 
establish validity of the 1974 and 1975 gen-
eral property taxes imposed; (2) the delay 
of nine days in setting the mill levy, with 
the resulting 20-day delay in giving written 
notice to each person named in the assess-
ment role, fell within the range of substan-
tial compliance with the statutory require-
ments and did not, therefore, require an 
invalidation of the 1976 general property 
tax in absence of a showing of prejudice; 
and (3) an award of costs and attorney fees 
was warranted. 
Affirmed. 
1. Taxation <&=>318 
Where specific time requirements are 
accompanied by negative words that signify 
that acts shall not be done at any time 
other than those designated, courts are con-
strained to hold that an assessment may not 
be made in violation of statutory schedule. 
2. Taxation «=*319(1) 
Statutory requirements designed to 
protect taxpayers in their dealings with 
taxing authorities or to facilitate taxpayer 
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input into assessment process are more like-
ly to be classified as mandatory. 
3. Taxation e=>363 
Statutory provisions governing form 
and duration of notice to taxpayer as to his 
tax liability or his right to contest assess-
ment must be strictly construed. 
4. Taxation <3=>319(1) 
Statutory requirements which are in-
tended to serve primarily as guidelines for 
orderly conduct of public business are more 
likely to be considered directory in tax 
cases. 
5. Municipal Corporations @=>968(1) 
Statutory deadline for assessment of 
general property taxes by a first-class city 
outside a borough, the setting of the mill 
levy, and the mailing of tax statements are 
directory rather than mandatory and pre-
cise conformity to them is not a condition 
precedent to imposition of a valid tax. AS 
29.43.020, 29.53.170(b). 
6. Municipal Corporations e=>971(4) 
Failure of first-class city to meet statu-
tory deadlines for assessment of general 
property taxes did not operate to automati-
cally invalidate those taxes given lack of 
negative prohibitions in governing statute 
as to time of ;>crformance. fact that dead-
lines did not govern right to notice or op-
portunity for a hearing, and potential ad-
verse impact of imposition of a strict com-
pliance rule on local governments AS 29.-
43.020, 29.53.170(b). 
7. Municipal Corporations <s=971(4) 
When taxpayer establishes a violation 
of the "directory" procedures set forth in 
the statute for imposition of genera! proj>-
erty taxes by a first-class city, the burden 
should be on the taxing authority to demon-
strate substantial compliance with the re-
quirements and purposes of statute. AS 
29.43.020, 29.53.170(b). 
8. Municipal Corporations <s=1000(5) 
Once a showing of substantial compli-
ance with the requirements and purposes of 
the statute has been made by a first-class 
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city for imposition of general property tax-
es, the action of the taxing authority will be 
upheld unless the taxpayer is able to dem-
onstrate that the noncompliance resulted in 
substantial prejudice to its interests. AS 
29.43.020, 29.53.170(b). 
9. Municipal Corporations <s=»974(3) 
Where first-class city fails to establish 
substantial compliance with the require-
ments and purposes of the statute for impo-
sition of general property taxes, prejudice 
to the taxpayer will be presumed and the 
tax or assessment will be overturned. AS 
29.43.020, 29.53.170(b). 
10. Municipal Corporations <$=>971(4) 
First-class city failed to substantially 
comply with statutory requirements so as to 
establish validity of the 1974 and 1975 gen-
eral property taxes imposed by it where, 
aside from fact that assessment notices and 
tax statements were not provided, there 
were no equalization hearings, city did not 
set the 1974 mill levy until 1975 and was 
not only three months late in setting the 
1975 levy, but was 15 months late in mail-
ing the tax statements to property owners. 
AS 29.43.020, 29.53.170(b). 
11. Taxation <s=>363 
The delay of nine days in setting the 
mill levy, with the resulting 20-day delay in 
giving written notice to each person named 
in the assessment roll, fell within the range 
of substantial compliance with the statuto-
ry requirement and did not, therefore, re-
quire an invalidation of the 1976 general 
property tax in absence of a showing of 
prejudice to taxpayer's interest such as a 
deprivation of his right to contest or appeal 
the assessment. AS 29.43.020, 29.53.170(b). 
12. Municipal Corporations <s=>971(4) 
One of the ways in which a taxpayer 
may be prejudiced by a delay in receiving 
notice of an assessment of general property 
taxes by a first-class city, so that tax or 
assessment may be overturned, is if he is 
deprived of his right to contest or appeal 
the assessment. AS 29.43.020, 29.53.170(b). 
13. Municipal Corporations @=> 1000(7) 
It could not be said that because seven 
of eleven original claims against first-class 
city were abandoned, city prevailed as 1 
tax assessment claims so as to precluc 
taxpayer from obtaining an award of cos1 
and fees in his favor, even though clairr 
were mooted by corrective actions taken b 
city, where those corrective actions wer 
made in response to those claims. AS 29 
43.020, 29.53.170(b). 
14. Costs «=>32(3) 
Anfawardof costs and iees in favor c 
taxpayerswas nott.precluded^on ground tha 
taxpayer did not prevail against first-clas 
city on tax refund claim, nQtwj|hstandinj 
that#aitpayers total recovery was less thai 
generajjorpperty tax for two of the thre« 
yea>s in question "wS^nvalidated and tax 
pa^^cofnplaint succeeded in forcing th< 
city fS^orhply with the statutory proce 
dures for assessing general property taxes 
AS 29.43.020, 29.53.170(b). 
15. Costs e=>172 
Refusing taxpayer's request for full at-
torney fees in suit against first-class cit) 
for refund of general property taxes wa< 
not an abuse of discretion, even though suit 
qualified as public interest litigation, where 
both sides expended unreasonable amounts 
of time and energy and amount awarded 
was sufficient for taxpayer to present his 
case adequately. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 82. 
16. Costs <z=>H2 
Taxpayer was not entitled to a higher 
attorney fee award under the "complex liti-
gation" exception to the rule in his action 
against first-class city for refund on general 
property taxes where most of his claims 
were dismissed as moot and the remainder, 
disposed of via summary judgment and 
stipulation, were not particularly complex 
or difficult. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 82. 
17. Costs <£=>172 
Where the trial court correctly charac-
terized the taxpayer's suit against the 
third-class city for refund of general prop-
erty taxes as public interest litigation, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding the taxpayer $15,000 in attorney 
fees under the "public interest" exception 
to the general rule even if the amount did 
equal full "reasonable" attorney fees. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 82. 
18. Costa «=172 
A trial court is not bound to award full 
attorney fees to a prevailing taxpayer un-
der the public interest exception under the 
general rule, but may exclude charges it 
finds to be unreasonable. Rules Civ.Proa, 
Rule 82. 
Patrick M. Anderson, Hedland, Fleischer 
& Friedman, Anchorage, for appellant, 
cross-appellee. 
L.B. Jacobson, Robertson, Monagle, Eas-
taugh & Bradley, Juneau, for appellee, 
cross-appellant. 
Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, 
CONNOR and MATTHEWS, JJ . 
OPINION 
RABINOWITZ, Justice. 
The City of Yakutat is a first class city 
not within an organized borough. It has 
1. AS 29.43.020 provides 
Assessment and tax collection. Home rule 
and first class cities outside boroughs may 
assess, levy and collect a general property 
tax. A property tax if levied must be as-
sessed, levied and collected as provided by 
ch. 53 of this title for boroughs Cities out-
side boroughs may levy and collect sales and 
use taxes as provided by ch 53 of this title 
for boroughs 
2. AS 29.53 060(a) reads 
Full and true value (a) The assessor shall 
assess property at its full and true value as of 
January 1 of the assessment year, except as 
provided in this section and AS 29.53 030, 
29.53.035 and 29.53.160 The full and true 
value is the estimated price which the prop 
erty would bring in an open market and un-
der the theYi prevailing market conditions in a 
sale between a willing seller and a willing 
buyer both conversant with the property and 
with prevailing general price levels 
3. AS 29.53 100(a) reads 
The assessor shall prepare an annual assess-
ment roll The roll contains 
(1) a description of all taxable property; 
(2) the assessed value of all taxable prop 
erty, 
(3) the names and addresses of persons 
with property subject to assessment and tax-
ation. 
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the power to levy genera! property taxes in 
accordance with the procedures set out in 
AS 29.53.010-.390.1 Under those proce-
dures, the municipal assessor assesses real 
property at its value as of January 1 of the 
assessment year.2 On the basis of this in-
formation, the assessor prepares an assess-
ment roll containing a description of all 
taxable property, the assessed value of this 
property, and the names and addresses of 
the owners of property subject to taxation.3 
The assessor then provides written notice to 
each person named in the assessment roll; 
this notice is to be mailed at least 30 days 
prior to the equalization hearings.4 The 
city assembly sits as a board of equalization 
for the purpose of hearing any appeals from 
the determinations of the municipal asses-
sor.5 Any resultant changes or adjustments 
in property valuations must be certified by 
the board to the assessor within seven days, 
and the assessor is then directed to file the 
final assessment roll by June l.6 Finally, 
4. AS 29.53.110 reads: 
Assessment notice, (a) The assessor shall 
give every' person named in the assessment 
roll a notice of assessment, showing the as-
sessed value of his property. On each notice 
is printed a brief summary of the dates when 
taxes are payable, delinquent and subject to 
penalty and interest, and the dates when the 
board of equalization will sit. 
(b) Sufficient assessment notice is given if 
mailed by first class mail 30 days before the 
equalization hearings If the address is not 
known to the assessor, the notice may be 
addressed to the person at the post office 
nearest the property. Notice is effective on 
the date of mailing 
5. AS 29.53.135 
6. AS 29.53.140 reads: 
Hearing (a) If an appellant fails to ap 
pear, the board of equalization may proceed 
with the hearing in his absence. 
(b) The appellant bears the burden of 
proof. 
(c) The only grounds for adjustment is 
proof of unequal, excessive or improper valu-
ation based on facts which are stated in a 
valid written appeal timely filed or proved at 
the hearing 
(d) The board shall certify its actions to 
the assessor within seven days. 
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the assembly determines the rate of levy 
before June 15 of each assessment year, and 
tax statements are mailed to property own-
ers by July 1 of the assessment year.7 
In 1974 the City failed to assess or levy 
real property taxes. The City did not pro-
vide assessment notices to proj>erty owners, 
there were no equalization hearings and tax 
statements were not mailed to property 
owners. In 1975 separate assessment no-
tices for 1974 and 1975 were mailed to 
municipal property owners on August 29, 
and the mill levy for both years was estab-
lished on September 6, 1975. The City held 
an equalization hearing on September 30, 
and tax statements were mailed to property 
owners on October 7. During 1976 the as-
sessment notices apparently were timely 
but the mill levy was not established until 
June 24 and the tax statements were 
mailed on or about July 20.8 
On or about July 26, 1977 Ryman paid 
under protest $4,430.57 in taxes, which rep-
resented his tax liability for the years 1974, 
1975, and 1976.9 On July 27, 1977, Ryman 
filed a complaint against the City asserting 
eleven separate claims for relief.10 Ryman 
subsequently moved for voluntary dismissal 
of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sev-
enth, eighth, and ninth claims; the eleventh 
claim which was in the nature of a motion 
for costs and attorney's fees was reserved 
(e) The assessor shall enter the changes 
and certify the final assessment roll by June 
1. 
7. AS 29.53.170(b) reads: 
Hie assembly shall annually determine the 
rate of levy before June 15. By July I the tax 
collector shall mail tax statements setting out 
the levy, dates when taxes are payable and 
delinquent, and penalties and interest. 
The remaining sections of AS 29.53 which set 
out procedures for collection of taxes and en-
forcement of tax liens are not relevant to the 
present dispute. 
8. The parties disputed the date of the 1976 
mailing. Although the defendant's tax state-
ment was postmarked July 20, the City con-
tended that the statements were mailed on 
June 30, which would be one day prior to the 
statutory deadline. The superior court found 
that the date of mailing was probably closer to 
the July 20 date alleged by Ryman. 
9. Mr. Ryman owned three parcels of property 
against which taxes were levied, as follows: 
for post-trial determination by the court. 
Thus, of Ryman's original eleven claims for 
relief only the sixth and tenth remained as 
of the date set for trial. In addition there 
were two counterclaims filed by the City: 
the first sought penalty and interest 
charges allegedly owed by Ryman due to 
delinquent payment of city sales taxes, the 
second sought costs and attorney's fees in-
curred by the City in defending the dis-
missed claims. Ryman's sixth claim, chal-
lenging certain conveyances of land by the 
City, and the City's counterclaim for sales 
taxes were settled by stipulation leaving 
Ryman's tenth claim, for refund of property 
taxes, for decision by the superior court.11 
After a hearing on cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, the superior court entered 
judgment in favor of Ryman for the 1974 
and 1975 taxes and in favor of the City for 
1976. Ryman and the City then filed oppos-
ing motions for costs and attorney's fees. 
At the hearing on these motions the superi-
or court determined that the litigation in-
volved questions of public interest and 
awarded Ryman, who it determined was the 
prevailing party, $5,028.98 in costs and $15,-
000 in attorney fees. The City appealed the 
superior court's decision on the 1974 and 
1975 taxes and its award of costs and attor-
ney's fees to Ryman. Ryman cross-appeal-
Property Description 1974 1975 1976 
U S S 2 8 8 ! . L o t 6 1 $129.21 $783 73 $2.533 20 
U S S 2 8 8 1 . L o t 6 $ 3 8 . 2 2 $ 2 6 95 $ 82 32 
USS 2881, Lot 81 $262.44 $137.10 $ 437 40 
Total $429.87 SSH7.78 $3.052 92 
10. In his complaint Ryman charged that the 
City also failed to comply with the provisions 
of its own local ordinances governing the as-
sessment of property taxes. On appeal, how-
ever, the parties have directed their arguments 
solely to the effect of the City's noncompliance 
with the provisions of the state statutes. Our 
discussion of the issues is accordingly limited. 
See State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 
P.2d 520, 528 (Alaska 1980). Lewis v. State, 
469 P.2d 689, 691-92 (Alaska 1970). 
11. The City agreed that its claim for costs and 
attorney's fees should be reserved for later de-
termination under Civil Rule 82. 
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ed challenging the court's ruling on the 
1976 tax and its denial of full attorney's 
fees. 
The City concedes that in 1974 and 1975 it 
failed to meet the deadlines set out in AS 
29.53.170(b) for the setting of the mill levy 
(June 15) and the mailing of tax statements 
(July 1), as provided in AS 29.53.170(b). 
The City also admits that in 1976 it failed to 
set the mill levy by June 15; there remains 
some dispute over whether the City met the 
July 1 deadline for mailing tax statements 
to property owners. Thus the principal 
question presented in this appeal is whether 
the property taxes for 1974, 1975, and 1976 
are invalid due to the untimeliness of the 
City's assessments and levies. 
Ryman asserts that the statutory dead-
lines are mandatory and that strict compli-
ance with them is necessary to make a levy 
valid. AS 29.43.020 provides that a first 
class city outsjde a borough "must" assess 
taxes in accordance with the procedures of 
AS 29.53 and AS 29.53.170(b), which stales 
that the mill levy "shall" be determined 
before June 15 and that tax statements 
"shall" be mailed by July 1. Ryman argues 
that the language of the statutes evidences 
a cleaj- legislative intent to impose manda-
tory procedural guidelines on the exercise 
of taxing powers by first class cities outside 
boroughs. The City contends that these 
deadlines are directory rather than manda-
tory and that precise conformity to them is 
not a condition precedent to the imposition 
of a valid tax. It argues that in order to 
invalidate a tax for failure to comply with 
the statu lor}' deadlines the aggrieved tax-
payer must establish that he was prejudiced 
by any delay/ 
The superior court rejected Flyman's ar-
gument that the property taxes were void 
unless the City strictly complied with the 
statutory deadlines. Although it did not 
employ the term "directory", the superior 
12. Initially, we note that this controversy is not 
resolved simply by asking whether the legisla-
ture intended for the locaJ taxing authorities to 
follow the prescribed procedures. As the Ore 
gon supreme court has stated: 
Such an issue cannot be decided by exam-
ining whether the legislature "directed" that 
court ruled that "substantial compliance" 
with the statutory requirements is suffi-
cient to protect taxpayers' rights and to 
establish a valid tax. The court concluded 
that the City failed substantially to comply 
with relevant statutory provisions in 1974 
and 1975 and Ryman was thus entitled to a 
refund of his tax payments for these years. 
The court went on to find that there was 
substantial compliance by the City in 1976 
and that the 1976 levy therefore was valid. 
We begin our analysis with the premise 
that the City is obligated to comply with 
statutory restrictions on its taxing powers. 
This leads us to the question whether any-
thing less than strict compliance with these 
"obligatory" statutory' requirements invali-
dates the resulting tax. To answer this 
question we must consider several factors.12 
[1] P^irst, where specific time require-
ments are accompanied by negative words 
that signify that the acts shall not be done 
at any time other than those designated, 
courts are constrained to hold that an as-
sessment may not be made in violation of 
the statutory schedule. Anaconda Co. v. 
Department of Revenue, 278 Or. 723, 565 
P.2d 10S4, 1088 (1977); In Re McLean 
Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 242, 188 S.E.2d 452, 
457 (1972). In this case the terms of AS 
29.53.170(b) do not indicate that the specific 
dates were intended to IK- absolute limits on 
the authority of local taxing officials. 
While the statute provides a schedule for 
setting the tax rate and mailing tax state-
ments, it does not state that non-compliance 
invalidates all subsequent attempts at com-
pliance. In addition, we note that there is 
no statement in the applicable statutes re-
garding the legal effect of noncompliance 
by the local taxing body. Therefore, we 
conclude that the legislature has not provid-
ed a clear signal of its intent with regard to 
noncompliance with these statutory dead-
lines. 
the procedure be followed or "mandated" it, 
for the issue arises only when the legislative 
W'ords make compliance obligatory. 
Anaconda Co v. Dept of Revenue, 278 Or. 723, 
565 P.2d 1084, 1087 (1977) 
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[2] Second, statutory requirements de-
signed to protect taxpayers in their dealings 
with the taxing authority or to facilitate 
taxpayer input into the assessment process 
are more likely to be classified as mandato-
ry. An early annotation, after noting that 
it was impossible to formulate any univer-
sal rules due to the diversity of statutory 
provisions, made the following observation: 
Generally, however, it may be observed 
that where the purpose of the statute is 
to protect the taxpayer, the provision as 
to the time when an act is to be per-
formed by a tax official or board is ordi-
narily construed to be mandatory, espe-
cially where there are negative words in 
the statute that the act shall not be done 
at any other time. On the other hand, 
where the purpose of the statute is not to 
protect the taxpayer, but merely to set up 
a guide for the tax officials, a provision 
as to the time when an act is to be 
performed by a tax official or board is 
ordinarily construed to be merely directo-
ry, especially where there are no negative 
words in the statute that the act shall not 
be done at any other time.13 
[3] We have held that statutory provi-
sions g6verning the form and duration of 
notice to the taxpayer as to his tax liability 
or his right to contest the assessment must 
be strictly construed; total compliance is 
necessary to protect the taxpayer and to 
validate the taxing authority's action. Ste-
phens v. Rogers Construction Co., 411 P.2d 
205, 207 (Alaska 1966); Johnson v. Miller, 
391 P.2d 437, 440-41 (Alaska 1964). In 
Stephens we held that the local board's 
failure to post the required ten-day notice 
of the tax hearing or to establish the date, 
mode, and manner of assessment or to pub-
licly equalize property values prior to fixing 
the mill levy resulted in an invalid tax. 
The reason for these conclusions is that 
statutory provisions relating to notice, to 
the date, mode and manner of assessment 
of taxes, and to the equalization of valua-
tion of property assessed for taxes are 
not merely directory in the sense that 
they are intended for the guidance of the 
Board in the conduct of its business, so as 
to secure order, system and dispatch in 
the Board's proceedings. Such provisions 
are designed for the protection of the 
rights of the taxpayer—to apprise him of 
the contemplated tax and how and when 
it will be assessed, and to give him the 
opportunity to be heard as to the tax 
obligation that is being imposed upon 
him. Provisions of this type are manda-
tory, and when they are not complied 
with the imposition of the tax is invalid 
and ineffective.14 
[4] Statutory requirements which are 
intended to serve primarily as guidelines for 
the orderly conduct of public business are 
more likely to be considered directory. 
Some courts have held that strict compli-
ance is unnecessary where the statutory 
provisions establish the schedule for the as-
sessment and levy of taxes, and noncompli-
ance does not affect the taxpayer's right to 
contest his tax liability. County of Marico-
pa v. Garfield, 109 Ariz. 503, 513 P.2d 932, 
933 (1973); St Louis County v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 529 S.W.2d 384 (Mo.1975); Parker 
v. Krick, 433 Pa. 514, 252 A.2d 648, 649 
(1969). See also Annot., 151 A.L.R. 248 
(1944). 
Any effort to apply the analysis outlined 
above to the statutory provisions in the 
present case, however, is somewhat proble-
matic. While the statutory deadlines for 
the assessment and levy of taxes undoubt-
edly serve to structure and regulate the 
internal operations of the taxing authori-
ties, they also serve the interests of taxpay-
ers. Compliance with these deadlines pro-
vides timely notice to the taxpayer of his 
annual assessment, thereby allowing the 
taxpayer to calculate with some degree of 
certainty the extent of his tax liability and 
to plan his annual financial affairs so as to 
meet this obligation. We therefore reject 
the notion that these deadlines can be char-
acterized solely as administrative guide-
lines. It does not necessarily follow, how-
ever, that a tax levy is invalid whenever the 
13. Annot., 151 A.L.R. 248, 248 (1944). 14. Stephens, 411 P.2d at 207. 
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taxing authority has failed to comply strict-
ly with the statutory deadlines. While 
there are instances where a substantial de-
lay in the assessment and fixing of taxes or 
the mailing of tax statements will seriously 
prejudice taxpayers' interests, there are 
also instances where minor deviations from 
these statutory deadlines will result in lit-
tle, if any, such prejudice. Rigid adherence 
to a rule of strict compliance in all cases 
would in our view be unreasonable. 
Third and finally, serious practical conse-
quences will follow from characterizing the 
statutory deadlines in this case as mandato-
ry. The application of a rule of strict com-
pliance to the statutory deadlines for the 
levying of taxes could seriously handicap 
the operation of local governments. Any 
deviation from the statutory norms, how-
ever slight or inadvertent, would automati-
cally invalidate the entire assessment proc-
ess. A significant source of revenue for 
local governments would be forfeited due to 
the mistake or dereliction of public officials. 
[5, 6] After considering all of the fac-
tors described above, we conclude that the 
statutory deadlines for the assessment of 
taxes, the setting of the mill levy, and the 
mailing of tax statements should be con-
strued as directory. Given the lack of neg-
ative prohibitions in the statute as to time 
of performance, the fact that these dead-
lines do not govern the right to notice or 
the opportunity for a hearing (even though 
in some cases they may offer significant 
protection to taxpayers' interests), and the 
potential adverse impact of a strict compli-
ance rule on local governments, we hold 
that the City's failure to meet the statutory 
deadlines does not automatically invalidate 
its decisions. 
Having declined to characterize these 
deadlines as mandatory, we must establish 
some standard for determining when the 
15. See Allen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No 1 of Thur-
ston Cty., 55 Wash 2d 226. 347 P.2d 539, 543 
(1959). See also IA CD Sands, Sutherland 
Statutory Construction 4th ed § 25 03, p. 299 
300 (1972). 
16. The substantial compliance test, in our opin 
ion, strikes the proper balance between the 
failure to comply with a "directory" dead-
line will invalidate the local taxing authori-
ty's action. The City argues that the tax 
should be upheld, regardless of the duration 
or the extent of the noncompliance, unless 
the delay results in prejudice to the taxpay-
er. According to the City, the burden 
should be on the taxpayer to show that the 
assessor overvalued the property and that 
the noncompliance deprived the taxpayer of 
an opportunity to contest his assessment 
before the local equalization board. Sec 
Good Development Co. v. Horner, 260 
N.W.2d 524, 530 (Iowa 1977). 
[7-9] In our view, when the taxpayer 
establishes a violation of these "directory" 
procedures, the burden should be on the 
taxing authority to demonstrate substantial 
compliance with the requirements and pur-
poses of the statute.15 Once a showing of 
substantial compliance has been made, the 
taxing authority's action will be upheld un-
less the taxpayer is able to demonstrate 
that the noncompliance resulted in substan-
tial prejudice to his interests. Where the 
local government's action fails to meet the 
substantial compliance test, however, preju-
dice to the taxpayer will be presumed and 
the tax or assessment will be overturned.16 
We n<>w turn to the record in this case. 
110J In 1974 the City made no attempt 
to comply with the statutory requirements. 
Assessment notices and tax statements 
were not provided and there were no equal-
ization hearings. The City did not set the 
1974 levy until September 1975, and tax 
statements were not mailed until October 
1975, fifteen months after the statutory 
deadline. In light of these delays we agree 
with the su;>erior court that there was no 
substantial compliance of the City's part 
and thus the 1974 tax was invalid as to 
Ry man. 
interest of taxpayers in having the taxing au-
thority adhere to statutorily-mandated proce-
dures and the interest of the taxing authority 
and the general public in not having levies 
declared invalid because of the negligence of 
the taxing authority's employees. 
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In 1975 the City was three months late in 
setting the levy and mailing the tax state-
ments to property owners. While this 
presents a closer question we conclude that 
this delay does not constitute substantial 
compliance as a matter of law. As we 
indicated previously, the "substantial com-
pliance" rule is intended to allow for minor 
delays or disruptions in the assessment pro-
cedures. The 90-day delay in this case can-
not be characterized as minor, and the City 
has failed to offer any justification for it. 
We therefore uphold the superior court's 
ruling that the 1975 tax was invalid as to 
Ryman. 
[11] In 1976, the City missed the dead-
line for setting the mill levy by nine days. 
We think that despite this minor delay, the 
City substantially complied with the stat-
ute. There is some dispute over the precise 
mailing date in 1976. Even if we accept 
Ryman's date of July 20 we think that the 
resulting 20-day delay falls within the 
range of substantial compliance. There-
fore, the 1976 tax wrill be upheld unless this 
delay resulted in some prejudice to Ryman's 
interests. 
Ryman's sole allegation of prejudice is 
that the City's delay in setting the mill levy 
caused him to miss the hearing at which the 
tax rate was established. He claims that he 
would have been able to attend and partici-
pate in the levy hearing if it had been held 
by the June 15 deadline. As it was, how-
ever, he was forced to leave town on busi-
ness before the City convened the hearing 
and set the levy. Ryman charges that he 
was deprived of his right to be seen and 
heard on the municipal budget and to as-
certain his tax liability. 
17. The seven abandoned claims involved gener-
al challenges to the City's governmental opera-
tions. Specifically Ryman alleged that the City 
failed to comply with statutory provisions re-
garding the codification of ordinances, the con-
duct of city counsel meetings and municipal 
elections, the assessment and collection of local 
taxes, and the preparation of the budget. In 
addition, Ryman claimed the City had discrimi-
natorily zoned a parcel of his property thereby 
precluding its development. 
[12] We are unpersuaded by Ryman's 
claims of prejudice. Several courts have 
held that a violation of a taxing provision 
does not prejudice the taxpayer's rights un-
less it deprives him of his right to contest or 
appeal the assessment. Good Development 
Co. v. Horner, 260 N.W.2d 524, 528 (Iowa 
1977); Parker v. Krick, 433 Pa. 514, 252 
A.2d 648, 649 (1969). While we are not 
adopting this as the sole test of prejudice 
we deem it significant that Ryman has not 
alleged that he was not given an opportuni-
ty to contest his assessment or that the 
delay caused him to incur a late charge or 
penalty on his taxes. In addition, we note 
that Ryman's absence was based in part on 
his own decision to pursue his personal busi-
ness rather than to wait for the convening 
of the hearing. While we are cognizant of 
Ryman's frustration at the City's untimeli-
ness, we do not think that Ryman has made 
a sufficient showing of prejudice to invali-
date the 1976 tax. 
Civil Rules 54 and 82 provide for the 
award of costs and attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party. In this case the superior 
court determined that Ryman had prevailed 
and entered an award of costs and fees in 
his favor. The City advances two., argu-
ments in support of its claim that this rul-
ing was erroneous. 
[13] First, seven of Ryman's eleven 
original claims against the City were aban-
doned by Ryman in his second amended 
complaint because remedial actions taken 
by the City had rendered them moot.17 Al-
though these claims technically were dis-
missed as moot, the City asserts that it 
controverted Ryman's allegations as to each 
of these claims in its answer to the amend-
ed complaint, and implies that Ryman's re-
Ryman's motion for voluntary dismissal of 
these claims was not opposed by the City and 
was granted by the superior court although the 
court stated that the proper procedure for par-
tial dismissal should have been an amendment 
under Civil Rule 15(a) rather than a voluntary' 
dismissal under Civil Rule 41. The propriety of 
this ruling is not at issue in this appeal. 
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quest for voluntary dismissal of these onJiiermGAQtary^award^jnisleading since 
claims was a "de facto" triumph for the 
City. Ryman concedes that these claims 
were mooted by the City's corrective actions 
but argues that the City's remedial meas-
ures were made in res[>onse to his lawsuit. 
The City contends that it initiated these 
corrective steps prior to the filing of Ry-
man's complaint and denies that Ryman's 
law suit was in any way responsible for 
them. 
The dismissal of a complaint, with or 
without prejudice, may justify an award of 
attorney's fees to the defendant as the 
"prevailing" party. Hart v. Wolff, 489 P.2d 
114, 119 (Alaska 1971). Moreover, in grant-
ing a motion for voluntary dismissal, after 
the merits of the controversy have been put 
into issue, the trial court may award costs 
and attorney's fees to the defendant. Mil-
ler v. Wilkes, 49G P.2d 176, 178 (Alaska 
1972). Thus there is precedent for the 
City's argument that it "prevailed" on the 
dismissed claims. In this case, however, the 
claims were dismissed as moot as a result of 
the City's corrective actions. Although the 
City claims its actions were not prompted 
by the litigation, the superior court found 
that Ryman's lawsuit provided some impe-
tus for the City's improvement in its opera-
tions. Because the City's reaction to Ry-
man's complaint was at least partly respon-
sible for the claims becoming moot, we con-
clude that the City has failed to establish 
that it prevailed as to thesr claims. 
[14] J ^ e x t , the City contends that Ry-
man did not -prevail on the tax refund 
claim. Specifically the City asserts that 
although ihe trial court Invalidated the 
properjy/tax f°r two. of Lhe three years in 
question.^yman'i^Lotal.recovery was less 
than one-third of ^the.refund he requested.18 
Ryrrian* contends that the City's emphasis 
18. Ryman's lax bill in 1974 was $429 87 as 
compared to $947 78 in 1975 and $3,052 92 in 
1976. Set supra note 9. Thus Ryman's refund 
of the 1974 and 1975 taxes amounted to 
$1,377.65, the City retained the 1976 payment 
it ignores^he^Xa^t^that Ryman's complaint 
was also intended to force'the City to com-
P*y v^ 1^ e»»&!'atutory procedures for as-
sessing pro{>erty taxes. 
The determination of the prevailing party 
is committed to the trial court's discretion 
and will be affirmed on appeal unless it is 
shown that the court abused its discretion 
by issuing a decision which is arbitrary, 
capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or im-
properly motivated.19 
[T]he prevailingj)arty^tq a su i t i s . t heone 
who^ua^s^uljy^prosecutes the action or 
successfully, defends against it, prevailing 
on the main issue^even though not to the 
extent-ofrthe original contention.
 ? ,He is 
the one in whose favor the decision or 
verdict is rendered-and the judgment en-
tered.20 
The main issue in this case was the dispute 
over the effect of the City's noncompliance 
with the statutory tax procedures. Al-
though the superior court agreed with the 
City that the statutory deadlines were di-
rectory, it ruled that the City's noncompli-
ance invalidated the property taxes for 1974 
and 1975 The fact that Ryman failed to 
recover the full refund does not preclude 
him from being the prevailing party. TOLK*-
luk v. Unci, 589 P.2d 873, 876 (Alaska 1979). 
Given that Ryman sought to correct the 
City's taxing procedures as well as to obtain 
a tax refund, we conclude that the superior 
court did not abuse its discretion in deter-
mining that Ryman was the prevailing par-
ty-
Ryman sought $5,028.9S in costs and $47,-
640.93 in attorney's fees. The superior 
court granted Ryman full costs but limited 
his attorney's fees to $15,000. Ryman con-
tends that this award was insufficient and 
that he was entitled to full fees under ei-
19. Tobeluk v. Lind. 589 P.2d 873, 878 (Alaska 
1979); Continental Ins. Co v. United States 
Fid & Guar. Co, 552 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Alaska 
1976). 
20. Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873, 876 (Alaska 
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ther the "public interest"2l or "complex 
litigation"22 exceptions to Civil Rule 82. 
We have held that the purpose of Civil 
Rule 82 is to provide partial compensation 
to the prevailing party for costs and fees. 
Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 512 P.2d 575, 
588, 63 A.L.R.3d 1034 (Alaska 1973). 
Where the litigation involves questions of 
public interest, however, the prevailing 
plaintiff may be entitled to full attorney's 
fees. 
[T]he successful public interest plaintiff, 
acting as a "private attorney general," 
should not be penalized by Rule 82 by-
failing to receive full compensation for 
the costs of litigating issues of public 
importance. We hold, therefore, that the 
trial court may, in its discretion, award 
full attorney's fees to public interest 
plaintiffs.23 
[15] Even though this suit qualifies as 
public interest litigation, it does not follow 
that Ryman is automatically entitled to full 
compensation. As Ryman acknowledges, 
the decision is still committed to the trial 
court's discretion. While this discretion 
may be somewhat narrower than in the 
usual Rule 82 context24 the court is not 
bound to award full fees; it may exclude 
charges it finds to be unreasonable. In the 
present case the superior court found that 
the litigation had gotten out of hand and 
that both sides had expended unreasonable 
amounts of time and energy'. The court 
determined that a sum of $15,000 would 
have been sufficient for Ryman to present 
this case adequately. After reviewing the 
record we conclude that the court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing Ryman's 
request for full attorney's fees. 
[16] We also reject Ryman's argument 
that he was entitled to a higher award 
under the "complex litigation" exception to 
1979), quoUngi&uzaiytiGolumbia ^Lumber Co., 
395^2a%lir514 (Alaska 1964) 
21. Thomas v. Bailey, 611 P.2d 536, 539 (Alaska 
1980); Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986, 
993-94 (Alaska 1977). 
22. Chugach Elec. Ass'n v. Northern Corp., 562 
P.2d 1053, 1063-64 (Alaska 1977), afVd, 563 
Civil Rule 82. Under this doctrine we have 
upheld enhanced awards of fees in cases 
involving numerous complex issues, exten-
sive time and expense, longer than normal 
trials, and unusually large claims or recov-
eries. Chugach Electric Ass'n v. Northern 
Corp., 562 P.2d 1053, 1063-64 (Alaska 1977), 
aff'd, 563 R2d 883 (1977); Beech Aircraft 
Corp. v. Harvey, 558 P.2d 879, 887 (Alaska 
1976). In this case most of the claims were 
dismissed as moot and the rest were dis-
posed of via summary judgment and stipu-
lation. We do not think the issues were 
particularly complex or difficult and the 
amounts in controversy were not unusually 
large. 
[17,18] Finally, the City contends that 
the trial court erred in awarding Ryman 
$15,000 in attorney's fees because that 
award constituted an award of full "reason-
able" attorney's fees (i.e., the full fees that 
a reasonable attorney would have charged 
Ryman for handling this case) and Ryman 
did not qualify for an award of full fees 
under the "public interest" exception. We 
reject this contention. The trial court cor-
rectly characterized this case as public in-
terest litigation, and therefore, even if $15,-
000 did equal full "reasonable" attorney's 
fees, the court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding Ryman that sum. 
The judgment of the trial court is AF-
FIRMED. 
COMPTON, J., not participating. 
p.2d 883 (Alaska 1977); Beech Aircraft Corp. 
v. Harvey, 558 P.2d 879, 887 (Alaska 1976). 
23. Anchorage v. McCabe, 568 P.2d 986. 993-94 
(Alaska 1977). 




The claimant's development of allergic 
contact dermatitis was unexpected, i.e., it 
is not recognized as an inherent' hazard 
of continued exposure to the chemicals 
with which the claimant routinely 
worked; his development of allergic con-
tact dermatitis was not gradual, i.e., a 
single exposure to the chemical in ques-
tion triggered the immunological re-
sponse that created the antibodies, that 
are his allergy, no later than seven days 
after the single, triggering exposure. 
[3] Dr. Ballinger's testimony demon-
strates that a tangible happening of a trau-
matic nature resulted in Mr. Bremer's con-
tact dermatitis, thereby meeting the tests 
under § 39-71-119, MCA. We hold that 
Mr. Bremer's allergy constituted an injury 
within the meaning of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act, as well as an occupational 
disease within the meaning of the Occupa-
tional Disease Act, so that he could elect 
his remedy between the Acts. The judg-
ment of the Workers' Compensation Court 
is affirmed. 
HOVEN v. AMRINE Mont. 5 3 3 
Cite M 727 P2d 533 (Monl. 1936) 
"time-definiteness" notices on buyers for failure to pay for 
stock they had purchased. The District 
Court, Fourth Judicial District, Missoula 
County, James B. Wheelis, J., issued p r e 
liminary injunction against buyers restrain-
ing them from taking any action which 
might negatively affect value of corpora-
tion or its stock. Buyers filed motion to 
modify preliminary injunction in order to 
allow sale of corporate asset. Trial court 
ruled default notices were valid and award-
ed seller1 attorney fees. Buyers appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Sheehy, J., held that: 
(1) modification of preliminary injunction 
was necessary in order to allow corpora-
tion's operations to continue and injunction 
was necessary to prevent buyers from dis-
sipating assets of corporation, and thus sell-
er was entitled to attorney fees in connec-
tion with modification hearing, and (2) 
award of attorney fees was not abuse of 
discretion, even though seller could have 
avoided modification hearing by stipulating 
to sale of asset. 
Affirmed. 
TURNAGE, C.J., and SHEEHY, MORRI-
SON, GULBRANDSON and HUNT, JJ., 
concur. 
Vernon HOVEN, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
William F. AMRINE and Larry 
Vervick, Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. 86-330. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted on Briefs Sept. 25, 1986. 
Decided Oct. 30, 1986. 
Buyers and seller entered into stock 
purchase agreement. Seller served default 
1. Costs <s=172 
Preliminary injunction, restraining 
stock purchase agreement buyers from tak-
ing any action which might negatively af-
fect value of corporation or its stock, and 
hearing to modify that injunction, in order 
to allow sale of corporate asset to permit 
corporation's operations to continue, were 
one facet of the litigation whose main is-
sues were validity of default notices served 
by stock purchase agreement seller and 
breach of contract; therefore, stock pur-
chase agreement provision, granting attor-
ney fees in event lawsuit was brought to 
enforce any agreement provisions, entitled 
seller as prevailing party to attorney fees 
incurred in connection with hearing on 
modification of preliminary injunction. 
2. CosU «=>32(2) 
The "prevailing party," for purposes of 
determining award of costs, is party who 
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has affirmative judgment rendered in his 
or her favor at conclusion of entire action. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Costs <e^l72 
It was not abuse of discretion to award 
attorney fees, pursuant to stock purchase 
agreement provision, to seller for expenses 
incurred in hearing to modify preliminary 
injunction, even though seller could have 
avoided such expenses by stipulation in-" 
stead of enforcing petition for modification; 
seller was prevailing party on action's main 
issues and seller's failure to stipulate was 
not necessarily unreasonable in adversarial 
setting where seller and buyers were un-
able to reach agreement. 
Lawrence F. Daly, Garlington, Lohn & 
Robinson, Missoula, for defendants and ap-
pellants. 
Christopher B. Swartley, Datsopoulos, 
MacDonald & Lind, Missoula, for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
SHEEHY, Justice. 
William Amrine and Larry Vervick ap-
peal from a judgment of the District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, 
awarding attorney fees to Vernon Hoven. 
We affirm the District Court's award. 
Hoven, Amrine and Vervick were equal 
shareholders in the Missoula accounting 
firm of Hoven, Vervick & Amrine. In July, 
1979, Amrine and Vervick entered into an 
agreement to purchase stock from Hoven. 
The agreement provided for the award of 
attorney fees in the event a lawsuit was 
brought to enforce any of the provisions of 
the agreement. 
In June, 1985, Hoven served default no-
tices on Amrine and Vervick for failing to 
pay for the stock they had purchased. 
Vervick and Amrine then brought suit in 
the District Court to have the notices de-
clared void. Hoven responded with a suit 
against Amrine and Vervick seeking an 
injunction and damages. The District 
Court consolidated the two cases, and after 
a show cause hearing on June 25, 1985, 
issued a preliminary injunction against Am-
rine and Vervick, restraining them from 
taking any action which might negatively 
affect the value of the corporation or its 
stock. 
Amrine and Vervick continued to manage 
the day-to-day business of the corporation. 
In August, 1985, the corporation experi-
enced cash flow problems and was unable 
to meet certain obligations, including state 
and, federal payroll taxes. Amrine and 
Vervick, through their attorney, attempted 
to contact Hoven, in order to obtain a stipu-
lation for the $ale of a corporate asset to 
raise money. Their attorney was unable to 
elicit a response from Hoven's attorney, 
and they finally filed a motion to modify 
the preliminary injunction. A hearing on 
this motion was held August 30, 1985. At 
the hearing, Hoven testified he had no sub-
stantive objections to the sale. The Dis-
trict Court granted the first two para-
graphs of Amrine and Vervick's petition 
for modification, deferring action on the 
remaining three issues. 
In October, 1985, the District Court ruled 
that the default notices were valid, and 
that Hoven was entitled to recover attor-
ney fees pursuant to the stock purchase 
agreement. In November, the court held a 
hearing to set the attorney fee award. Ho-
ven was awarded fees for all attorney ser-
vices between June 14 and July 9, 1985. 
The court reserved ruling on which party 
was entitled to recover fees for the period 
after July 9, 1985. Finally, in April, 1986, 
the District Court granted Hoven attorney 
fees for the post-July 9 period, and denied 
Amrine and Vervick's request for the 
same. 
Amrine and Vervick raise two issues on 
appeal: Whether Hoven was entitled to an 
award of attorney fees for the postJuly 9 
period, and if so, whether those fees were 
reasonable? Additionally, respondent Ho-
ven requests attorney fees for this appeal. 
Attorney fees are allowed when they are 
provided for by statute or^ contractual pro-
vision. Jordan v. Elizabethan Manor 
(1979), 181 Mont. 424, 434, 593 P.2d 1049, 
HOVEN v. AMRINE 
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Mont. 535 
1055. In this case, the stock purchase 
agreement had a clause which provided: 
a. Attorney Fees. In the event suit is 
brought to enforce any of the provisions 
of this agreement, the prevailing parties 
shall be entitled to costs of suit and any 
appeals thereon, including reasonable at-
torney's fees. 
[1] Amrine and Vervick argue that the 
attorney fees awarded for the August 30 
hearing for modification of the preliminary' 
injunction do not fall under the contract 
provision cited above. They argue that the 
modification of the injunction to allow sale 
of a corporate asset has nothing Vy do with 
enforcement of the provisions of the stock 
purchase agreement. 
We disagree. The main issues before 
the District Court were whether or not the 
stock purchase agreement had been breach-
ed by the failure of Amrine and Vervick to 
tender payment to Hoven, and whether the 
default notices were valid. These were 
complex issues which the court ultimately 
decided in favor of Hoven in October, 1985. 
In the interim, while the court was resolv-
ing the issues, a temporary injunction was 
necessary to prevent Amrine and Vervick 
from dissipating the assets of the corpora-
tion. The August 30 modification of the 
injunction was necessary in order to allow 
the corporation's operations to continue. 
We find, as did the District Court, that the 
injunction and its modification were one 
facet of the litigation whose main issues 
were the validity of the default notices and 
breach of contract. 
[2]AirTheparty«who prevails on the main 
issue of a case'is-entitled to costs. Medhus 
v. Duttcr (1979), 184 Mont. 437, 447, 603 
P.2d 669, 674.-K-Arpre vailing-party is one 
who has an affirmative judgment rendered 
in his or her'favor at the conclusion of the 
entire case. Jordan v. Elizabethan Man-
or, 181 Mont, at 434, 593 P.2d at 1055. 
Medhus concerned costs under §§ 25-10-
101 and 2S-1O-102, MCA, while Jordan 
related to attorney fees by contract. The 
interpretation in these cases of "prevailing 
party" is applicable here. The District 
Court found that Amrine and Vervick were 
not prevailing parties; not only did Hoven 
prevail on the main issues of the case, but 
the court granted only two of the five 
requests made in Amrine and Vervick's 
petition to modify. The court's award of 
attorney fees in this case wa. proper. 
[3] Amrine and Vervick's second argu-
ment is that the attorney fees incurred by 
Hoven are unreasonable since those fees 
would not have been incurred if Hoven had 
stipulated to the sale of the asset rather 
than force them to petition the court for a 
modification of the injunction. The District 
Court found that where parties are able to 
stipulate to an issue, matters may be more 
quickly resolved—but that the failure to 
stipulate to an issue is not necessarily un-
reasonable in an adversarial setting where 
the parties are unable to reach an agree-
ment. The court found that by participat-
ing in the hearing, whether or not it was 
reasonable or necessary, both parties in-
curred expenses and attorney fees. 
We hold the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion by awarding attorney fees to 
Hoven, including those incurred by his at-
torney from the August 30 hearing. The 
District Court awarded attorney fees to the 
party prevailing on the main issues of the 
case. It is not reasonable to require the 
District Court to keep a running tally of 
"points scored" by each side in order to 
ap^K)rtion costs and attorney fees at the 
end of every lawsuit. Our adoption of the 
prevailing party rule in Medhus v. Duttcr, 
svj>raf obviates that requirement. 
Order of the District Court is affirmed, 
and the cause remanded for determination 
of respondent's costs and attorney fees for 
this appeal. 
TURNAGE, C.J., and MORRISON, GULr 
BRANDSON and WEBER, JJ., concur. 
( O I M* KUMMI SrSH*) 
BUZA v. C O L U M N LUMBER COMPANY Alaska 5 H 
Cite as,
 A i a s k a | 395 P 2 d 511 
Waiter BUZA and At Buza, Appellants, 
v. 
COLUMBIA LUMBER COMPANY of Ata$ka f 
a corporation, Appellee. 
No. 453. 
Supreme Court of Alaska. 
Oct 2, 1904. 
Action for conversion of logs, f he 
Superior Court, Third Judicial District, }}u_ 
bert A. Gilbert, J., entered judgment for 
plaintiff and defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Arcnd, A. J., held that w h c r c 
defendant disregarded in three specifica_ 
tibns of error (he ptzin requirements of Su-
preme. Court Rule as to contents of br|eft 
court would not consider errors char^ed 
and that where plaintiff was the only p r e . 
vailing party, it was entitled to cost. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error €=>758(3) 
Specification of error stating that t w 0 
numbered instructions were wrong and t^ a t 
other instructions should have been giv e n 
did not comply with rule of Supreme Co\ irt 
requiring that specifications of error shall 
set out each error separately. 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>758(3) 
Specification of error that lower cour£ 
ought to have allowed certain memorandum 
violated rule as to contents of brief, wh^ r c 
substance of memorandum was not set fo^th 
and grounds on which memorandum's ^J . 
• mission was »urged -were -not -stated? S>u_ 
preme Court Rules, rule 11(a) (6). 
3. Appeal and Error <§=>766 
Whcrc appellant disregarded in thr c c 
specifications of error the plain requii-c_ 
ments of Supreme Court Rule as to contcr^s 
of brief, court would not consider crrc, rs 
charged. Supreme Court Rules, rule l l ( a ) 
J») 
4. Costs <S=>32(3) 
Where judgment was entered for plain . 
tiff, declaring it to be owner of pcrsor tai 
property covered by lawsuit and ordering 




entitied*to,costs. AS 09.60.010; Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rules 54(d), 82(a) (1, 2). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Costs <S=>32(2) 
"Prevailing j>arty"ris^party*< which j s 
prcdominanfc-*n4awsuit and i$ one_ who suc-
cessful!y^rosecutcs-»action„.orarsuccess fully 
defends againgfcjj^p rev ailing on main issue, 
even thoughoioUto extent of original con-
tention and is'one in whose-favor .decision 
or verdict is rendered and judgment entered. 
6. Costs <£=>!84(7) 
In view of decision that plaintiff owned 
"six bundles of spruce logs, witnesses, one 
of whose testimony indicated that defend-
ants had actually taken the logs and an-
other witness whose testimony indicated 
that plaintiff had had good title to them, al-
lowance of witness' costs with respect to 
such witnesses was not improper on basis 
that they testified only as to plaintiff's dam-
age claim for which no recovery had been 
granted. 
Albert Maffei, Anchorage, for appellants. 
G. F. Boney and L. S. Kurtz, Jr., of Burr, 
Boney 8c Pease, Anchorage, for appellee. 
Before NESBETT, C. J., and DIMOND 
and AREND, JJ. 
AREND, Justice*. 
..This appeal -is-brought to-review-the de-
cision in the court below concerning the 
ownership of six bundles of spruce logs 
designated as Carlson Raft No. 7 and valued 
at about $8,000. 
In a complaint, filed on July 20, 1962, the 
plaintiff-appellee, Columbia Lumber Com-
pany, hereinafter referred to as Columbia, 
accused the defendants-appellants of con-
verting the logs, willfully trespassing upon 
Columbia's property and interfering with 
its mill operations. For relief Columbia 
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prayed for the re turn of the logs and for 
compensatory and punitive damages total ing 
$31,00a 1 
In answer to the complaint, the appellants 
alleged that the logs were the property of 
the appellant, Al Buza, who had purchased 
them from one Boyd Carlson by bill of sale ; 
denied that they had converted the logs or 
that they had trespassed upon or damaged 
Columbia's p roper ty ; and admitted the 
value of the logs to be $8,000. By way of 
counterclaim the appellants alleged that Al 
Buza was the owner of the logs , tha t 
Columbia had wrongfully taken them from 
Pat ton Bay to Whit t icr , Alaska, to Al 
Buza 's damage in the sum of $7,500; and 
that Al Buza was entitled to recover the 
logs or thei r value. 
Columbia filed a reply to the counter-
claim in which it denied all of the allega-
tions of the counterclaim except for ad-
mit t ing the value of the logs to be $8,000, 
and that it had taken the logs from Pa t ton 
Bay to Whi t t i c r but not wrongfully. 
The case was tried to a ju ry which re-
turned a verdict for Columbia. By its 
verdict the ju ry found that Columbia was 
the owner of the logs and entitled to their 
possession but that it was not entitled to re-
cover any damages . Judgment was entered 
mi the verdict and the appellants filed a mo-
tion for a new trial, which was denied. The 
judgment included an award of an a t tor-
ney's fee to Columbia for $1,250. Later the 
trial court entered a "Corrected Judgment 
on General Verd ic t" award ing to Columbia 
an a t torney ' s fee in the amount stated and 
its costs of suit to be taxed by the clerk in 
thc_amount of $1,302.10. Notice of appeal 
to this court was filed by the appellants on 
December 2, 1963. Nine days later an ap-
peal was taken to the superior court from 
the clerk's ruling on costs and on. Decem-
ber 17, 1963, the superior court declared that 
the clerk's cost bill of $1,302.10 would stand. 
I. In the -event' that the loss could not be 
recovered, Columbia demanded judgment 
for their value ($3,000), $1,000 for dara-
ngc to its log boom, $5,000 for diverting 
the nctivitic9 of employees at the mill 
and punitive damages lor the wrongful 
T h e appellants have listed five sped 
tions of e r ro r , all of which have been 
tacked by Columbia on the grounds that • 
fail to comply with the following rcqi 
ments of Supreme Court Rule 11(a) 
" ( a ) * * * [Appel lant 's] bri< 
shall contain * * * 
* * * * * * 
"(6) A specification of e r rors reli< 
upon which shall be numbered and sh; 
set out separately and par t icular ly ea< 
er ror intended to be urged. W h e n tl 
e r ro r alleged is to the admission or r 
jection of evidence, the specifkati( 
shall quote the grounds urged at tl 
trial for the objection and the full su 
stance of the evidence admit ted or r 
jectcd, and refer to the page numb 
in the t ranscr ip t as contained in tl 
record on appeal where the same m; 
be found. W h e n the er ror alleged is 
the charge of the court, the specific 
tion shall set out the par t refcrr-
to verbat im, whether it be in instru 
tions given or in instructions refuse 
together with the grounds of the o 
jeet ions urged at the tr ial . \Vh« 
findings arc specified as er ror , the spc< 
fication shall state as par t icular ly 
may be wherein the findings of fact ai 
conclusions of law are alleged to be c 
roneous. * * * " 
W e agree with Columbia as to the 
three e r rors specified. These w e r e : 
1) Tha t the lower court e r red in givh 
instruct ions to ju ry par t icular ly i 
s t ruct ion No. 17 and ins t ruct ion No. 
and for the courts [sic] failure to gi 
instruct ions encompassing the folio* 
ing s t a t u t e s : 29-1-71 and 2 9 - 1 -
A C L A 1949. 
2) T h a t the following portion of i 
struction No. 17 was e r r o n e o u s : "if t 
j u r y finds tha t the logs were left in t 
nets of the appellants in the amount 
$25,000. Columbia regained possc*su 
of the logs in question through the sta 
police several days after the complai 
was filed. 
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possession of seller Carlson who, in 
turn, sold them to plaintiff for value 
received and caused them to be de-
livered to plaintiffs sawmill at Whit-
ticr, Alaska without informing plaintiff 
that said logs were the property of the 
defendants, if indeed they were, then 
you must find plaintiff to be the owner 
of the logs and render a verdict for 
said plaintiff/' (emphasis added). 
3) That the lower court ought to have 
allowed as evidence that certain memo-
randum made by appellant, AL BUZA, 
at the time he had a conversation with 
Mr. Morgan, President of appellee, 
COLUMBIA LUMBER COMPANY, 
which memorandum was made at the 
time of the conversation in July, 1962. 
[1] Comparing these three specifications 
of error with the requirements of Supreme 
Court Rule 11(a) (6) we find a woeful lack 
of compliance on the part of the appellants. 
The first specification actually specifies 
three errors: That instruction 17 was 
wrong; that instruction 19 was wrong; 
and that other instructions should have 
been given. Furthermore, it does not set 
forth the instructions claimed to have been 
erroneously refused; and it docs not state 
the grounds of objection urged at the trial. 
Specification of error No. 2 likewise fails 
to set forth the grounds of objection urged 
at the trial. Without searching the record 
ourselves, we do not know whether the ap-
pellants even voiced any objections to in-
struction No. 17 in the court below. Nor 
do the appellants state anywhere in their 
liricf that they objected "to the instruction 
2. Preferred Gen. Agency of Alaskn, Inc. 
v. RafTctto, Opinion No. 214, 391 P.2d 
931, 053 (Alaska 19J>D; Crumc v. 
Crumc, 37S P.2d 183, 1S4-185 (Alaska 
1003); McLcmoro v. Harris, 374 P.2d 
410 (Alaska 1DG2); Parks v. Brown, 
3G8 P.2d 220 (Alaska 19G2); Bidwell v. 
Scheclc, 355 P.2d 581, 5S7-588 (Alaska 
1900). 
3. Crume v. Crumc, supra note 2, 378 P.2d 
at 185. 
395 P.2d—33 
in the lower court or the nature of the ob-
jection at the time, if objection was made. 
[2] The third specification of error vio-
lates Rule 11(a) (6) in two respects: (1) 
The substance of the memorandum alleged 
to have been erroneously excluded is not 
set forth; and (2) the grounds on which 
the memorandum's admission was urged is 
not stated in the specification. 
[3] Since the appellants have disregard-
ed the plain requirements of Supreme Court 
Rule 11(a) (6), which has been in effect 
now for nearly five years and the observance 
of which has been urged upon the bar in 
a number of our decisions,2 we need not 
consider the first three errors charged.3 
The other two errors specified by the ap-
pellants relate to the allowance of costs 
to Columbia and are set forth in the mar-
gin.4 With respect to the issues raised by 
these specifications of error, the appellants 
contend that Columbia was not the prevail-
ing party since it did not recover the full 
amount of the relief prayed for and, there-
fore, was not entitled to costs; or, in the 
alternative, if Columbia was entitled to 
costs, it should not have been allowed costs 
for the transportation and witness fees of 
witnesses whose testimony produced no ver-
dict by the jury. 
AS 09.60.010 states: ''Except as other-
wise provided by statute, the supreme court 
shall determine by rule or order what costs, 
if any, including attorney fees, shall be 
allowed the prcvialing party in any case." 
Civil Rule 54(d) provides that "costs shall 
be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs." 
4. The appellants' last two specifications 
of error allege: 
."4) That the appellee [Columbia] was 
not the prevailing party nnd, therefore, 
not entitled to costs as provided by 
Section 00 GO 010 Alaska Statutes. 
"5) That the lower court erred in 
affirming the clerk's decision on costs 
and particularly to the costs awarded for 
travel and witness fees for Gifford Evans 
and Thomas A. Morgan and that insofar 
as their testimony was concerned the 
jury returned a verdict not in plaintiff's 
(appellee's) favor." 
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Civil Rule 82(a ) (1) sets forth a schedule 
of fees which is to be applied for any par ty 
recovering a money judgment and is fol-
lowed by 82 (a ) (2) which s t a t e s : " In ac-
tions where the money judgment is not an 
accurate cr i ter ia for de te rmining the fee to 
be allowed to the prevai l ing side, the court 
shall award a fee commensura te with the 
amount and value of legal services render-
ed." 
[4] I t is t rue that Columbia did not re-
cover the full measure of the relief it had 
prayed for but it was nonetheless the pre-
vail ing par ty and the only prevai l ing party. 
Judgment was entered for Columbia, de-
clar ing it to be the owner "of the personal 
property cohered by th<s fawsak " aad order-
ing the appel lants ' counterc la im dismissed 
with prejudice. 
[5] The dict ionary s ta tes tha t " P R E -
V A I L I N G applies esp. to that which is pre-
d o m i n a n t , " 0 and it has been established by 
case law that the prevai l ing par ty to a suit 
is the one who successfully prosecutes the 
action or successfully defends against it, 
prevail ing on the main issue, c v e n n h o u g h 
not to the extent of the original contention.6 
H e is~the onc*in*whose favor the decision 
or verdicl i s ^ r e n d c r e d ^ n d ^ t h e judgment 
entered.7 
[6] As to the other point on costs, the 
appellants claim that GifTord Evans , the 
super intendent of Columbia 's operat ions 
at Whit t ier , and T h o m a s Morgan , president 
of Columbia, testified only as to Columbia's 
damage claim of $31,000, for which no rc-
c<?r<rrj' ir<?s gr<?r?tcd /// AV //-/<?) c&s/rt. T///S 
being so, they contend that no witness costs 
should have been allowed for Evans or 
Morgan. Looking to the record, however, 
we note that Evans ' test imony was also 
5. Webster's New International JV'tmnnry 
(2d cd. unnbr. 19G0). 
6. nines v. Pcrcr, 242 F.2<1 450, 4C>G (Oih 
Cir. 1957) ; Atwood v. Kleberg, 1G3 F. 
2d JOS. 115 (5lh Cir.), cert, denied, 332 
•U.S. 843, 68 S.Ct. 207, 2GS, 92 L.Ed. 
414 (1947); Huggins v. ni l] , 23G S.W. 
1054, 1055 (Mo.1921); Dixon v. Scboon-
over, 22G Or. 443, 359 P.2d 115, 120, 
modified, 22G Or. 443, 300 l\2d 274 
used to show tha t the appellants actually 
took the log's des ignated Carlson's Raf t No. 
7. By M o r g a n ' s testimony, Columbia 
brought out tha t the logs intended for the 
appellants (not Car lson 's Raft No. 7) were 
ready and available for them to pick up at 
Pa t ton Bay all du r ing the time of the dispute 
between the par t ies . H i s test imony also 
tended to establish the fact that Columbia 
was a bona fide purchaser
 ;for value of the 
logs in Carlson Raf t No. 7 and hence had 
good title to them. 
W e find no e r ro r in the al lowance of costs 
to Columbia, inclusive of the a t torney fees. 
Nor do we find any abuse of its discretion 
by the tr ial court in affirming the clerk's 
award of costs. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O j M T H U H I l l JTSKH 
A P E X C O N C R E T E CO., Inc., Appellant, 
v. 
Max E. B R A Y , Appellee. 
No. 438. 
Supreme Court of Alaska. 
Oct. 1, 19C4. 
Salary claim by former employee 
against corpora te employer. F rom an ad-
versc judgment of the Superior Court, 
Thi rd Judicial Distr ict , E d w a r d V. -Davis, 
J., the corporat ion appealetl _Thc Supreme 
Court , Arcnd, A. J., held that tr ial judge 
had not pre judged the case and that his 
( 1 9 6 1 ) ; Baldwin v. Albort i , ?« W.^ l i 2d 
243. 3G2 P.2d 25S. 201 (1001)"." Contrn. 
United States for Use and Benefit of 
Miller & BcnUej Equipment Co \ Kel-
ly, 192 F.Supp. 274 (D.AJuska 19G1). 
7. Ihinnc v. New York Tel. Co., 107 Misc. 
439, 17G N.Y.S. 519 (Sup.Ct.1019); En-
nis v. King, 50 Wash.2d 405, 341 P.2d 
8S5, 353 P.2d 950, 954 (19G0). 
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Herbert O. TRAYNER, an individual , and 
Trayner Investments Corpora t ion , a 
Utah corporat ion, Plaintiffs and Re-
spondents. 
v. 
Robeil CUSHING, an individual . 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 18732. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 7, 1984. 
Builder brought action against pur-
chaser for sums allegedly remaining due on 
a contract for the construction and pur 
chase of a home, and purchaser counter-
claimed for costs of repairs due to faulty 
workmanship. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Philip R. Fishier, J., 
awarded builder value of certain extras 
provided to purchaser, but reduced the 
award by cost of repairs necessitated by 
faulty workmanship, and awarded builder 
attorney fees, and purchaser appealed the 
award of attorney fees. The Supreme 
Court held that both parlies were entitled 
to attorney fees pursuant to the contract, 
where each had rights under the agree-
ment that were denied by the other, each 
was required to lake legal action to enforce 
the agreement in one or more particulars, 
and each was successful on one or more: 
nomts and unsuccessful on others 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Er ror <£=-*! 69 
Issues not presented to the trial court 
for decision are not reviewable on appeal. 
2. Appeal and Er ror <S=>170<1) 
Issue of whether provision of written 
agreement for construction and sale of a 
home that party failing to fulfill its obliga-
tions under ihe agreement wool! pay attor-
ney fees incurred in enforcing the agree-
ment applied to ark oral amendment of the 
agreement was not preserved lor revi«*v» on 
appeal, '//here the issue was raised for first 
time on appeal. 
.1. Costs <3=>172 
Where the parties have agreed by con 
tract to the payment of attorney fees, court 
may award reasonable fees in accordance 
with terms of the parties ' agreement. 
4. Costs <s=»172 
Amount of attorney fees to be award 
ed pursuant to a contract provision for 
payment of attorney fees is largely within 
sound discretion of trial court, but factors 
which should be considered include rela-
tionship of the fee to amount recovered, 
novelty and difficulty of issues involved, 
overall result achieved and necessity of ini-
tiating a lawsuit to vindicate rights under 
the contract. 
5. Costs e=»172 
A party entitled to attorney fees pur-
suant to provisions of a contract is entitled 
only to those fees attributable to the suc-
cessful vindication of contractual rights 
within terms of the agreement. 
C». Costs <s=>172 
Roth builder and purchaser of a home 
were entitled to award of attorney fees 
pursuant to their agreement for construc-
tion and sale of the home, which provided 
that either party failing to carry out terms 
specified in the agreement, would pay attor-
ney fees incurred in enforcing the agree-
ment, where each of the parties ha J rights 
under the agreement that were denied by 
the other, each was required to. take legal 
action to enforce the agreement in one or 
more particular, and each was successful 
on one or more points and unsuccessful on 
others; however, each was entitled to at-
torney fees only for time spent in enforcing 
rights under the contract and not for time 
spent on other matters not covered under 
the contract. 
Lrant. H. Wail, Salt Lake City, for <Je 
feraiant and appellant. 
James A. Boevers, Gordon Straehan, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents. 
PKR CURIAM. 
sale was written or. a standard form ear-
nest money agreement and offer to pur 
rliii.s". tu t it was modified by oral agree 
ment that "ext ras" would be provided as 
requested by defendant and c h a r e d at the 
contractor^ (plaintiffs) cost. The house 
was completed anu the sale closed. At the 
closing, the price agreed under the written 
contract was paid. The parties could not 
agree with respect to the price of the ex-
tri.s, ImwcviT, ai:;! that n mount was not 
,>:t..l. 
Plaintiffs brought action, claiming 
$9,leM~? for the extras and, in addition, 
claiming that the $2,500 earnest money 
was never paid, though they had acknowl-
edged receipt of that amount by signing 
the earnest money receipt and again by 
signing the closing statements 
Defendant answered, alleging that plain-
tiffs had overcharged him in his claim for 
the extras, but admitting that he owed 
plaintiffs $2,990 He denied that the ear-
nest money had not been paid, and he coun-
TRAYNEK v. CUSIMNC; Utah 8 5 7 
Cite »» fc*8 P 2d 8*6 (U(»)i 19*4* 
tiffs. Defendant challenges only the 
award of attorney fees on appeal. 
The written earnest money agreement 
and offer to purchase, signed by both par-
tie.,, provides: 
We do hereby agree to carry out and 
fulfill the terms specified above . . . . If 
either party fails to do so, he agrees to 
pay all expenses of enforcing this agree-
ment, or any right arising out of breach 
thereof, including attorney's fees. 
Defeiidan! first contends that this provi 
sioi. of the written agreement does not 
apply to the oral amendment of the con-
tract. He reasons that because plaintift: 
recovered judgment only for the extras 
provided by the oral contract, they wore 
not entitled to an award of attorney fees> 
under our rule that such fees are awarded 
only if there is a contractual or statutory 
liability therefor.' 
repairs due to 
e part of plain-
ter<'la;med for $2,250 for 
fau'tv workmanship on th 
tifts. 
The trial court, sitting without a jury. 
f./uri'l that plaintiffs had net carried their 
b.ird"n of proving that the earnest moooy 
n.i i :."t been paid arid denied judgment f»>r 
that amount. The court further found thai 
plaintiffs had overcharged defendant J or 
the extra work by charging the retail price 
of electrical fixtures unreduced h> the con-
tractor 's discounts and by fading to give 
defendant credit for returned items. In 
addition, the court granted defendant dam-
;i)'.'.1 d*r lepairs i.ece^sita!. d by faulty 
workmanship on the par! of plaintiff.*.. 
^ttXL&^^'JJkf&Ai&is Th.- .-.eirt a!... 
a.' a i d e d .ittnrne;* fee*, of $2,owo t.» j>lan. 
I . / / . ft, I i . h I ' l e " 
• L . t ' 
f f ' 7 7 ) . 
M -7' ,) 
f l , 2 | Defendant raises this point for 
the first turn on appeal He did not 
pre-.-cnt to the -trial court the question of 
whether the oral agreement was a separate 
contract or a modification of the written 
agreement In fact, the case was tried by 
both parties upon the assumption that the 
oral agreement was a modification of tne 
written agreement and was therefore a 
part of n. Issues- not presented to the trial 
court for decision are not reviewable by 
this CoU't.-' and we express no opinion on 
t h e l;-»sue. 
rather than, plaintiffs, is entitled to an 
award of attorney fr"s under the theories' 
',1) that pla.ntiff^ breached the contract by 
charging retail price for some items rather 
than contractor's eo>t, as agreed; atfftSTS' 
t~2*$*»n^£u; ^^t«Kie#auteri^a4xi^t£h^»^ fkla^ 
t*t»j^ L j*_- .j%vjfor£ i> v» -1' **. H '-jus v. nttri * (m d/u • -
7. V ,\>*,i 1 Srx\'fn,j>i. t it -i * t S M I' V e«"e. ( J 9 7 P 1 
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[3-5] Where the parties have agreed by 
contract to the payment of attorney (v.es, 
the court may award reasonable fees in 
accordance with the terms of the parties' 
agreement.1 The amount to be awarded is 
largely within the sound discretion of the 
trial court,4 but such factors should be 
considered as the relationship of the fee to 
the amount recovered, the novelty and dif-
ficulty of the issues involved, the overall 
result achieved and the necessity of initiat-
ii'ii; a lawsuit to vindicate rights under the 
contract.5 In addition, a party is entitled 
only to those fees attributable to the suc-
cessful vindication of contractual rights 
within the terms of their agreement.*' 
16 J ^^0^::^^-.-^tffrrjiaftipi jctoe and 
;i^i^Karf«Bt^^wAr4:n^att04^ey fees to tin 
' 'piwwiui^fHuAy'v^^ party "not m 
doiaMkfc&^JkidtUter «f -"the*e* f*hrawRs was 
k4a»»^Ja. 4A»C, screentvut before; u». These 
parties hMe£*groed instead to tht» payment 
of•+tot*nMa&^iHHh.-i&~jm action jbrought to 
"t^HMiiprt^'thf ^r*«nrwH«t^*m- any right 
urtarw^ront Qt breach iMPWf/*? The qm s 
tiWt before ***e intd e w r t w a s : winch party 
V&ifofesd^the agreement a^amst the oth-
i^ T~ Each of these parties had rights under 
the agreement that were denied him by the 
other. Kach was required to take legal 
action to enforce the agreement in on** or 
morv particulars. Kach was successful on 
one or more points and unsuccessful on 
3. I'urtlc Ma>i L-cmcn', in<. \ I<•''£&•- Mmta;,-
•ne'J. Utah. r>4S I*.2d 6<s7 < i ^ S1- > 
4. Id 
5. Id 
<*. .SV>e, e x Sitthh- x Hctm.'f •.;./>»«! w I. v^  »..-.-«-
pluiiUttl wa a l lowed fees o:.i\ for time hi-. 
<itlurncv spent in f< ,; e< i .^urc of ;i note ;m«l 
mortgage und not lot the c ickns . ' ol «« cotsnici-
claim (>n w h a n r;<n^r of ..< Oor, MO aj'.rccm. n( 
foi !).i\nicri: >A a o o r n c v Ices had liccn in;u!c, 
a n d / ' , 7 / / / A f , / , V / v r r <; !• C v .';,' I-/y///•%• / O u , v v ,1 •. 
->"( . l a a h . r>S7 I V . M !.>/'•> ( ' . " /< .?> . v . l n ' i > u<-' 
others. Each was therefore entitled to an 
award of attorney fees for successfully 
enforcing the agreement against the other. 
At trial, defendant suggested that both 
parties might be entitled to attorney fees, 
depending upon the court's resolution of 
the issues, but the judge stated he was of 
the opinion that fees should go only to the 
prevailing party. The court therefore 
awarded fees only to plaintiffs since the 
net judgment was in their favor. The 
court was in error in making this award, 
b<>th in failing to recognize that some part 
of the time charged by plaintiffs' attorney 
was spe?it in defending the counterclaim on 
which* he was not successful and in failing 
to award defendant any fees for enforcing 
his rights under the contract. 
The award of attorney fees is reversed, 
.and this case is remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings not inconsist-
ent with this opinion. Costs to defendant.7 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
fO c *ty "U*»l* i W i n 
Gem I . i l l u m e d an a w a i d io defendant for fees 
a t t r ibu tab le to t u n c spent in defence of plain-
list':, c o m p l a i n t , but am ecu with the ma l cour t 
that de fendan t was not enti t led to fees at tr ibuta-
ble to p u r s u i n g a i ouolc i i latin on which he was 
not successful . 
7. No a w a r d of a t l o rnev fees for prosecut ing or 
de fend ing this appea l is m a d e since defendant , 
J he successful pa r ty on appeal , has not request 
cd such a n a w a r d . Sde Mutiagemem Services v. 
l)e\t>L.>pfn<'nt As>oc. Utah. 617 P.2d 406 (1980). 
in v\hich this Court held thai a t torney fees on 
app-'al mav be awai ded where there is a con-
11 .K tual obl igat ion tnei d o r . 
S T A T I C v. M A T I I K W;«-}, SdVJ 
t 'dr »» t.'UI I' 2<1 MV* (Wash. l***-0 
102 Wnsii 2d ^57 4. S e a r c h e s a n d S e i / a i r e s ' ^ -*7 (26) 
Th t - S T A T I * of W a s h i n g t o n , l i r s p o u d r n t . R e x a h - n l ial l e s s o o w i t h ••M-'msivr r ip .h l 
v t o u s e l e a s e d p r e m i s e s h a s s t a n d i n g : t o t h a i 
l e n p / - s e a r c h of p r e m i s e s W e s t V K O W A 
C o n s t . A r . 1, ?,• 7. 
L e s l i e M A T I I K , P e t i t i o n e r . 
N o . 499^1*—1. 
S u p r e m e C o u r t of W a s h a a i / t 
Kn I Jane 
a. S e : . r r ,«-s u n d S e i z u r e s ^ - 7 ( 2 7 ) 
C o n s e n t to v. r. r r a r . ; ! '>.s s e a r c h by «>ne 
w h o p<c> .sses c«-rnf;»'»»j a u t h o r i t y o v e r 
S e p t 27 , ! ; * £ ; . } i t v . n i > e t c r e f fec t - ; is - a ! i d a s a c o o n s i a h 
s»'?; ' . n,>n< >;,:.<-T.\;n^r p - - r s o u w i t h w C n a 
n i c h .11? 1. a , : \ : ..},.i;- : W e s t ' s l : ( ' \ V . ' 
I V f e n d a n t >v t ls - a n v ' c t e d in t h e S u p o r C . a - - t - \ - ' ' " >•? 7 
or C o u r t . K i : i ; r C ' . ' - I I P ' ; . F r a n k L. S u l l h . a n , 
J . <»r t w o c o u n t s «>•" 7 i r s t - i h - j r o f r o b h o r - C Search** . , a n d S e i z u r e * - C ^ 7 ( 1 ' 7 ) 
an*: h e a p p e a l e d . T h e C o u r t o f A p p e a N , ?,."> l .da . -T i. c ' ' ' com:: : >n ., :*A o r . t y r u i C " < f 
W a c h A p p . o 7 2 , o h s i \ 2 d .r>S>th a f f i r m e d , a n d t h e S t a ' e C o p s i i t u t i o a . c o . . — n l n. w a r r ^ : i i 
o - f e n a a r A s o u g h t r e v i e w T h e S u p r c o - i< r,s a- jareh is - o ! v a h J u n f - s s • • o y t s e a n n r ' 
<VuT-l, K . s e l n n i . J . , hold th .ul : M I r! f e n d a r n p a r t y ha.» n ^ h l t o p e r a a t s- a r c h Lnsv ! n:i 
rth-' h a d • x c l u s i v e n p ; h ; t o u . - r o f l e a s e d hta* j o i n t ac\a_.~s o r c o n t r o l of p r o m i s e s a i d 
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p r e m i s e s ; a n d (3) i n - c o u r t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of 
0e r « i . d a n i w a s n o t s u b j e c t t o e x c l u . C n a c S e a r c h e s a n d S e i ; u r e s C-->7(i:7) 
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Vi-.tness" i d e n t i t y b e f o r e s e a r c h to<»k p!a 
aiici ' n - * o u r t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w a s b a s e d < 
v. i i n i ' t s ' uUMTvii t i 'M. of d e f e n d a n t a t t in 
•.. f c r a n e . 
A f f i r m e d . 
a r e a , it i a a y L». p r o j n - r i o ;;.r« - u r r e t l»a t 
j ' ea s -onah l} - a . s i j i v . j ? r i sk ; h a t ; : o i : t c o n t r o l 
iiiiiy b e a u t h o r i z e d to alio-,*, a s e a r c h . ; !a»w 
e . ' - r , w i t ^ o u i r i ^ h i . t»< c o n t r o l o r e x e r c i s e 
j o h u p o s r e s ^ l o ^ , o f LTi'/er a r e a , n o a s ^ a m o -
t ioi of ri; K a r d y s i . c a n v a l i d a i e s e a r c h 
Wes t* : ; l U ' W A C o n , ' A r t I . >i 7. 
i . S e a r c h e s a n d S e i z u r e s <S=7(29i 
.V.at-_ h e a r - t u i i ' d e n of e- 'ta , .-i; .-inn l >: i fsat 
w a r r a ! . t i » ' s > s t a r c h f«!!s '.:. i t h i n or,u «-f re." 
< Lr«. -«i "V.'-t'p'd'ji:^ to \'<>r,--t:' a t ; o n a ; w a r 
r a n ' r»-q a i r e m e n t . i ' . S i ' . A C o n s t A rneoa! 
4, A , - s t s HCAVA <Jk»;isi A r t i , ^ 7 
S. S e a r e ' r . i ' s a r a l S « - i z u r e > • ' - 7 ' t , 7 » 
Land!<»; d - t m a n . • > a l i a : h . j . u ill no t 
s n . p o r i n i f f - ra ic* tf 'a- v. ar .*ant!e:- .- . e a r - a c 
c o : . - e n t c d to i>y !aad!<>rd is a u t h ' - r i / e d , 
w l i r i i •i-jao'* i< »rf -•> ' l i i ' o v r pos:?uu*. to f 
p r -per t v; .-. ••>, -
 u . , aap ! ; - ' • ; . Cihi . i l iv , l o 
S e a r c h e s a n d S e i z u r e s : ^- r ' 7 (27) a j . a r . n a a . ' . s a*.-i ra•/:••• h n u t . ' d r e a ' a ! .n 
C - . n - n t U) s e a r c h e s t . ^ h ' i . ^ h e s v a h d i t \ r a n a . -n..••:;* a suc l . ^ . t a o s ^ f«..JMii in m o t e l s . 
a r c h i! p- ra < n ^ O M I J J ooyjset : ! ra is a n 
1
 v. Jo su con .^oa ' 
!». .a fd i; • ji hi i i - .c- . . a n d r<»«»i.; r i -n . ' a l s \ ' «->' 's 
K< ^ V A ( O H M A r t 1 - 7 
3. S e a r c h e s a n d S»*i / i i re» - ^ 7 ^ 2 7 ' i> S e ; u c h e s . a n d S v o c r r s -—r7'27» 
I - i : , :;• r«! i;i;r, <• - . . • • ! : ' '<» •-••arot; <0 .; has ' :; '.nl :.:••• • : a n ' * , TO.V !O e o r " * - ; , ' 
' - a a n t a p a r t a a - n * .v;,«-n t • ,:.:.<.\ a ti.- ' • :• t«; -oa.-'-fi - ' • • . « ; • • . r- . ' • • n t a o p- .v :o . . «•. 
! I I I « " ! , will not h e r - j i e w . - d .x: i t . - r aoP \>A: V. h; '. 'A - ;-.• a". ^ e n t a J ' - . A - ' a s i v e j»a— a s 
oi «-ii i i o i i f i . ' ! t h a t i . i . ,da»rd v. d ! iio *• ii*;i n i i: _ •; N..»I a . o i h u s , ^ a I i o .' !• •- • - M M O ' I I of o-n 
a i . . . r t . a . T i ; a n o e / si j i 'h »arei i /n s t a n< ' ?/»n a r . l ' s h«-dr«»o:n v. a - a:-- a: • . n e/.i d. nev;pp.< 
a a t a s s n i a e - r i sk ; t ao '.ai-di* »r«i *A iM e.\erci.-,»- fa t lha? i h e r '•» ;•:•.•:!:.••.- «v;r. p » n 
ha* i a / f . l •-?" io:at coaM"'-' 'W.O l l i ' W '• !",.• -• \ ; -t . ^ i". 
4 0 
337 FACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
'Washington for the proper performance of 
his contract for the purchase of the tim-
ber herein involved, and the said Owner is 
wholly an independent operator and not an 
agent of the Buyer, and will hold the Buyer 
harmless from any claims for labor or 
other charges or expenses that may become 
a lien against these logs, this being solely 
the purchase and sale of logs. 
"IV. 
"It is contemplated that the Buyer will 
advance to the Owner all sums necessary 
to promptly pay for all stumpage due 
from the Owner on said lands and will like-
wise advance on the purchase price of these 
logs from time to time such amounts as is 
reasonably necessary to carry out the log-
ging operations; Provided only, that said 
advances shall in no event exceed the pur-
chase price of said logs as herein agreed 
upon. 
"V. 
"The Buyer shall at all times have the 
right to examine the books of the Owner 
to the extent reasonably necessary to de-
termine the fact that all logs purchased 
by the Buyer are free from any liens for 
stumpage, labor, or any other charges that 
might arise against the Buyer, and should 
at any time the said charges exceed the 
actual purchase price of these logs, then the 
Buyer at its option may take possession of 
the said timber tracts and log the same 
paying to the State the sum due for stump-
age for the timber removed. 
"VI. 
"The Owner has been delivering logs 
from the lands herein described since ap-
proximately May 10, 1955, and has deliv-
ered to date approximately two and one-
half million feet. Prior to the first delivery 
of logs the Buyer advanced to the Owner 
the sum of $16,009.60 on or about the 5th 
day of April, 1955. Since the delivery of 
logs has started the Buyer has advanced on 
tht^  purchase price of the logs $114,338.14. 
"VII. 
"It is now mutually agreed that the full 
purchase price of the logs already delivered 
together with the logs hereafter to be deliv-
ered shall all be determined under the price 
formula as set forth herein. The advance 
of $16,009.60 made on the 5th day of April, 
1955, shall be prorated over the full pur-
chase price of all of the logs now bought 
under this contract by aljotting $2.00 
per M feet to all logs delivered includ-
ing those heretofore delivered as well as 
those hereafter delivered under this con-
tract, until the full $16,009.60 prepayment 
shall have been fully liquidated. 
"Dated this 29th day of July, 1955. 
"Joe Daman 
"Owner 
"Walton Lumber Company, 
a corporation, 
"By Clyde Walton 
"Buyer" 
«rr • •«•€• rrrru« ™ N > 
Thomas A. DAWSON, Respondent, 
v. 
Will iam J. SHEARER and Marjorle Ann 
Shearer, his wife, Appellants. 
No. 34743. 
Supreme Court of Washington, 
Department 2. 
March 26, 1059. 
Rehearing Denied May 7, 1950. 
Action to recover for the balance due 
on construction of a house. Judgment for 
the plaintiff in the Superior Court, King 
County, Story Birdseye, J., and the defend-
ants appealed. The Supreme Court, Foster. 
J., held that the evidence sustained the 
judgment for the plaintiff, that parol evi-
dence was admjjsit^le,. an&^that, fact,., that 
amount,claimed.by^thej^csptond_ent was re-
duced by a credit, did nc^t,establish that re-




1. Appeal and Error C=MOIO<l) 
F i n d i n g of a trial court will not be d is -
turbed if there is any ev idence to support 
it. 
2. Contracts <S=>350(I) 
In act ion to recover for the balance 
due on construct ion of a house , ev idence 
sustained judgment for the plaintiffs. 
3. Evidence C=»442(5) 
W h e r e contract for construct ion of a 
house w a s partly in w r i t i n g and partly oral 
and the document did not incorporate the 
complete a g r e e m e n t o f the parties , admit-
ting oral t e s t imony to s h o w the agreement 
was proper. 
I. Evidence C=>384 
T h e parol ev idence rule is not an e x -
rlusionary rule o f ev idence , but one of sub-
itantivc law. 
D A W S O N T. S H E A E E E Wash . 
Cite as 337 P.2<3 46 
"In this regard w e fully appreciate 
the rule that a finding of the trial Court 
will not be disturbed if there is any 
evidence to support it. * * * " 
[ 2 ] N o useful purpose would be served 
by a narrat ive of the ev idence . It is suf-
ficient to say that it was sharply in confl ict 
and that the findings of fac t arc amply sup-
ported by substantial ev idence . 
[ 3 ] Appel lants argue that the parol ev i -
dence rule w a s violated in admitt ing oral 
test imony to show the agreement . A f t e r 
the work w a s finished the parties did s ign a 
contract, but the court found upon o v e r -
whe lming ev idence that this document "did 
not incorporate therein the complete a g r e e -
ment of the parties." Indeed, the appel-
lants' answer specifically pleaded that the 
contract w a s partly in wr i t ing and partly 
oral. 
5. Coita C=32<5) 
Fac t that amount c la imed by plaintiff 
n act ion for balance due on construct ion of 
• - * * t - * « - - ' . ' 
L house w a s reduced by credit did not e s -
a b h s h that plaintiff w a s not the "prevai l ing * 
>arty" and not entit led to costs.,. KCVV 4.-
W.030. 
See publication Words ond Fhrnsca, 
for other judicial constructions t»i»d defi-
iiitious of "Prevailing Party". 
Zundel, M e r g e s , Brain & Isaac, Seatt le , 
or appel lants . 
Hclsc l l , Paul , Fe t t crman , T o d d & H o k a n -
on, and Richard S. W h i t e , Seatt le , for rc-
pondent. 
F O S T E R , Just ice . 
Appel lants , de fendants below, appeal 
roiti a j u d g m e n t against them for the bal-
ncc due on the construct ion of a house . 
[ 1 ] T h e basic dispute is factual and the 
videncc is in direct conflict. In con-
Dnance with our decided cases , 1 appel-
nts' counsel , in the open ing brief, forth-
ghl ly concede the applicable rule of l a w : 
Kuyntli v. Anderson Constr. Co., Wash., 
.*<24 P 2 d 2G4 ; Fischler v. Nicklin, 51 
\Vii8h.2ii 018. 319 P.2d 100S ; Croton 
[ 4 ] Recent ly we rev iewed this aspect 
of the so-cal led parol ev idence rule in 
Barber v. Rochester , W a s h . , 328 P.2d 711, 
and need not now restate the analysis . T h e 
name is a misnomer for it is not an e x c l u -
sionary rule of evidence, but one of sub-
stantive law. 
T h e conclus ion there reached is found in 
the fo l lowing paragraph : 
"People have the right to make their 
agreements partly oral and partly in 
writ ing, or entirely oral or entirely in 
w r i t i n g ; and it is the court's duty to 
ascertain from all relevant , extr ins ic 
evidence, either oral or wri t ten, wheth -
er the entire agreement has been incor-
porated in the writ ing or not. That is 
a question of fact. R inaudo v. B loom, 
209 Md. 1, 120 A.2d 184; Lawrence 
v. Tandy & Allen, Inc., 14 N.J. 1, 100 
A.2d S91 ; Atlantic Northern Air l ines 
v. Sc l .wimmcr , 12 N.J. 293, 96 A.2d 
652. * * V 
T h e ass ignment is wi thout merit. 
This , l ikewise , disposes of the as s ignment 
that the court erred in refus ing to require 
CIHMIIM-UI Corp. v. TJirkcnwald, 50 Wash. 
2d 034, 314 l \2d G22. 
~~. ,- - ^ /%*<* x»x-ii. v i v A X i X b , AU OX«l£«Xjfc«*$ 
respondent to elect between the written con-
tract or the oral one. 
H , f^ t-H^nimtai f,irf l""J^**™^llllliy11 ^ 
t ^ ^ ^ « K o s t » u r u l e j * K ( i W r ^ ^ k 0 3 0 M t r h o 
ti0^m*thc&ipfceYaiUB«I^^ 
ingrd*fendanj&reclM^5^^ 
ti ff^Kr^cpyeryi by^mQfts^m&irfQthe&i&imcs 
o t a ^ h f TH f^l^ ffssignmontsrotHorj^ jQitis, 
thwwfiiifliMRa^^ 
The judgment is affirmed. 
WEAVER, C. J., and HILL, DON-
WORTH and ROSELLINI, JJ., concur. 
Ruth Dodd MOLLETT, Respondent, 
v. 
C ITY OF TACOMA, a municipal corporation, 
John H. Anderson, Lyle H. Lemley, C. A. 
Galsford, Carl Berglund, Harry Manning, 
Eddie Bernard and Les Flfer, the members 
of and constituting the Board of Adminis-
tration of the Tacorn a Employe's Retire-
ment System of the City of Tacoma, Ap-
pellants. 
No. 34004. 
Supreme Court of Washington, 
Department 1. 
March 19, 1059. 
Rehearing Denied June 11, 19T>9. 
Action by employee against city and 
pension board for increased pension on 
theory that she was involuntarily separated 
from employment. The Superior Court, 
Pierce County, Bcrtil E. Johnson, J., ren-
dered judgment for the employee, and city 
and board appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Ott, J., held that where city had no legal 
obligation to permit the employee to be-
come eligible for retirement, employee vol-
untarily assented to conditions upon which 
city was willing to permit her to earn pen-
sion, and employee fully understood she 
would voluntarily leave city# service at 
agreed termination date, employee was not 
overreached, defrauded, or misled by be-
ing permitted to qualify for normal retire-
ment on city's terms. 
Reversed with instructions. 
Hunter, J., dissented. 
f. Municipal Corporations C=220(9) 
In action by employee against city for 
increased pension on theory that she was 
involuntarily separated from employment, 
employee had burden of proof to establish 
that employment was terminated by invol-
untary separation. 
2. Municipal Corporations <©=>2I7(6) 
Fact that employee was ready, able and 
willing to work did not obligate city to cm-
ploy her beyond termination day of con-
tract of her employment. 
3. Municipal Corporations <£=2I7(6) 
Where employment contract between 
city and employee specified period of dura-
tion of employment, the contract terminat-
ed by operation of time alone. 
4. Master and Servant <3=>2I 
Where prospective employee accepts 
employment contract containing fixed ter-
minal date, and employer offers no further 
employment beyond the terminal date, em-
ployee cannot be heard to say when termi-
nal date arrives, that severance from his 
employment was involuntary or that his 
employer breached termination provisions 
of contract. 
5. Municipal Corporations <§=>220(9) 
Where city had no legal obligation to 
permit employee to become eligible for re-
tirement, employee voluntarily assented to 
conditions upon which city was willing to 
permit her to earn pension, and employee 
fully understood she would voluntarily 
Cite na 33*! 
cave city service at agreed terminat ion 
date, employee w a s not overreached, de-
frauded, or misled by being permitted to 
qualify for n o r m a l ' retirement on city's 
terms. 
6. Municipal Corporations <5==220(9) 
In action by employee against city for 
increased pension o n theory that she w a s 
involuntari ly separated from employment , 
ev idence preponderated against trial court's 
finding that employee w a s involuntari ly 
separated from city service . 
Marshall McCormick, Robert R. H a m i l -
ton and Allan R. l i i l lett , Tacoma, for appel-
lants. 
E . K Murray, E . M. Murray, T a c o m a , 
for respondent. 
O T T , Justice. 
September 8, 1950, Ruth Dodd Mollett 
voluntari ly res igned her employment with 
the city of T a c o m a . She had been a mem-
ber of the T a c o m a retirement system nine 
years, eight months, and eight days, and 
had paid into the retirement fund the sum 
of $1,847.24, wh ich w a s refunded to her 
upon her res ignat ion, as provided by the 
pension ordinance . 
In 1955, Mrs. Mollett made application 
to the city for employment , "In order to es -
tablish [ h e r ] pens ion rights." B e c a u s e of 
problems invo lv ing civil service el igibil ity 
lists, she w as notified in wri t ing that her 
application for employment had been ac-
cepted on a temporary basis and that she 
would be employed by the city for a term 
commencing September 7, 1955, and termi-
nating December 9, 1955. Eatrr , she was 
g iven written not ice of, and she accepted, 
further limited term employment appoint-
ments, as f o l l o w s : from December 12, 
1955, to March 9, 1956; from March 10, 
1956, to September 9, 1956; and from Sep-
tember 10, 1956, to October 31, 1956. 
Mrs. Mollett redeposited in the retire-
ment fund, as authorized by the ordinance, 
the amount of her former wi thdrawal , $1 , -
847.24, and dur ing the four limited term 
337 P.2d 4 
P.2d 48 
employment periods, pension deduct ions 
were made from her salary and deposited 
in the pension fund. 
Subsequent to October 31, 1956, the ter-
mination date of her last l imited term ap-
pointment, Mrs. Mollett was notified that 
she had been granted a normal pension in 
the sum of $40.91 a month, in conformity 
with the voluntary retirement provis ions, 
§§ 13(b) and 1 4 ( a ) , of ordinance N o . 14039, 
as amended. 
Mrs. Mollett instituted this act ion against 
the city of T a c o m a and the pension board 
for an increased pension, contending that 
she w a s inz'oluntarily separated from her 
employment and that she was entitled to a 
minimum pension of $85 a month, as pro-
vided by § 14(c) of ordinance N o . 14039, 
as amended. 
From a judgment sustaining her conten-
tion, the city and the pension board have 
appealed. T h e city will be referred to 
herein as though it were the sole appellant. 
The appeal presents a s ingle query ; W a s 
respondent's retirement accomplished by 
an involuntary separation from city service 
employment ? 
Sect ion 14(c) of ordinance N o . 14039, 
as amended, is in part as f o l l o w s : 
"Any member who entered the Re-
tirement Sys tem on January 1, 1941, 
* * * tvlio shall have been or shall 
be retired by reason of an inz'ohtntary 
permanent separation from city serv-
ice, and * * * has reached the age 
of f ifty-seven (57) years and has to 
his credit at least ten (10) years of 
creditable service , shall receive * * 
not less that $85.00 per month. * * " 
( I ta l ics ours . ) 
Webster ' s International Dict ionary de-
fines "involuntary" as "Not proceeding 
from choice ; done, g iven , etc., unwil l ing-
ly or under compuls ion; * * * ". 
Sect ion 13(b) , as amended, prov ides : 
" 'Any member in the city service 
may retire by filing with the Board a 
wri t ten application stat ing when he de-
s ires to be retired, such application to 
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trial briefing, and involved a significant 
number of difficult and complex legal is-
sues. We therefore conclude that the supe-
rior court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding Northern attorney's fees above 
those called for under the schedule of Rule 
82. 
Affirmed. 
O * no NUMBIR SYSTEM 
STATE of Alaska, Appellant, 
v. 
ALASKA INTERNATIONAL AIR, 
INC., Appellee. 
No. 2808. 
Supreme Court of Alaska. 
April 13, 1977. 
Alaska filed civil complaint requesting 
liquidated damages for oil spills. Following 
State's voluntary dismissal of its action, 
upon motion of defendant, the Superior 
Court, Fourth Judicial District, Gerald J. 
Van Hoormssen, J., granted attorney fees to 
defendant, and State appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Burke, J., held that actions of 
defendant concerning discovery motions 
and its "sparse" motion to dismiss did not 
serve to join issue before court and thus 
plaintiff's voluntary dismissal, prior to .an-
swer or a motion for summary judgment or 
any other pleading or motion requiring con-
sideration of merits, terminated the action 
so that no "prevailing party" could emerge 
to receive an award of attorney fees under 
rule. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Costs <*=~172 
The "prevailing party," within rule au-
thorizing the award of attorney fees to 
prevailing party, is one who is successful on 
the main issue in a case. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 82. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Appeal and Error «=*984(1, 5) 
Costs <*=>172 
The power to award costs and attorney 
fees lies within the discretion of the trial 
courts and will not be interfered with un-
less there is a clear abuse of discretion. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 82. 
3. Costs <*=»172 
Actions of defendant concerning dis-
covery motions and its "sparse" motion to 
dismiss did not serve to join issue before 
court and thus plaintiff's voluntary dismiss-
al, prior to answer or a motion for summary 
judgment or any other pleading or motion 
requiring consideration of merits, terminat-
ed the action so that no "prevailing party" 
could emerge to receive an award of attor-
ney fees under rule. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rules 41(aXl)[a], 77(b)(2), 82(a). 
Jonathan K. Tillinghast, Asst. Alty. Gen., 
Avrum M. Gross, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for 
appellant. 
OPINION 
Before BOOCHEVER, C. J., and RARI-
NOWITZ, CONNOR, ERWIN and BURKE, 
JJ. 
BURKE, Justice. 
This action comes to us on appeal from a 
lower court order awarding attorney's fees 
to appellee, Alaska International Air, after 
appellant, State of Alaska, dismissed its 
case pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), Alaska Rules 
of Civil Procedure. It should be noted that 
appellee filed no brief in response to the 
State's appeal. 
CQH nfcPOTikroflrtplain«ifmflg»8n' p*rHor*^TOH 
foM^iiwiiuuiiiipirirdraiuPE/iiffidtiyHy^ueitf^ g 
STATE v. ALASKA 
Clt«a&, AUslca 
l f i ^aw^ K < M P " t ^ h r ^ w R < r ^ M < i n w n * AIA filed 
neither an answer nor a motion for summa-
ry judgment. The appellant on December 
1, 1975 noticed a voluntary dismissal of its 
action without prejudice under Rule 
41(aXl), Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.* 
Subsequent to that notice, and upon AlA's 
motion, the lower court granted AIA 
$3,500.00 in attorney's fees This appeal 
was taken from that award. 
Contemporaneous with the filing of its 
complaint, appellant served upon AIA an 
initial set of interrogatories, requests for 
admission and requests for production of 
documents. The entire discovery request 
consumed less than five pages, and focused 
on such threshold matters as admissions of 
liability, identity of witnesses and the like. 
For a period of almost six months, AIA 
neither complied with the discovery re-
1. AS 46.03 760 p rov ides in pe r t i nen t pa r t : 
Pollution penalties, (a) A pe r son w h o violates 
§§ 710, 730. 740. or 750 of this c h a p t e r is fcuilty 
of a m i s d e m e a n o r and upon conv ic t ion is pun-
i s h a b l e by a fine of not more t han $25,000. or 
by i m p r i s o n m e n t for not more t h a n one year . 
or by bo th Each unlawful act c o n s t i t u t e s a 
s e p a r a t e offense 
(b) !n add i t ion to the pena t t i es p rov ided »n 
(a) of this sec t ion a person w h o viola tes 
§§ 7 4 0 - 7 5 0 of th i s c h a p t e r is l iable, in a civil 
a c t i o n , to the s t a t e for l iquidated d a m a g e s to be 
a s s e s s e d by the cour t for an a m o u n t not less 
t h a n S5.000 nor m o r e than $100,000. d e p e n d i n g 
on the s e v e n t y of the violation. 
2. Rule 41(a)(1) . A la ska Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e 
p r o v i d e s in pe r t i nen t par t : 
Subjec t to the provis ions of Rule 23(c) . of 
Rule 66 and of a n y s t a tu t e of the s ta te , an 
ac t ion m a y be d ismissed by the plaintiff with-
out o rder of cour t (u) by filing a not ice of 
d i smis sa l at a n y l ime befure se rv ice by the 
a d v e r s e p a r t y of an answer or of a mot ion for 
s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t , wh icheve r first o c c u r s 
. . Un less o the rwi se s t a t e d in the no-
lice of d i smissa l the d i smissa l is 
w i thou t p re jud ice 
3. Rule 26(c). Alaska Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e , 
p r o v i d e s . 
(c) Protective Orders Upon m o t i o n by a 
p a r t y or by t h e person from w h o m discovery 
is s o u g h t , a n d for good c a u s e s h o w n , the 
c o u r t in w h i c h the action ts p e n d i n g or altei -
na t ive ly , on m a t t e r s relat ing to a depos i t i on . 
the cour t in the judicial d i s t r ic t w h e r e the 
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quests nor sought a protective order under 
Civil Rule 2G(c).3 
On May 28, 1975, AIA filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a 
claim on which relief could be granted. 
The motion was supported by a Vh page 
memorandum The memorandum, which 
contained no case authorities, argued, inter 
alia, that the complaint should be dismissed 
because (1) it alleged the discharge of oil, 
when the relevant statute proscribed only 
the discharge of petroleum products; (2) it 
alleged that AIA "allowed" the discharge of 
oil, when ihc statute proscribed only the 
"causing or |>ermitting" of the discharge, 
and (3) in any event, AS 46.03.760(b) "is 
unconstitutional on its face." AIA did not 
identify which constitution, nor which pro-
visions thereof, were being violated by the 
statute. 
On July 1, 1975, appellant, pursuant to 
Rule 37(a). Alaska Rules of Civil 
Procedure,4 filed a motion to compel a re-
depos i t ion is to be t aken m a y m a k e any order 
which jus t i ce requ i res to p ro tec t a par ty or 
pe r son from a n n o y a n c e , e m b a r r a s s m e n t , op-
press ion , or undue burden or e x p e n s e , includ-
ing one or more of the following ( I ) that the 
d i scovery not be had, (2) tha t the d iscovery 
m a y be had only on specified t e r m s and con-
d i t ions , including a des igna t ion of the t ime or 
place; (3) that the d iscovery m a y be had only 
by a m e t h o d of d iscovery o t h e r than that 
se lec ted by the pa r ty seek ing d i scovery . (A) 
t ha t ce r t a in m a t t e r s not be inqu i red into, or 
tha t the scope of the d i scovery be limited to 
cer ta in m a t t e r s . (5) that d i s cove ry be con 
d u c t e d wi th no one present e x c e p t pe r sons 
d e s i g n a t e d by the cour t . (6) tha t a deposi t ion 
after be ing sealed be opened only by order of 
the cour t ; (7) that a t r ade s e c r e t or other 
conf ident ia l r e sea rch , d e v e l o p m e n t , or com 
merc ia l in format ion not be d i sc losed or be 
d isc losed only in a des igna ted w a y . (H) that 
the pa r t i e s s imul taneous ly file specified doc 
u m e n t s or informat ion enc losed in sealed en 
ve lopes to be opened a s d i r ec t ed by the 
cour t 
If the mot ion for a p ro tec t ive order is de-
nied in whole or in par t , the cour t n u > . on 
such t e r m s and condi t ions as a re just , order 
tha t any pa r ty or person p rov ide or permit 
d i scovery The provis ions of Rule 37(a)(-1) 
apply to the a w a r d of e x p e n s e s incurred in 
re la t ion to the mot ion 
4. Rule 37(a) p rovides 
(a) Motion for Outer Compelling Dis 
covery. A par ty , upon r e a s o n a b l e notice to 
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sponse to its yet unanswered discovery re-
quests, and to award appellant expenses in 
bringing the motion. On September 22, 
1975, the lower court granted appellant's 
motion to compel discovery and awarded 
appellant $500.00 in attorney's fees. The 
order, however, required compliance with 
the discovery requests by a date which had 
already passed—August 29, 1975. On or 
about September 25th, the court corrected 
its error and served the amended order 
upon all counsel the same day. The amend-
ed order required compliance by October 10, 
1975. 
The October 10th deadline expired with-
out compliance by AIA. On October 14, 
1975, appellant moved, pursuant to Civil 
Rule 37(b)(2)(C),5 for judgment by default 
other parties and ail persons affected there-
by, may apply for an order compelling dis-
covery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate Court. An application for 
an order to a party may be made to the court 
in which the action is pending, or, on matters 
relating to a deposition, to the court in the 
judicial district where the deposition is being 
taken. An application for an order to a depo-
nent who is not a party shall be made to the 
court in the judicial district where the deposi-
tion is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a 
question propounded or submitted under 
Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity 
fails to make a designation under Rules 
30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer 
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33. or 
if a party, in response to a request for inspec-
tion submitted under Rule 34. fails to re-
spond that inspection will be permitted as 
requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move 
for an order compelling an answer, or a des-
ignation, or an order compelling inspection in 
accordance with the request. When taking a 
deposition on oral examination, the propo-
nent of the question may complete or ad-
journ the examination before he applies for 
an order 
If the court denies the motion in whole or 
in part, it may make such protective order as 
it would have been empowered to make on a 
motion made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or Incomplete Answer. For 
purposes of this subdivision an evasive or 
incomplete answer is to be treated as a fail-
ure to answer. 
(4) Award of Expenses of Motion. If the 
motion is granted, the court shall, after op-
portunity for hearing, require the party or 
deponent whose conduct necessitated the 
for failure to comply with the lower court's 
discovery order. On October 16th, AIA 
served upon appellant documents in re-
sponse to appellant 's May 2, 1975 request 
for production. On October 23rd, AIA re-
sponded to appellant 's May 2nd interrogato-
ries and requests for admissions. 
AIA opposed the motion for entry of 
default judgment on the ground that its 
failure to comply with the court's order 
compelling discovery, and its lack of re-
sponse to appellant's discovery requests, 
were due to excusable neglect. On Novem-
ber 28, 1975, the lower court denied appel-
lant's motion for default judgment. 
On December 1, 1975, appellant filed a 
notice of voluntary dismissal without preju-
dice pursuant to Civil Rule 41(a)(1). The 
motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving 
party the reasonable expenses incurred in 
obtaining the order, including attorney's fees, 
unless the court finds that the opposition to 
the motion was substantially justified or that 
other circumstances make an award of ex-
penses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, 
after opportunity for hearing, require the 
moving party or the attorney advising the 
motion or both of them to pay to the party or 
deponent who opposed the motion the rea-
sonable expenses incurred in opposing the 
motion, including attorney's fees, unless the 
court finds that the making of the motion 
was substantially justified or that other cir-
cumstances make an award of expenses un-
just. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied 
in part, the court may apportion the reasona-
ble expenses incurred in relation to the mo-
tion among the parties and persons in a just 
manner. 
5. Rule 37(b)(2)(C), Alaska Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides in pertinent part: 
If a party fails to obey an order to 
provide or permit discovery, including an or-
der made under subdivision (a) of this rule or 
Rule 35. the court in which the action is 
pending may make such orders in regard to 
the failure as are just, and among others the 
following: 
(C) An order striking out pleadings or 
parts thereof, or staying further proceedings 
until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the 
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or 
rendering a judgment by default against the 
disobedient party 
STATE v. ALASKA 
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case was dismissed because the passage of 
time had made witnesses unavailable. The 
alleged oil spills occurred in connection with 
construction of the Trans-Alaska pipeline, 
and persons involved shared the transient 
nature of most pi|>eline personnel, making 
production of witnesses difficult. 
On December 17, 1975, AIA moved for an 
award of attorney fees, contending that it 
was the prevailing party under Civil Rule 
82(a).* On January 28, 197G, the lower 
court awarded AIA $3,500.00 for all legal 
work allegedly devoted to the case by Mr. 
Cole. The court ruled that, although " the 
case has never really l>een at issue," none-
theless "there is no question that [AIA] is 
the prevailing party." 
[1, 2] In Alaska, the basic structure with 
respect to the awarding of attorney's fees is 
set forth in Civil Rule 82 which provides for 
the awarding of attorney's fees to the pre-
vailing party. ThlP^III^ViltfW^paVby^hftW1 
te»fWH6fiffia*a»KWnH3^ 
theajnajjiiiMUe^untakcase Cooper v. Curl-
son, 511 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Alaska 1973). The 
power to award costs and attorney's fees 
lies within the discretion of the trial courts 
and will not be interfered with unless there 
is a clear abuse of discretion. Adoption of 
V.M.C., 528 P.2d 788, 795 (Alaska 1974). 
Given this framework, the state argues, 
citing R. A. Davcnny & Associates, Inc. v. 
Shinjin Motor Sales Company, Ltd., 533 
P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1975), that the lower 
6. Rule 82(a) A l a s k a Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e , 
p r o v i d e s : 
(a) Allowance to Prevailing Party tis Costs 
(1) Unless t he cou r t , in its d i s c r e t i o n , o th -
e r w i s e d i rec t s , the fo l lowing s c h e d u l e of at-
t o r n e y ' s fees will be a d h e r e d to in fixing s u c h 
fees for t he p a r t y r e c o v e r i n g any m o n e y 
j u d g m e n t t h e r e i n , as p a r t of the c o s t s of t h e 
ac t ion a l lowed by law 
A T T O P N L r S f i l l IN A V I U A G f C A S t S 
t o n l f l l f f l V v H H O u l T t i r f l H o n C o n l f i l f d 
Firit J 2 .000 2b V. ? 0 V . 15 V. 
N f . t 13.0O0 ? 0 V . IS*'- t ? b V. 
Nr»t 1 5 . 0 0 0 15 V. I ? b V . 1 0 % 
Ow#r $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 10 V. 7 b V. b V. 
Should no r e c o v e r y be h a d . a t t o r n e y ' s fees 
for the p reva i l ing pa r ty m a y be fixed by the 
c o u r t as a pa r t of the c o s t s of t h e a c t i o n , in 
its d i sc re t ion , in a r e a s o n a b l e a m o u n t . 
(2) In a c t i o n s w h e r e t h e m o n e y j u d g m e n t 
is not an a c c u r a t e c r i te r ia for d e t e r m i n i n g the 
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court erred in awarding attorney's fees to 
AIA after the state d is missed its case pur-
suant to Civil Rule 41(aXl). The thrust of 
the state 's argument is tha t the mere filing 
of the notice of dismissal under the rule 
terminates the litigation. This court initial-
ly answered such a contention in Miller v. 
Wilkes, 496 P.2d 176 (Alaska 1972). Miller 
involved a suit wherein the plaintiff alleged 
an oral agreement for the sale of an inter-
est in real property. Miller sought and 
obtained a temporary order restraining 
Wilkes from conveying his interest in the 
property. After dissolution of the tempo-
rary order, Miller moved for a preliminary 
injunction. Hearings were scheduled, fre-
quently continued, and never held. Wilkes 
filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
preliminary injunction which raised four de-
fenses, and also an affidavit which denied 
several factual allegations of the plaintiff. 
Subsequently, Miller filed a voluntary dis-
missal of his suit. Wilkes immediately 
moved (or attorney's fees and his motion 
was granted. Miller moved for reconsidera-
tion but an order was entered awarding 
Wilkes $500.00 in attorney's fees. 
This court, while noting that there is 
authority for the proposition that a notice 
of dismissal pursuant to Civil Rule 
41(aXl)[<i] deprives a court of jurisdiction to 
take any further action on a particular mat-
ter,7 held for the broader view that: 
The primary purpose of Ruie 41(a)(1) is 
to 'allow the plaintiff to dismiss as of 
fee to be a l lowed to t he p reva i l ing s ide , (he 
cour t shal l a w a r d a fee c o m m e n s u r a t e with 
the a m o u n t and va lue of legal s e rv i ces ren-
d e r e d 
( 3 ; T h e a l l o w a n c e of a t t o r n e y ' s fees by the 
c o u r t in c o n f o r m a n c e wi th the fo rego ing 
s c h e d u l e is not to be c o n s t r u e d a s fixing the 
fees b e t w e e n a t t o r n e y a n d client 
7. 496 P 2d at 177. n I, c i t ing 5 J Moore . 
Fi-di-ral P r a c t i c e § 4 1 0 2 ( 2 ] . nt 102 1 1022 (2d 
ed 197 1). 9 C. Wr igh t and A Miller. Federa l 
P r a c t i c e a n d P r o c e d u r e § 2366. at 176 177 
( ! 9 7 l ) . Miller v Reddin. 422 F 2d 1264 (9th 
Cir 1970). Hyde Constr. Co v Koehrin^ Co. 
388 F 2d 501 (10th Cir. 1968). American Cyan-
amid Co. v. McGhce. 317 F 2d 295 (5th Cir 
1963). Bryan v. Smith. 174 F 2d 212 (7th O r . 
1949) But see White v. Thompson. 80 F S u p p 
41 1 (N D.III. 1948) 
., ~+* ojc«rvilliv3 
right before issue has been joined. 
Where issue has been joined by means 
other than those specified in Rule 41(aXl) 
that purpose dictates tha t the plaintiffs' 
right to dismiss by notice be nonetheless 
terminated. Not every action by the de-
fendant cuts off the plaintiff's right; 
only those actions which would require 
the court to consider the merits of the 
controversy or which involve considerable 
expense and effort on the part of the 
defendant suffice. 496 P.2d at 177-78. 
(footnotes omitted, emphasis in original) 
In R. A. Davenny & Assoc., Inc. v. Shinjin 
Motor Sales Company, Ltd., 533 P.2d 1112 
(Alaska 1975) we were again called upon to 
decide the applicability of Civil Rule 
41(aXl) as a cut off mechanism to a civil 
action. In Shinjin, the plaintiff, R. A. Da-
venny, instituted an action on October 23, 
1974 against the defendant, Shinjin alleging 
that Shinjin had wrongfully failed to file a 
termination s ta tement pursuant to a securi-
ty agreement.8 On November 12, Wana-
maker and DeVcaux entered an appearance 
as attorneys for Shinjin, and, on this same 
date, the plaintiff agreed to allow the de-
fendant until December 19, 1974 to answer 
the complaint. Thereafter, on November 
18, 1974, Shinjin filed a notice that the 
deposition of R. A. Davenny would be taken 
on December 4, 1974. On December 2, 1974 
Shinjin's counsel declined to stipulate to a 
postponement of Davenny's deposition. 
The following day Davenny filed a notice of 
dismissal pursuant to Civil Rule 41(a)(l)[a]. 
After this notice had been filed, Shinjin, 
later that same afternoon, filed an answer 
to Davenny's complaint. On December 4, 
8. AS 45.05.774(a) of Alaska's Uniform Com-
mercial Code—Secured Transactions provides 
in part: 
If there is no outstanding secured obliga-
tion and no commitment to make advances, 
incur obligations, or otherwise give value, the 
secured party must, on written demand by 
the debtor, send the debtor a statement that 
he no longer claims a security interest under 
the financing statement, which shall be iden-
tified by file number. 
9. In Miller, 496 P 2d 176. 178, this court stated 
in finding the facts sufficient for joinder of the 
Issue that 
Shinjin filed objections to the notice o{ 
missal. The superior court, after a heat 
denied the plaintiff's Civil Rule 41(a)(i 
dismissal. The superior court's decision £ 
predicated on the grounds that the plair{ 
had waived its right to a voluntary disn| 
al under Civil Rule 41(a)(l)[a] by virtu? 
the stipulation which it had entered t 
with the defendant. 
After holding that a stipulation extei 
ing time does not waive a plaintiff's rig 
to dismiss an action pursuant to Civil Rt 
41(aXl)[a], 533 P.2d at 1114, this court fu 
ther refined the Miller v. Wilkes rule [ 
stat ing: 
[t]he dicta in Miller regarding 'actior 
which involve considerable expense an;; 
effort on the part of defendant ' was nq 
essential to support the result in Milled 
and is hereby disapproved. (footnote 
omitted) 
Given these guidelines, the question \i 
whether the issue in this particular litiga-! 
tion was joined.9 In beginning our analysis 
we must look to the actions of appellee to 
ascertain if its efforts rose to the functional 
equivalent of an answer. After review of; 
the record, we can find no action that 
would rise to the Miller-Davenny standard \ 
and serve to join the issue before the court. *, 
AIA's motion to dismiss is so sparse as to : 
prove frivolous. Civil Rule 77(bX2) states: • 
(b) There shall be served and filed with ' 
the motion: \ 
• * • * * * 
(2) A brief, complete written state-
ment ot the reasons in support of the 
motion, which shall include a memoran-
A motion for a preliminary injunction puts 
the merits of the controversy in issue: in 
considering the motion the trial court would 
have to determine the likelihood of success 
The memorandum and affidavit together 
serve as an 'answer' to the motion for a 
preliminary injunction. As such, they are 
tantamount to an 'answer' for purposes of 
Rule 41(a)(1) and should terminate the plain-
tiffs right to dismiss the action by notice. 
The trial court could therefore properly have 
considered the notice as a motion for dis-
missal and was within its powers in award-
ing costs. (footnote omitted) 496 P.2d at 
178. 
STATE v. ALASKA 
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dum of the points and authorities upon 
which the moving party will rely; 
In support of its motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to stale a claim on which relief could be 
granted, AIA filed in support thereof a IV2 
page memorandum. This memorandum 
was devoid of any authorities and merely 
raised three somewhat dubious issues: 
1. The semantic point that the com-
plaint only alleged that appellee "allowed" 
the discharge of oil, when the s tatute pro-
scribed "causing or permitting" of dis-
charge: 
2. The fact that the complaint alleged 
the discharge of "oil," when the statute 
proscribed only the discharge of "petroleum 
products;" and 
3. The unsupported statement that "AS 
46.03.700(b) is unconstitutional on its face." 
[3] With the plaintiff's utilization of the 
cutoff mechanism embodied in Civil Rule 
41(aXl)[a], prior to service of an answer, a 
motion for summary judgment, or any oth-
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cr pleading or motion that would have re-
quired the trial court to consider the merits 
of the controversy, the action was terminat-
ed. R. A. Davenny & Assoc, Inc. v. Shinjin 
Motor Sales Company, Ltd., 533 P.2d 1112, 
1115 (Alaska 1975); Miller v. Wilkes, 49G 
P.2d 176, 177 (Alaska 1972). Without a 
joinder of issue no controversy developed 
out of which a prevailing party could 
emerge. See Cooper v. Carlson, 511 P.2d 
1305, 1308 (Alaska 1973). The lack of a 
prevailing party therefore precludes an 
award of attorney's fees under Civil Rule 
82(a). Consequently, we hold that the low-
er court erred in awarding AIA attorney's 
fees. We reverse the judgment l>elow and 
remand for entry of zero attorney's fees 
REVERSED and REMANDED 
When recorded return to: 
Verden E. Bettilyon 
Woodbury Bettilyon and Kesler 
2677 East Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
AMENDED NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
The undersigned, ASSOCIATED TITLE CO., Tiustee, hereby gives Notice 
of Default and of" the exorcise of its election to declare all sums secured 
by the Trust Deed hereinafter described to be immediately due and payable. 
This notice relates to a Trust Deed executed by, DANIEL S. MEHR & 
KATHRYN C. MEHR, DANIEL S. MEHR II K DEBORAH L. MEHR as Trustor, ASSOCIATED 
TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE CORP., as 
Beneficiary, dated January 28, 1983, recorded February 2, 1983, in Bock 325 
at Page 133, as Document No. 199115 of the records of the Uintah, County 
Recorder, covering the following described property to-wit: 
PARCEL I 
Beginning 65 rods East and 317 feet North of the South quarter corner of 
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence East 125 feet; thence South 70 feet; thence West 125 
feet; thence North 70 feet to the place of beginning, and being within the 
unplatted part of Vernal City, Uintah County, Utah. 
Beginning 65 rods East and 220 feet North of the South quarter comer cf 
Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence North 27 feet; thence East 125 feet; thence North 70 
feet thence East 117.2 feet, more or less, to the East line of the 
Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter section of said section; thence 
South 152 feet; thence West 125 feet, more or less, to the East property 
line of Robert Lowell Robbins and Ardith II. Robbins as acquired by Warranty 
Deed, recorded November 11, 1971, as Entry No. 127337, in Book 172, at Page 
112 of official records, thence North 55 feet; thence West 105 feet to the 
place of beginning, and being within the unplatted part of Vernal City, 
Uintah County, Utah. 
Parcel 2 
"Beginning 23 rods North of the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter of 
the Southeast, quarter, Section 23, Township 4 South, Range 21 East. Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 242.13 feet; thence South 3 
rods 13 feet; thence East 242.13 feet more or less to the 1/16th line; 
thence North 3 rods 13 feet to the place of beginning. 
ALSO: Lots 21, 22 and 23 of the proposed CENTRAL PART, PLAT "A", a 
subdivision located in Section 26 Township 4 South, Range 21 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, in Uintah County, Utah. 
415 
This Trust Deed was assigned to OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS 
BANK .formerly known as NEBRASKA SAVING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, F.A. 
A breach of an obligation for which the trust property was conveyed as 
security, has occurred consisting of the following: Payments for 
January through July, 1905, for a total delinquency of $83,128.24, are due 
and payable. Said breach can be cured by payment of said sum, plus 
additional payments and interest that may accrue hereafter. 
In the event of your -failure to cure said breach within ninety days 
after the recording of tin's Notice of Default, the Beneficiary shall and 
Joes hereby elect to exeiciso its option to declare all sums secured by the-
Trust Deed above described to be immediately due and payable without 
further notice to you. At the end o1 said ninety day period the Trustee 
elects to sell or cause to he sold such property to satisfy the obligation 
due under the note. 
You are further advised of your right to bring a court action to 
assert the non-existence of a default or any otlier defense you may have to 
the acceleration and sale of the property. 
By reason of such default, OCCIDENTAL/NEBRASKA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK 
formerly known as NEBRASKA SAVING and LOAN ASSOCIATION', F.A., the present 
beneficiary under said Trust Deed, has executed and delivered to Trustee a 
written Declaration of Default and demand for sale and has deposited with 
said Trustee such Trust Deed and all documents evidencing obligations 
secured thereby, and has declared and does hereby declare all sums secured 
thereby immediately due and payable, ano has elected arc does hereby elect 
to cause the trust properties to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured 
thereby. 
bATED this 6th day of September, 1985, 
Verden E. Bettilyon 
Attorney for Trustee 
ss. 
,v S 
STATE OF Utah ) 
COUNTY OF Salt Lake ) 
'.','Divthe 6th day of September, 1985, personal ly appeared before me, 
/\\y^r4xr}) E.; Be t t i l yon , Attorney at Law, the signer of the foregoing 
•./ • ' ' ' ih 'Hrui i^nt, who duly acknowledge to me that he executed the same. 
'S \ ' 'My>'pQmpii ^ sion Expi res : 5-18-89 
V \ 'Residing'* t\i Boun t i f u l , Utah Notary Public ~xr 
n. i i l* 
